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This PhD dissertation studies the e⁄ects of some types of asymmetries in the context
of international markets. It pursues two main targets: the ￿rst one is to implement an
e¢ ciency analysis of di⁄erent degrees of production factors integration; the second one is
to shed further light on the determinants of Pricing-to-Market in order to close the gap
on the Purchasing Power Parity.
The ￿rst part of the work aims at evaluating whether a full integration of countries or
regions is always welfare-improving or not. In case it is not, it tries to establish in which
cases and to which extent the mobility of production factors should be constrained in order
to yield welfare-improvements. Finally, it turns to the point of view of individual markets,
by looking at which one gains and which one loses after integration with other markets.
Thus, a static general equilibrium framework is provided. It features (many) heteroge-
neous monopolistic ￿rms, that are aggregated according to a nested CES function. Two
di⁄erent theoretical scenarios are developed: in the ￿rst one, all the production factors
in the model (i.e. capital and labour) are assumed to be free mobile across markets; in
the second one, one of the inputs, namely labour, is restricted at the individual market
level. It turns out that, as long as cross-market demand elasticities are homogeneous,
the integrated economy always produces an e¢ cient outcome. However, if markups di⁄er
across markets, then full integration yields an ine¢ cient level of production due to misal-
location of production factors. In this case, a welfare-superior result can be reached for
some exogenous restrictions of labour mobility.
The second part of the thesis addresses the Purchasing Power Parity puzzle by focus-
ing on the determinants of Pricing-to-Market. Thus, in order to understand the reasons
why ￿rms price their goods di⁄erently across national borders, the model by Atkeson
and Burstein (American Economic Review, 2008) is directly extended in two di⁄erent
ways. More speci￿cally, the original framework explains Pricing-to-Market through both
imperfect competition with variable markups and international trade costs. However, it
is not able to completely match the actual extent of Pricing-to-Market reported in some
countries and, particularly, in the United States; therefore, the main goal is to improve
that result. The ￿rst extension developed consists in adding ￿xed costs of production
and heterogeneity in country level demand preferences to the reference setting. Evidence
of cross-country asymmetry in total household expenditure shares on di⁄erent goods is
provided such as of home bias. The second extension, instead, consists in including het-
erogeneity in international trade costs. Even in this case, evidence of asymmetry in costs
to export is shown. According to numerical results, both the extensions are able to im-
prove the reference work: the extent of Pricing-to-Market predicted is closer to the actual
value; furthermore, both the ratio of exports to gross output in manufacturing sectors and
the share of manufacturing plants that export in the US market are matched.
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41 Introduction
My thesis wants to give a contribute to a better understanding of the role of some asym-
metries in international markets. In particular, I focus on two types of asymmetries: in
market competition toughness and in demand preferences. In the ￿rst case, I evaluate
the e⁄ect of heterogeneity in demand elasticities on allocation of production factors across
regional/national markets. In the second case, instead, I consider the impact of hetero-
geneity in country-level demand preferences on international prices.
So, the ￿rst part of the work develops a study about economic e¢ ciency of production
factors mobility across both symmetric and asymmetric markets. The major target is
to evaluate whether a full integration of countries or regions (such as industrial sectors)
is always Pareto-e¢ cient or not. In case it is not, I try to establish in which cases and
to which extent the mobility of inputs should be constrained in order to yield Pareto-
improvements. Finally, I also consider the point of view of individual markets, by looking
at which one gains and which one loses after integration with other markets.
In more practical terms, my research pursues the object to assess e¢ cient degrees
of labour force integration across national markets, according to the starting population
distribution and the degree of asymmetry in market competition level. Furthermore, it
focuses on the impact of competition regulation on wages and ￿nancial ￿ ows in both the
regional and international context. Thus, on the one hand, this would allow to shed further
light on how e⁄ective current agreements on production factors mobility are, especially
within the European Union. On the other hand, it would also make possible to contribute
to the debate about the economic opportunity of integrating further countries with the
current EU members. In fact, one of the key targets at the origin of the European Union
is to generate and promote a Single Market and, of course, full integration of input fac-
tors, namely capital and labour, is crucial to achieve that goal. However, I argue that,
once markets get integrated, free trade of production factors might raise problems as a
consequence of asymmetry in markets competitiveness across the countries involved in the
agreement. Speci￿cally, as long as markets are asymmetric, once full integration of inputs
is allowed for, then an excess of both capital and labour ￿ ows could be expected to the
relatively more competitive markets, so leading to welfare losses. Intuitively, this would
happen because markets with relatively larger demand elasticities, ceteris paribus, will
turn out to have lower prices of goods and, consequently, larger real wages. Then, (too)
many workers will have incentives to leave the markets where ￿rms have larger monopoly
power. In addition, an excess of workers moving to one side of the single market could
also be associated to an excess of capital moving to the same direction: this is because
capital and labour are normally thought of as having some degree of complementarity with
each other in the production process. Thus, the ￿nal outcome expected is that there are
5some parts of the integrated market ine¢ ciently producing "too much" and other parts
ine¢ ciently producing "too little".
In order to show how plausible and realistic the allocation e¢ ciency problem can be
within the European context, it might be worth to look at the extent of market entry bar-
riers related to both current EU member states and some of the EU candidates (Turkey
and Iceland). This is because those barriers might proxy the degree of internal market
competitiveness. In fact, as argued in Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001), the
level of market competition can depend on the level of entry barriers that prevent new
competitors from entering the market and competing with the incumbents. In turn, such
barriers might depend on institutional and political factors. So, according to OECD data,
in terms of product market regulations, among the EU-15 countries, there is a big gap be-
tween Greece, that reports the largest entry barriers (i.e. entrepreneurship barriers, trade
and investment barriers and state control barriers), and Ireland and the UK, that report
the lowest entry barriers. Moreover, the members that joined the Union in 2004 seem
to have larger barriers than the original ￿fteen members; more speci￿cally, the countries
with the largest barriers are Poland and Czech Republic. Among the candidate members,
Turkey￿ s barriers exceed the EU-15 ones and can be generally placed in within the top
values across the whole Union; Iceland, instead, has got very low barriers. Furthermore,
some literature about migration ￿ ows across the European Union after the 2004 enlarge-
ment (see, for instance, Zaiceva and Zimmermann [2008] and Kaczmarczyk and M. Ok￿lski
[2008]) recorded the largest increase in migration out￿ ows from those countries that report
the largest entry barriers to those countries that report the lowest market barriers.
Thus, on the one hand, my research work focuses on an aspect of integration of national
markets that has not been considered so far, namely possible misallocation problems. On
the other hand, it suggests, as a remedy to such a problem, a solution that has been ignored
by the previous literature about allocation e¢ ciency. So far, problems related to interna-
tional factors mobility, particularly within the European Union, have been mostly related
to labour markets. Boeri and Br￿cker (2001) argued that large income and wage asym-
metries between the current member states and the candidates had raised many concerns
about labour markets and income distribution. More speci￿cally, those concerns regarded
living standard of low-skilled workers, that were threatened by an increase of both the
in￿ ow of low-cost workers and the out￿ ow of plants from the West to the East. Moreover,
issues about economic integration have been also raised within the economic geography
literature. In more detail, it has been shown that the common European market has
enhanced processes of concentration of economic activities and specialization of economic
areas and, so doing, has increased the risk of asymmetric shocks. For example, Amiti
(1998) found an increase in the geographical concentration of production within European
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ated within the European Union as a whole. She explained such a result by Krugman￿ s
argument: increasing returns-to-scale are more likely to be geographically concentrated
within large demand areas and to employ a large proportion of intermediate inputs. Thus,
she expected the monetary union to enhance such a geographical concentration and, con-
sequently, the probability of asymmetric shocks. Ottaviano and Purga (1998) stated that,
on the one hand, integration of national markets within the European Union was making
central regions stronger and stronger because they were able to attract the most modern
production sectors; on the other hand, this was weakening the peripheral areas as they
could not keep traditional and less productive industries. Finally, Midelfart, Overman and
Venables (2003) gave some empirical evidence about clustering and specialization within
the EU area: labour intensive industries seem to be more concentrated in the South of
the EU, while service sector is more concentrated in the central regions. In more detail,
some countries, such as Greece, Portugal and Finland, have manufacturing production
structures that are very di⁄erent from the other countries. They pointed out that trade
integration is an incentive to cluster in order to exploit comparative advantages. This is
because it lowers producers￿need of producing next to consumers. The expected conse-
quence of production specialization is to make EU members more vulnerable to asymmetric
shocks. Furthermore, market forces seem to move economic activity from the periphery
to the central regions and this cannot be o⁄set by factor price di⁄erences anymore.
In addition, integration of European markets has also raised issues concerning ￿scal
competition. For instance, Cremer and Pestieau (1996) focused on a possible problem
coming from the construction of the European Union: income disparities between member
states is less economically acceptable than disparities between non-member countries. This
makes the need of redistribution higher. However, enhancing free trade of goods and
integration of production inputs makes taxation harder. Therefore, it results to be crucial
to decrease income asymmetries across member countries. Bolton and Gerard (1997) also
implemented an economic analysis that had some implications for the European Union.
They showed a trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency gains from uni￿cation and costs derived from
losing political control within a uni￿ed context. So, in order to minimize the costs of
integration, it results to be very important to make preferences over ￿scal policies more
homogeneous. The EU can be helpful in that direction by reducing both per capita income
and income distribution di⁄erences across countries, through structural funds for regional
development, and by increasing labour mobility. Kessler, Lulfesman and Myers (2002) set
up a two-country model with two input factors: labour and capital. They assumed that
the social protection in each country is funded by a source based tax that is democratically
chosen by inhabitants. They proved that integration of only one of the two production
resources lowers countries￿redistributive ability because of tax competition. However, as
7long as the two countries have similar economic and political conditions, ￿scal competition
results to be reduced if both the input factors are integrated. Finally, Kessler, Lulfesmann
and Myers (2003) showed that if countries are symmetric according to their per-capita
endowment but asymmetric according to the capital endowment of the majority of voters,
world output might be reduced by integration. However, in the opposite case, that is
countries di⁄er by per-capita endowment but are similar by capital endowment of the
decisive majority, integration is socially preferred to autarky.
Furthermore, with respect to important recent works about misallocation problems
due to markup heterogeneity, such as Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2008) and Epifani and
Gancia (2011), on the one hand, I consider two production factors (i.e. capital and labour)
rather than one (i.e. labour). This is to investigate the e⁄ects of market integration not
only on wages but also on ￿nancial ￿ ows; in addition, it makes the model more empirically
testable. Of course, employing two input factors leads to possibly more complicated cases
of distortion since the two inputs must interact in the production process and, at the same
time, the respective markets they come from can crucially di⁄er in terms of degree of
mobility allowed. On the other hand, a di⁄erent solution to market ine¢ ciency is proposed,
that does not imply lump-sum transfers as in the ￿rst reference nor subsidies to production
as in the second one. More speci￿cally, I propose and quantify an exogenous allocation
of labour force that can correct misallocation problems due to markup asymmetry. My
solution might be thought of as more feasible, especially in an international context, where
￿scal policy instruments are generally hard to be implemented because of di¢ culties in
coordinating them across national borders.
Turning to some details about the theoretical setting I build up, this is a static gen-
eral equilibrium model featuring a nested CES production function (see Bhaskar [2002]):
there are complementarities across sectors, each of which comprise (many) heterogenous
monopolistically competitive ￿rms. The model is solved analytically and a closed form
solution is provided. Sectors are allowed to vary by demand elasticity. This is to capture
the heterogeneity in the toughness of price competition across markets. Indeed many fac-
tors, some potentially related to each other, can determine that asymmetry: horizontal
product di⁄erentiation across ￿rms (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), the number of competitors
(Dunne, Klimek, Roberts, Xu, 2009), preference for variety (Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz,
2008; Epifani and Gancia, 2011), producers￿clusters, geographic segmentation and trans-
port costs (Syverson, 2004), institutional factors, such as entry barriers, price controls,
operational restrictions, public sector size (Hopenhayn, 1992; Aghion, Harris, Howitt and
Vickers, 2001; Ryan, 2006). Even though the latter is just a short list, it shows that de-
mand elasticity might well summarize several features concerning the economic structure,
at least from the static point of view. Moreover, I set up two di⁄erent framework: in the
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settings); in the second one, labour is restricted at the industry level. The two settings￿
equilibria turn out to be crucially di⁄erent in terms of aggregate production, intermediate
inputs costs and factors allocation. In particular, in the second setting wages di⁄er across
industries, whilst in the fully integrated economy equilibrium wage is unique such as the
rental in both the settings.
My framework is analytically consistent with Epifani and Gancia (2011). The latter is
a static model featuring a continuum of industries, that are heterogeneous by productivity
and are aggregated according to a standard CES function. Within each industry there
are di⁄erentiated varieties; in this case, the perceived elasticities at the industry level
depends on the number of varieties (that can be heterogeneous across industries) and/or
the elasticity substitution in consumption across varieties. Indeed, there are some relevant
di⁄erences between that theoretical setting and mine. First, according to their model, the
number of ￿rms within each sector is low, so that the decision of each ￿rm a⁄ects the
others and then markups result to be endogenous; according to my model, instead, the
number of di⁄erentiated competitors in each industry is assumed to be very large, so that
markups are exogenous. Second, in the reference setting, ￿rms competing in the same
industrial sector are homogeneous in terms of productivity; in my framework, ￿rms are
allowed to be heterogeneous by productivity, so that they will charge di⁄erent prices,
produce di⁄erent quantities and they will not share the same amount of input factors.
Third, they model the preference for variety by a proper parameter, that can also be
heterogeneous across industries; in my setting, that parameter is assumed to be always
equal to one, so that the model results to be neutral with respect to preference for variety.
Fourth, one further crucial di⁄erence between the two models is in the industry entry
mechanism. Epifani and Gancia distinguish between two separate frameworks: in the ￿rst
one, there is restricted entry and sunk ￿xed costs are assumed to be zero, so that ￿rms can
make positive pro￿ts; in the second one, there is free entry and sunk ￿xed costs are larger
than zero, so that competitors will keep entering the industry until pro￿ts are turned to
zero. My framework, instead, relies on the restricted entry assumption: the number of
￿rms within each industry is given; sunk ￿xed costs are assumed to be zero and ￿rms￿
pro￿ts can be positive.
In terms of results, the crucial outcome of my model concerns the di⁄erence in produc-
tion factors allocation between the labour restricted economy and the integrated economy.
According to the Social Planner, inputs allocation only depends on the relative productiv-
ity of the agents (￿rms) working in the economy. Both the competitive settings I model
can actually catch the Social Planner allocation if demand elasticities across all the sectors
are homogeneous. However, they both yield an ine¢ cient solution in case of cross-industry
markup asymmetry. On the one hand, in the integrated setting, industry level allocation
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ity of the industry. Speci￿cally, the larger the relative productivity and / or the larger
the demand elasticity, the larger the amount of both capital and labour allocated in that
industry. On the other hand, in the labour restricted economy, the labour allocation in
each industry is given while the capital allocation results to be not only a function of the
industry relative productivity and the industry speci￿c demand elasticity, but also of the
stock of labour exogenously allocated. Therefore, the major result is that the allocation
distortion due to markup asymmetry across industry can be (partially) corrected by an
exogenous allocation of labour force. Intuitively, by exogenously managing the distrib-
ution of labour force across markets, I can withdraw (part) of the ine¢ ciently excessive
amount of labour allocated in the relative more competitive market and move that into
the relatively less competitive market. Nevertheless, the solution coming from a labour
restricted market is not a ￿rst best solution. The reason is that I constrain only one of the
two input factors: capital keeps being free mobile even in a (partially) restricted context
and, then, is distorted as well as in the integrated setting. In particular, the lower the
output elasticity of capital, i.e. the lower the contribute of capital to production, the more
e⁄ective labour restriction will be in the direction of a ￿rst best allocation of input factors.
In order to illustrate the di⁄erences between the two analytical frameworks I set up, I
also exploit some comparative statics exercises. The target is to graphically compare the
outcomes, in terms of both aggregate and individual country level income and in terms
of remuneration of production factors, of a two-country economy in a labour constrained
market and in an integrated one. In more detail, I take into account two di⁄erent scenarios:
in the ￿rst one, the two countries have the same degree of internal competition toughness;
in the second one, one country is more competitive than the other. In aggregate terms,
I show that, in the ￿rst scenario, a completely integrated economy yields a ￿rst best
result, while the segmented economy produces as much as the one without migration
constraints if the population distribution matches the labour force distribution according
to the integrated market. In the second scenario, instead, the integrated economy can not
yield an optimal result because of ine¢ cient allocation of production factors. In case of
exogenous restrictions to labour mobility, the economy can improve its welfare even though
the result will be always suboptimal, as long as the other input factor, that is capital, is
kept free to move across national borders. At the individual country level, it results
that, assuming the capital ownership equally distributed across the two countries, the
country with a population that is larger than the labour force allocated in the integrated
economy is always better o⁄. Nevertheless, if the population size is lower than the labour
force allocated after integration, then the country can be either better or worse o⁄. In
particular, it is worse o⁄ if the original population size is very small.
Obst￿ ed and Rogo⁄(2000), addressing the persistence of real exchange rate deviations
10for a range of countries, de￿ned that as one the six major puzzles in international eco-
nomics: the Purchasing Power Parity puzzle. In fact, according to the Purchasing Power
Parity theory, the real exchange rate is equal to one or, alternatively, tends to turn back
to the unity when the long-run ratio changes for some reasons (a weaker version is the
relative PPP, according to which changes in national price levels are always equal or have
the tendency to be equal in the log-run.) So, the second part of my thesis focuses on one
of the major reasons that the literature has given so far to such a puzzle, that is pricing-to-
market. Krugman (1986), for example, observed that movements of US import prices are
not perfectly correlated with movements of exchange rates: this is to make some evidence
of pricing-to-market by foreign sellers to the American market. From the theoretical point
of view, Krugman concludes that the understanding of pricing-to-market mostly rely on
dynamic models of imperfect competition.
Thus, I try to explain what leads ￿rms to pricing-to-market in international markets
and, so doing, I want to give a contribute to the PPP puzzle literature. Within this
scope, I exploit the model set up by A. Atkeson and A. Burstein (American Economic
Review, 2008) and I extend that in di⁄erent ways. In particular, the original framework
studied the large and systematic deviations from the relative PPP. The main object was
to theoretically address two empirical facts concerning the US economy: ￿rst, the terms
of trade of manufacturing goods, de￿ned as a country￿s ratio of export and import prices
relative to its partners of trade, are much less volatile than the Producer Price Index-
based real exchange rate for the same type of goods; second, movements in Consumer
Price Index-based real exchange rates for manufacturing goods are almost as volatile as
movements in Producer Price Index-based real exchange rates for manufactures. The
authors explained both the issues by the pricing-to-market argument, that is the choice
of individual producers to change the relative price of her output abroad and at home
as a response to aggregate international shocks. In more detail, their model relies on
two main characteristics: imperfect competition with variable markups and international
trade costs (both ￿xed and "iceberg" type marginal costs.) Thus, ￿rms did not result
to completely pass through variations in marginal costs to prices due to the fact that
markups depended on the market share. However, imperfect competition with variable
markups is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition in order to have pricing-to-market: in
fact, without any trade costs, ￿rms have to face the same competitors both abroad and
at home, so that they will have the same markups and charge the same prices in both the
markets. Thus, their model results to be able to match many relevant characteristics of
international trade and market structure and, particularly, to reproduce actual deviations
from the relative purchasing power parity in the US.
The ￿rst extension I introduce into the reference model consists in cross-country de-
mand preference heterogeneity and home-bias e⁄ect. The intuition is the di⁄erent pricing
11of the same goods across international markets might be due to the fact that consumers
from di⁄erent areas of the world have di⁄erent tastes that can a⁄ect international trade in
terms of both quantities and prices. Such di⁄erent tastes can be due to several factors, of
cultural or environmental type. For example, selling Italian co⁄ee in India can be not as
easy as in Italy simply because Italian consumers like Italian co⁄ee more than Indian con-
sumers do; selling Chinese noodles in Italy can be a hard business as consumers normally
prefer Italian pasta over there. Furthermore, the geographical environment can also mat-
ter. In particular, climatic characteristics of markets could a⁄ect expenditure preferences.
For instance, selling umbrellas in desertic areas might be something really di¢ cult to do
with respect to, say, Scotland, such as selling air conditioners in North Africa countries can
be much easier than selling them in Arctic areas. As a consequence, even in a more and
more integrated international market, the country level total expenditure of households
can be distributed in a very di⁄erent manner over the same panel of goods. So, tastes
might determine the size of the market for a particular good; in turn, this could a⁄ect the
degree of competition between the producers of that good and, consequently, the market
power (and pricing) of each of them. Moreover, the e⁄ect of preference heterogeneity on
international trade may become even more plausible in the form of home bias by taking
also into account economies of scale. More speci￿cally, national economies tend to pro-
duce more those goods that domestic consumers like more than others in order to exploit
increasing returns to scale. The latter imply cost advantages by businesses of larger sizes,
due to ￿xed costs of production.
At the aim of proxying country level demand preferences, I choose Consumer Price
Index weights provided by the OECD database, that represent the shares of household
￿nal consumption on the same panel of products classi￿ed according to the four-digit
C.O.I.C.O.P. (i.e. Classi￿cation of Individual Consumption According to Purpose). So, I
pick up CPI weights data for the US and for ￿ve of the top US international trading part-
ners (Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico and the UK). Then, for each country, I aggregate
the weights according to seven broad categories: Food, Housing, Apparel, Transport and
Communication, Medical Care, Education and Recreation, Other Goods. By comparing
the aggregate weights associated to the broad categories in each country, it turns out that
the US have a relatively larger share of total household expenditure spent for Housing
and Medical Care and a lower share spent in Food and Education and Recreation. Fur-
thermore, turning to the US trading partners, Mexico and, in a second position, Japan
turn out to be among the farthest ones from the US in terms of expenditure shares on
Food and Housing, that represent more than half of the total expenditure for most of the
countries. Overall, the most homogenous country with the US in terms of total house-
hold expenditure shares seems to be Canada; among the European countries, instead,
Germany seems to be relatively closer with respect to the UK. Moreover, cross-category
12heterogeneity in preferences also varies across countries. In fact, there are countries, such
as the US and Canada, where preferences seem to be more concentrated in some categories
(namely, Housing and Transport and Communication) with respect to the others. On the
other side, in the UK, preferences result to be more evenly distributed across expenditure
items. Furthermore, I also provide evidence of the presence of home bias both in the US
and in some of the US trading partners, such as the UK. In more detail, I collect data
from the OECD database about consumption, production and number of enterprises at
the two-digit industry level. In the US, in middle 2000s, consumption and production
patterns across di⁄erent industries result to be very similar: the larger the consumption
of the product of a given industry, the larger the production of that industry. In addition,
the number of enterprises in a given industry seems also to be positively correlated to the
total production/consumption of that industry speci￿c good. Thus, the larger the share
of total household expenditure on the product of given industry, the larger the production
of that product and the larger the amount of ￿rms that enter that industry. For the UK,
in the same period, the positive correlation between consumers￿preferences, production
and the number of active enterprises across industrial sectors is even more evident.
Thus, I ￿rst test a simple extension to the reference work, by only adding heterogeneity
in demand preferences. The aim is to understand whether introducing such an asymmetry
can improve the ability of the original framework in showing that CPI-based real exchange
rates are as volatile as PPI-based real exchange rates. In fact, if actual data say that
relative consumer prices move one-by-one with relative producer prices, the model I am
referring to is able to address only slightly more than 80 percent of that relationship.
Another important target I pursue is to reproduce the actual data in the US on the overall
volume of trade, the percentage of exporters and the level of industry concentration at the
sector level. Thus, the ￿rst economic value concerning the US economy that I consider
is the average of exports relative to gross output in manufacturing sectors in the period
1997-2003 (16.5 percent). The second value targeted is the share of US manufacturing
plants that export in the period 1987-1992, that is 25 percent. Finally, the third economic
value that I try to match in my numerical exercises is the median Her￿ndahl index across
sectors equal to 1,500. In order to make my results directly comparable to those in
Atkeson and Burstein (2008), all the common parameters are set at the same values
as in the original work. So, the only di⁄erence with the latter is the heterogeneity in
preferences. Preferences are built up in a way such as to represent the actual distribution
of CPI weights across di⁄erent commodities according to the OECD data. In more detail,
country 1 preferences are always proxied with US CPI weights in 2000, while country
2 preferences are proxied with CPI weights of some of the US major trading partners:
Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico and the UK. Considering di⁄erent countries allows to
compare the e⁄ect of di⁄erent degrees of cross-country heterogeneity in preferences on
13the prediction of pricing-to-market. In addition, it makes possible to consider di⁄erent
degrees of cross-category heterogeneity in demand preferences, as the countries selected
also report di⁄erent distributions of weights across the expenditure items. Next, I test
one further and more complicated extension to the original framework, that considers
both heterogeneity in demand preferences and ￿xed costs of production, so as to capture
the home-bias e⁄ect: countries should specialize in the production of those goods that
domestic consumers prefer to others: this is to exploit increasing returns to scale.
It results that the ￿rst simple extension consisting in adding heterogeneity in prefer-
ences across sectors and countries does not yield any improvement in the ability of the
model to predict the reaction of CPI-based real exchange rate to aggregate shocks relative
to the reaction of PPI-based real exchange rate. However, cross-sector asymmetry in de-
mand preferences turn out to (slightly) a⁄ect both extensive and intensive margins. This
is because exporting to countries where preferences are more concentrated in some sectors
is more di¢ cult than exporting to those countries where preferences are more equally dis-
tributed across di⁄erent good. One the one hand, if consumption is more concentrated
in some sectors, then the other ones will be so small that exporters will have to struggle
to sell any good to them. On the other hand, sectors associated to very large prefer-
ences are not able to o⁄set the previous e⁄ect by allowing a relatively larger number of
exporters to access the market. The more complicated extension, instead, that introduces
both preference heterogeneity and ￿xed costs of production into the original model, yields
an improvement in terms of the target variable. Most of the result seems to be led by
the introduction of ￿xed costs of production while, as in the previous case, adding pref-
erence heterogeneity across countries did not yield any bene￿t in terms of prediction of
pricing-to-market.
Next, I focus on the role of trade costs and, particularly, of the cross-country hetero-
geneity in those costs in explaining the extent of pricing-to-market. In fact, even though
a part of those costs (mainly related to physical distance) could be thought of as not
strongly depending on the direction of the shipping, there is another part that may vary
according to the direction, as country speci￿c. Thus, shipping a pair of shoes from Europe
to the US might lead to a di⁄erent trade cost with respect to shipping that pair of shoes
from the US to Europe. This is because US exporters to Europe might have to deal with
costs related to, for example, wholesale and retail costs, marketing, advertising costs and
local transport, that are di⁄erent in extent from the costs that European exporters have to
face when they ship their goods into the US market. In the literature, an important work
about international trade costs is Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). They estimated the
tax equivalent of "representative" trade costs (for industrialized countries) to be equal to
around 170 percent. Those costs included transportation costs (of both freight and time
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ferent currency, information and security costs) and retail and wholesale distribution costs.
Crucially, they reported the fact that some of them can vary across di⁄erent goods and dif-
ferent countries. In turn, I expect this heterogeneity might generate asymmetries in terms
of international trade volumes and prices. In particular, if these costs a⁄ect the degree of
competition within the national economies by imposing entry barriers to exporters, then
the heterogeneity in those costs could also imply di⁄erent pricing across countries. Thus,
ceteris paribus, countries that impose lower trade costs to foreign competitors should have
more competition within the domestic market and, then, lower prices. On the other side,
countries that impose larger barriers to competitors coming from abroad, might have less
competition in the market and then larger prices. Consequently, even at the ￿rm level, it
might result that the price charged in the domestic market di⁄er from the price charged
abroad as a consequence of a di⁄erent degree of competition in the two markets due to
trade costs heterogeneity.
Pursuing the object of giving some evidence of trade costs asymmetry, I collect some
data from the World Bank database about two variables. The ￿rst variable I consider
is the cost to export, that include the fees to completing the procedure to export to
a particular country, such as documents, administrative fees for customs clearance and
technical control, terminal handling charges, customs broker fees and inland transport.
The second variable I take into account is the lead time to export, that is recorded in
calendar days. On the one hand, costs to export to the US turn out to be lower than costs
to export to Canada, Mexico, Japan, France and Italy that, together, represent almost 50
percent of total US international trade volume. On the other hand, in terms of lead time,
exporting to the US takes less than half of the time needed to exporting procedures to
Canada, Japan and France and less than one third of the time required to complete the
procedure of exporting in Mexico and Italy (the gap becomes even larger when the US are
compared to China).
Therefore, in order to verify the e⁄ectiveness of this idea, I develop one further ex-
tension to Atkeson and Burstein (2008), introducing heterogeneous international trade
costs. In particular, I introduce asymmetry in "iceberg" type marginal costs. Even in this
case, all the parameters that are in common with the original framework are set at the
same values. Iceberg costs are set so as to match actual data according to which, as said
before, exporting to the US implies lower costs than exporting to most of the US most
important international trading partners. Thus, in terms of results, it comes out that
introducing asymmetry in iceberg costs can improve the ability of the reference model to
predict the actual extent of pricing-to-market. Asymmetry in trade costs implies, ceteris
paribus, a di⁄erent number of competitors across the two countries. Assuming that the
number of domestic competitors is the same, more exporters will enter the country that is
15associated to relatively lower trade costs (the US.) Then, this is going to a⁄ect the market
shares that each competitor (both domestic and foreign) can hold in the two markets: a
relatively larger number of competitors in the economy yields lower market shares and,
consequently, lower market powers. Therefore, such a heterogeneity in trade costs can
enhance the di⁄erence in market share that each exporter has in the respective domestic
and foreign market and, then, the extent of pricing-to-market. It is worth to remind that
the reference work proved that pricing-to-market occurs if the elasticity of markup varies
with ￿rm￿ s market share and market shares at home and abroad are di⁄erent, and (or) if
market shares at home and abroad react to shocks to aggregate costs in a di⁄erent way.
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2.1 Economic integration: is it always e¢ cient ?
The ￿rst part of my research is an e¢ ciency analysis of markets integration. In particular,
I theoretically study the opportunity to integrate markets that can be asymmetric in terms
of productivity, size and demand elasticities. By markets here, I mean both spatially de-
￿ned markets, such as regions or countries, and good speci￿c markets, such as industries.
Moreover, by integration, I mean dropping barriers to production factors, namely capi-
tal and labour. Thus, I compare a fully integrated economy with a partially integrated
economy: in the ￿rst one, both the input factors assumed, i.e. capital and labour, are
assumed to be free mobile across all the markets in the economy; in the second one, one
input factor is allowed to cross markets￿borders, while the other one is constrained at the
level of each individual market. More speci￿cally, in the second case, I assume a single
capital market, in that capital ￿ ows freely between countries, regions or industries, and
a restricted labour market. The latter models the di¢ culties of labour migrating across
international barriers (in a trade context) or from a poor region to a richer one (in a
regional context). Therefore, I am going to exploit such a framework mainly to study the
impact of competition regulations on wages and ￿nancial ￿ ows both in the regional and in
the international context, and the output, welfare and ￿nancial implications of allowing
free labour mobility across markets. In more practical terms, one object of this research
work is to possibly contribute to the current debate about the size of the European Union.
While the global ￿nancial crisis is still running, some economists and policy makers are
wondering if criteria adopted to build up the current EU are su¢ cient to guarantee the
survival chances of the Union itself. Furthermore, the opportunity to add the other candi-
date countries (Croatia, Island, Macedonia, Montenegro, Turkey) to the current members
is still under evaluation.
Thus, I think that such a framework can rely on di⁄erent literatures, that I am going
to shortly review next. First of all, my study can be related to more general international
trade issues. In fact, the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model predicts that
international prices of input factors equalize as an e⁄ect of international trade. According
to that theory, the latter makes the price of each country￿ s scarce input factor fall until
it converges to the international common price. Therefore, international trade and inter-
national integration of input factors can be regarded as substitute as long as they both
lead to the convergence of inputs prices. Then, at least from this point of view, barriers
to production factors mobility and to ￿nal goods trade might also seen as strongly related
to each other.
172.1.1 Productivity heterogeneity and trade
In particular, so much work has been spent in the last years to highlight how international
trade enhances productivity by selecting the most e¢ cient competitors. From the theoret-
ical point of view, Melitz (2003) set up a pioneering model that explains welfare gains from
international trade though intra-industry reallocation. In more detail, the model features
a continuum of monopolistically competitive ￿rms, each of which produces a di⁄erent va-
riety. Moreover, there is only one input factor, i.e. labour, that is inelastically supplied
at the aggregate level and represents the size of the economy. In particular, although all
￿rms deal with the same ￿xed cost of production, they are heterogeneous by productivity
level: the higher the ￿rm level productivity, the lower the marginal costs (however, one
further meaning of such a heterogeneity is that, assuming production costs to be equal
across ￿rms, the higher the productivity the larger the quality of the variety produced.)
Therefore, a larger productivity leads to lower prices and larger outputs, revenues and
pro￿ts. This asymmetry turns out to be crucial for the entry/exit mechanism. Firms
wishing to enter the market have to face ￿xed (sunk) entry costs: ￿rms with a low pro-
ductivity are supposed to exit the market as they are not able to make pro￿ts that are
high enough to cover such costs. Opening the market to international competition makes
the latter mechanism even tougher. In fact, Melitz proved that international trade makes
the most e¢ cient ￿rms increase their market shares and pro￿ts. This happens because
entry costs to production result to be increased when markets are opened to international
competition. Thus, because labour is inelastically supplied, the increased labour demand
by the more productive ￿rms and the new entrants increases the real wage and pushes the
least productive agents o⁄the market. As a consequence, aggregate productivity, that is a
weighted average of (surviving) ￿rms￿productivities results to be increased. On the more
empirical side, several works showed as international competition forces the least produc-
tive ￿rms to exit the market by imposing tougher competition; in addition, it increases
the probability to survive of the most e¢ cient competitors. For example, I might start
with a very important work, that is Bernard and Jensen (1999). The latter is an empirical
study that tests and compares two di⁄erent hypotheses (both holding within Melitz[2003]
) about the relation between ￿rm level productivity and international trade. According to
the ￿rst hypothesis (self-selection hypothesis), the more e¢ cient ￿rms become exporters;
this is because entering the export market often implies covering high sunk entry costs,
so that only the "good" ￿rms can make nonnegative pro￿ts by selling abroad. According
to the second hypothesis (learning-by-doing hypothesis), exporting boosts ￿rms￿perfor-
mances and, in particular, ￿rms￿productivities. Thus, they worked on US data and found
clear evidence on the ￿rst hypothesis: both growth rates and levels of performance vari-
ables are larger for exporters before the entry into the export market. In more detail, the
exporters turned out to produce double and to be up to 19 percent more productive with
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e⁄ects of export on ￿rm performances resulted to be less clear: even though employment
growth rate and the probability of survival came out to be both larger for exporters, pro-
ductivity and wage growth rate were not found to be signi￿cantly larger for the same group
of ￿rms, especially for longer horizons. Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000) studied the same
two hypotheses on both Taiwan and Republic of Korea data. In the Taiwanese case, they
found that exporters show higher productivity before entering the foreign market with
respect to non-exporters; however, in some industries, there is also evidence of productiv-
ity improvement after the entry. In particular, the increase in the productivity gap after
entry was explained by direct bene￿ts from exporting, such as knowledge spillovers from
foreign buyers. Furthermore, plants that keep exporting resulted to be more productive
than those exiting the export market. In the Korean case, instead, there is less evidence
on both the hypotheses: before the entry into the foreign market, there were found no
signi￿cant di⁄erences between ￿rms starting exporting and ￿rms keeping out of the foreign
market. Moreover, there was no evidence of learning-by-exporting either; ￿nally, export
exit did not result to cause performance worsening such as for Taiwanese ￿rms. Pavcnik
(2002) developed an empirical study about the e⁄ects of trade liberalization on plant pro-
ductivity in Chile. This was a very interesting case as Chile had chosen to massively open
its domestic market to foreign competition between the late 1970s and the early 1980s.
Thus, they estimated the impact of trade on plants￿e¢ ciency by distinguishing between
traded and non-traded goods sectors. Using data on a panel of manufacturing ￿rms, it
was found evidence that, as an e⁄ect of an increase in international trade openness, plants
in the import-competing sector improved their productivity. In particular, in many cases
the increase in aggregate productivity seemed to depend on the reallocation of resources
to the relatively more e¢ cient producers.
2.1.2 Trade, market size and competition toughness
Some further works focused on the relation between market size and competition tough-
ness. One of those is Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005), that is an empirical study on
the e⁄ects of market size on the size distribution of American establishments for the ma-
jor industries across a large number of US cities. Thus, they mainly found that market
size and employment/sales at the producer level are positively correlated (by market size
they mean the number of consumers, that is the population size). In particular, the work
showed that the larger the market size, the larger the number of producers (less than
proportionally), the lower markups and producers￿prices and, ￿nally, the larger the sales
of each producer. Furthermore, relying on a model featuring competition between many
producers, the elasticity of producers￿average sales to market size turned out to be a
lower bound for the toughness of price competition. Next, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) is
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are assumed to di⁄er by size and are not perfectly integrated through trade. Moreover,
asymmetries in the toughness of competition are endogenous: they depend on the num-
ber of competitors and on average productivity. However, trade costs are assumed to be
symmetric. Thus, they found that larger and more integrated markets show higher pro-
ductivity, lower markups and, consequently, lower prices. In particular, bigger markets
have a larger number of competitors and a higher level of product variety; furthermore,
￿rms are more e¢ cient, produce larger outputs and make larger pro￿ts (because larger
demand outweighs the e⁄ects of lower markups and prices). Therefore, trade turned out to
have pro-competitive e⁄ects due to the reduction of markups and, then, prices. The latter
model was empirically tested by Chen, Imbs and Scott (2009). Thus, working on disaggre-
gated data for a panel of EU manufacturing ￿rms, they found that, at least in the short
run, trade openness has a pro-competitive e⁄ect. In particular, they provided evidence
that an increase in openness to trade lowers prices and markups and raises productivity
and pro￿t margins. These results were the estimated e⁄ect of the increased access of for-
eign competitors to the domestic market, due to a decrease in trade barriers. However, in
the long run, results are more ambiguous and, sometimes, show anti-competitive e⁄ects.
One further important recent work about gains from international trade is Bernard,
Redding and Schott (2007). This is a two-country model with two sectors and a continuum
of heterogeneous ￿rms; countries di⁄er by factor endowments and sectors vary by factor
intensity (Heckscher-Ohlin comparative advantages hold). The main result was that falling
trade costs leads to reallocation of resources within industries and across both industries
themselves and countries. In addition, this reallocation causes signi￿cant job turnover in
all sectors and boosts relatively more creative destruction in comparative advantage sectors
with respect to comparative disadvantage sectors; thus, it magni￿es ex-ante comparative
advantage and generate additional welfare gains from trade. Furthermore, improvements
in aggregate productivity reduces and can also reverse the losses in terms of real wage
of scarce factor. In addition, a really rich framework that studied the relation between
international trade openness and government size is Epifani and Gancia (2009). The lat-
ter developed a static model of a world economy featuring a larger number of identical
countries in each of which there is a continuum of industries. Consumers￿utility relies on
the consumption of di⁄erentiated goods and a country-speci￿c public good. Governments
functions are twofold: ￿rst, they produce public goods that are ￿nanced through taxation
and, second, they insure against the risk of idiosyncratic shocks through transfers. In ad-
dition, they unilaterally set policies in order to maximize domestic citizens￿utility. Trade
is assumed to happen because consumers like variety. Moreover, economic integration be-
tween countries is imperfect because in some sectors trade costs are prohibitive. Finally,
labour mobility across sectors is also limited by both sector-speci￿c human capital and
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openness can enhance the size of governments in two ways: ￿rst, it reduces the domes-
tic cost of taxation (terms-of-trade channel); second, it boosts risk and public transfers
(demand of insurance channel). The ￿rst channel turned out to be ine¢ cient from the
point of view of world welfare: the government set taxes to ￿nance public spending but
the induced improvement of terms of trade lowers the cost of public spending that, conse-
quently, are not fully internalized by policy makers. However, the second channel resulted
to be Pareto optimal. Indeed, the power of the two channels mentioned above depends
on the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods. It might be worth
highlighting that these results took this work into the debate about the coordination of
￿scal policies imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact. Particularly, the authors claimed
that limits to budget de￿cits and debt can not tackle the ine¢ ciencies studied in the paper
that, instead, depend on too high level of public spending.
2.1.3 E¢ ciency of input factors allocation
Thus, turning to a description of my work, it ￿rst aims at making further theoretical
evidence of the allocation ine¢ ciency that is implied by mark-up heterogeneity across
sectors: in case of demand elasticity asymmetries, input factors allocations is driven not
only by productivity forces (i.e. the input factors demand is proportional to the relative
productivity of producers) but also by monopoly power distortions. Particularly, there
will be an excess of input factors within those sectors/markets with a relatively larger
demand elasticity; in turn, industries or regions where monopoly power is relatively larger
will result to be in de￿cit of input resources. Thus, taking both perfect competition, i.e.
prices equal to marginal costs, and perfect homogeneity of mark-ups across all the goods
as fairly unrealistic cases, I think it can be worth going deeper into the study of factors
misallocation other than looking for possible economic remedies.
As Lerner (1934) and Samuelson (1947) ￿rst pointed out, optimal allocation of re-
sources is implied by synchronization of monopoly powers in the pricing of all the goods.
In fact, what really matters in order to have an e¢ cient allocation across ￿rms/industries
is that they all impose the same markup over their marginal costs. In that case, relative
prices perfectly re￿ ect relative costs across the goods and this leads to optimal allocation1
. Therefore, an e¢ cient allocation is not prevented from monopoly power in sŁ, but from
deviations of markups.
The concept of misallocation is been applied to several ￿elds in economics. First, Ade ao,
Correia and Teles (2003) set up optimal monetary policy within a framework without cap-
ital featuring cash-in-advance restrictions, sticky prices, and monopolistic competition.
1See also Koeniger and Licandro, 2006, that also showed relative prices are not distorted by demand
elasticities as long as markups across the goods are all the same.
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tary policy is to set the nominal interest rate equal to zero, so that the wedge between the
marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation is minimized; how-
ever, the optimal allocation turns out to be still distorted by a constant mark-up, because
of the zero bound on the interest rate. Under sticky prices, instead, the optimal allocation
leads to variable mark-ups; the planner is able to exploit not only the interest rate but
also the money supply, so that she is able to get higher utility. An important recent work
about this subject is also that by Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2008), within a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model. They proved that the market economy is e¢ cient if
and only if symmetric, homothetic preferences are of the CES form studied by Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977). CES-DS preferences lead to synchronization of markups across goods and
over time; furthermore, they make the bene￿t of variety in elasticity form be identical to
net markup in the pricing of goods and, so doing, perfectly balance two contrasting forces
that are the "consumer surplus e⁄ect" and "pro￿t destruction e⁄ect" (see Grossman, G.
M. and Helpman E., 1991). Furthermore, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) showed that input
factor misallocation can explain lower aggregate total factor productivity in China and
India with respect to the US. Particularly, there are two di⁄erent sources of distortion:
one a⁄ects the marginal products of both the input factors, namely capital and labour, by
the same proportion as an output distortion (for example, government restrictions on size,
transportation costs, public output subsidies); the other one hits the marginal product of
capital relative to labour (for example, easy access to credit through business groups or
state-owned banks). Thus, they found that if production factors were reallocated accord-
ing to the US plant-level marginal products within each four-digit sector, aggregate total
factor productivity would signi￿cantly increase in both China and India. Finally, Epifani
and Gancia (2011) showed that asymmetric exposure to international trade can contribute
to markup heterogeneity across industries; in turn, the latter always leads to intersectoral
misallocation. If ￿rm entry is not free, then that misallocation can imply a welfare loss;
instead, if it is free, markup asymmetry does not always lead to a welfare reduction as
policy makers can improve input factors allocation by supporting those industries that are
relatively less competitive (i.e. with lower demand elasticity). Therefore, international
free trade and domestic industrial policy can be complementary.
2.1.4 Di⁄erent sources of market power
In order to justify my interest to allocation problems due to markups asymmetry, it might
be worth to make clear what these markups actually represent and what can determine
them. Indeed, markups give an idea of the toughness of price competition in the market.
In turn, such price competition can depend on several factors. Of course, one of the major
factors is represented by the number of competitors. In turn, the latter is generally a
22function of the sunk entry costs: the larger those costs, the lower the number of di⁄erent
products within the same market. The role of entry costs in determining the strictness
of competition was highlighted by Spence (1976). He pointed out that they a⁄ect market
structures and impose a non-competitive pricing. Furthermore, they limit the number
and the variety of products that can be supplied to the market. In fact, the probability
of entering the market crucially depends on the pro￿tability of that choice: thus, in order
to make nonnegative pro￿ts, revenues must cover the ￿xed costs and the variable costs.
Therefore, the larger the ￿xed (entry) costs, the lower the number of competitors for which
getting into the market will be pro￿table. Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) developed an em-
pirical work on US data. They used a geographical de￿nition of market (that is meant as a
town) and assumed there could exist di⁄erent types of industries: an industry containing
no ￿rms, a one-￿rm monopoly industry, a two-￿rms duopoly industry and more than two
￿rms industry. The type of the industry was thought of as depending on pro￿ts, that were
assumed to be increasing linear functions of market size. Moreover, each further competi-
tor had to deal with entry costs (barriers) that were imposed by the former incumbent
competitors. Thus, empirically, they found that entry barriers signi￿cantly varies across
industries. In particular, there were relevant di⁄erences between professional industries
and retail industries: the ￿rst ones turned out to have larger entry costs. One further
empirical work on US data about the role of entry costs is Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). In
this work, the authors estimated a model of entry in atomistically competitive markets.
Thus, they mainly showed that the number of producers in oligopolist markets varies by
the conditions of demand and market competition. In addition, post-entry competition
increases at a rate that decreases with the number of incumbents. In fact, they estimated
that most of the increase in competition comes with the entry of the second/third ￿rm.
One further relevant reference on this subject is Schmalensee (1992), that provided a re-
view of John Sutton￿ s Sunk Costs and Market Structure: Price Competition, Advertising,
and the Evolution of Concentration. The latter is a work that provided evidence about
di⁄erences in industry concentration. In theory, such di⁄erences might be due to the
toughness of price competition (that, in turn, can be determined by the level of horizontal
di⁄erentiation) and, particularly, market size. Thus, the relation between industry concen-
tration and market size is estimated; furthermore, inter-industry along with international
comparisons are also employed. In more detail, two types of markets are distinguished
according to the relevance of advertising: the latter concerns only the market of the sec-
ond type. So, in the ￿rst market type, the lowest possible concentration degree tends to
zero as the market size increases; in the second market type, instead, the lower bound
converges to a strictly positive value. The latter result is explained by the fact that ad-
vertising creates an entry barrier and reduces pro￿t growth. Next, Berry (1992) estimated
an oligopolistic model of entry in the airline industry. This paper focused on inferences
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entrants into the industry. Thus, it is revealed how important the role for airport presence
in determining airline pro￿tability. Furthermore, through a simulation estimator, it is
showed that pro￿ts decrease quite rapidly in the number of entering ￿rms. However, even
if the number of potentially pro￿table ￿rms rises, the number of ￿rms actually entering the
market resulted to be limited by within market competition. Finally, they claimed to be
able to give more precise estimates of the e⁄ect of policies to increase airport access with
respect to simple models, such as probit, that rely only on ￿rm heterogeneity but not on
interactions between ￿rms and that might then provide exaggerated results. Hopenhayn
(1992) set up a dynamic stochastic model for a competitive industry which endogenously
determines both processes for entry and exit and output and employment for individ-
ual ￿rms. Thus, the work employed a stationary equilibrium analysis in order to extend
standard long-run industry equilibrium theory to take into account entry, exit, and ￿rm
dynamics. In particular, the intuition behind their model comes from two empirical facts
related to the process of job/￿rm turnover: ￿rst, ￿rm level dynamics is dominated by ￿rm
relative uncertainty; second, entry and exit rates are strongly correlated across industries
(i.e. there are high and low turnover industries). Therefore, they found that markets with
larger sunk costs show low rates of producer turnover. Moreover, existing ￿rms turned out
to be protected from competition pressures by large entry costs. Aghion, Harris, Howitt
and Vickers (2001) shed further light on the relation between competition intensity and
innovation and growth. They reached two main ￿ndings. First, some competition can be
growth-enhancing. In particular, if both product market competition and imitation are
allowed to vary together, then the maximal growth rate is achieved in correspondence of
the maximal degree of competition. Therefore, the Shumpeterian e⁄ect of tougher com-
petition can be outweighed by increasing incentives for ￿rms to innovate (even though
this can reduce the overall level of pro￿ts); those incentives come from the need to escape
competition with "neck-and-neck" rivals. Secondly, they found that a little imitation can
also be growth-enhancing (nevertheless, too much turns out to be harmful). So, the usual
Shumpeterian e⁄ect of imitation keeps holding for large imitation propensities; however,
it results to be outweighed by the composition e⁄ect of enhancing "neck-and-neck" ri-
valry when that propensity is relatively low. Syverson (2004), instead, developed a spatial
competition model. In the product market, the degree of substitutability depends on how
clustered producers are: the more clustered in the market they are, the easier for consumers
to switch between suppliers and, then, the more competitive the market. In particular,
the larger the competition in denser markets, the harder for less e¢ cient competitors to
make positive pro￿ts. Thus, an increase in demand density (i.e. demand per unit area) in
local markets truncate distribution productivity of producers from below. Furthermore,
tougher markets also comprise, on average, larger size producers. In addition, demand
24density also depends on how large transport costs are. So, lowering transport costs can
enhance productivity in two ways: ￿rst, less resources are needed to move goods around
and, second, competition within spatially di⁄erentiated industries increases and market
shares result to be reallocated to the more e¢ cient producers. Aspland and Nocke (2006)
set up a stochastic dynamic model of monopolistic competitive industry to study the ef-
fect of ￿xed costs and market size on entry (exit) rates. Thus, they showed a stationary
equilibrium with simultaneous entry and exit. According to that equilibrium, e¢ cient
￿rms are able to survive, while ine¢ cient producers are replaced by new entrants. In
particular, they found that the level of turnover is increasing in ￿xed costs and market
size: in large markets, competition is tougher than small markets, so that the price-costs
margins are lower. In addition, in terms of e⁄ects of market integration, a larger market
implies larger turnover; however, larger turnover also leads to a multiplication of entry
costs and the latter might imply ine¢ ciency. The work also included an empirical part
on Swedish data: they found that an increase in market size or ￿xed costs shifts the
age distribution towards younger producers. Ryan (2006) built up a dynamic model of
oligopoly to study the e⁄ects of environmental regulation on the cement industry in the
US. In more detail, the work exploited a two-step estimator which takes into account the
whole cost structure of the industry, that is both sunk entry costs and adjustment costs
of investments. Thus, the main result was that regulation leads to larger sunk costs and
lower entry rate. As a consequence of lower entry rates, welfare fell because the amount
of production turned out to be ine¢ cient. Berry and Reiss (2007) provided a literature
review on market structure and competition. In the short run, the number of competitors
is given; price or quantity competition leads to ￿rms￿pro￿ts that depend on the market
structure and, then, on the toughness of competition. In turn, the latter is a function of
several di⁄erent factors: product di⁄erentiation across ￿rms, geographic segmentation of
the markets, level of transport costs, structural factors such as collusion, price-quantity
competition, productivity and production costs heterogeneity across ￿rms. A more recent
work focusing on the relation between toughness of price and the number of competitors
in Dunne, Klimek, Robert and Xu (2009). This is an empirical work on US data, that es-
timates a dynamic structural model of ￿rm entry and exit decision within an oligopolistic
industry. The market structure depends on the entry/exit decision of individual producers
and that decision depends on the expectations of future pro￿ts. In turn, those expecta-
tions are determined by the nature of competition within the market. Thus, they found
that the larger the number of competitors, the tougher the price competition. In more
detail, as the number of competitors increases, the value of both keeping producing within
the market and entering the market falls, so that the probability of enter decreases and the
probability of exit increases. Empirically, they estimated that a seven percent reduction
in the average sunk entry cost would decrease the lon-run pro￿ts of a monopolist by the
25same amount as if the ￿rm competed within a duopoly economy.
Furthermore, imperfect competition has also been used to explain some "core-periphery"
patterns within international economics. Krugman and Venables (1990) illustrated the ef-
fects of the integration through a model with one "central" country featuring a large access
to market and one "peripheral" country with a smaller local market. Furthermore, in their
model there are two sectors: one with constant return-to-scale and the manufacturing one
with imperfect competition. Thus, they showed that reduction of trade barriers moves
production of the manufacturing sector towards the "central" economy: this happens be-
cause when barriers are still high (in the short run), there are cost advantages in producing
manufacturing goods next to the larger market2 . Krugman (1991) explained the emer-
gence of a "core-periphery" pattern as depending on transportation costs, economies of
scale and the share of manufacturing share in the national income. He assumed there exist
two sectors (one competitive, that is agriculture, and one with increasing return-to-scale,
that is manufacturing) and two input factors (one immobile, that is land and one mobile,
that is labour). Because of economies of scale, production of manufacturing goods results
to be placed at only a limited number of places: this is to be closer to a larger demand
and, thus, to minimize the transport costs. From the labour market￿ s point of view, the
concentration of production within a few locations enhances employment conditions for
workers with industry-speci￿c skills and also reduces the probability of labour shortage
for ￿rms. In turn, a larger demand for manufacturing goods will move to those places
where manufacturing production is more concentrated ("circular causation"). One further
relevant reference, at this point, is Ottaviano and Thisse (2002) tried to address some wor-
ries concerning full labour markets integration across the European countries, so stated
by the European Commission in 1999: ￿it could be in the advantage of the new members
to restrict this right for a set period of time. The economies of the applicant countries
are more likely to su⁄er a brain drain and loss of a valuable part of [their] young mobile
workforce if early, unrestricted liberalization of labour markets is granted.￿ They set a
two-region model featuring two sectors (one "modern" and one "traditional") and two
input factors: one is skilled workers (free mobile) and the other one is unskilled workers
(immobile). They proved that the market leads to an e¢ cient solution when trade barriers
are either high or low. Instead, for intermediate values of barriers, there is agglomeration
of the modern sector even though dispersion would be socially e¢ cient. This happens
because the unskilled workers in both the regions have to deal with pecuniary external-
ities as skilled workers move from one region to the other; furthermore, skilled workers
neglect the e⁄ect of their move on the other skilled workers. This model seemed to well
represent the EU case as intermediate trade barriers might be a good proxy for shipping
2However, in the long run, trade barriers become lower and production moves back to the peripheral
economy, that has got lower production costs (i.e. wages).
26costs between medium-sized markets, such as those in the European Union. Finally, Red-
ding and Venables (2004) pointed to geographical factors as important determinants for
cross-country di⁄erences in per-capita income. Thus, even if trade barriers are lowered,
the distance from large demand markets will keep remote regions￿income down.
2.1.5 Some issues concerning economic integration and ￿scal competition
Indeed, the integration of input factors, especially across the EU countries, has also raised
issues concerning ￿scal competition. Epple and Romer (1991) built up a model with the
following primary features: there are two goods (housing and a composite good), many
communities with a continuum of households, a tax (chosen by the local government) that
is proportional to the value of property, uniform redistribution among the inhabitants of
proceeds coming from such a tax, free mobility individuals across communities; moreover,
the tax rate, the tax base and the population of each jurisdiction are endogenously deter-
mined. By such a model, they found that local redistribution leads the poorest households
to move to those communities that provide more redistribution. Furthermore, the local
decision on the level of redistribution crucially depends on the share of inhabitants that
rent capital: the larger that share, the more the community will be keen to redistribution.
Cremer and Pestieau (1996) set a two-country model featuring a Ricardian production
function. They highlighted a possible problem coming from the construction of the Eu-
ropean Union: income disparities between member states is less economically acceptable
than disparities between non-member countries. Consequently, the need of redistribution
becomes higher. However, enhancing free trade of goods and integration of production
inputs yields makes taxation harder. Tougher competition imposes keeping production
costs low by reducing taxes on both capital and labour. In turn, expenditure in social
protection and public good is expected to decrease. Therefore, it turns out to be crucial
to decrease income asymmetries across member countries. Bolton and Gerard (1997) built
a model about the breakup or uni￿cation policies of democratic nations. The equilib-
rium outcome is the result of a trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency gains from uni￿cation and
costs derived from losing political control within a uni￿ed context. Their analysis led to
some implications concerning the European Union. Particularly, in order to minimize the
costs of integration it results to be very important to make preferences over ￿scal policies
more homogeneous. The European Uni￿cation can work into that direction by reducing
both per capita income and income distribution di⁄erences across the European coun-
tries (mainly through structural funds for regional development); furthermore, enhancing
labour mobility also helps to make such preferences more similar: in fact, they theoret-
ically proved that if all production factors are fully mobile, then all incentives to break
up collapse. Hindrinks (2001) created a model of redistribution assuming that both rich
and poor people are imperfectly mobile and, moreover, that each jusrisdiction sets the
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(such as zoning requirements, immigration policies and housing markets, among others)
are detrimental to redistribution. Moreover, majority voting can lead to ine¢ ciency if it
a⁄ects membership: particularly, poors can vote against a Pareto-improving tax reduction
as it could push more rich people to move into their jurisdiction and, so doing, change the
majority. Kessler, Lulfesmann and Myers (2002) set a two-country model with two input
factors: labour and capital. The social protection in each country is funded by a source
based tax that is democratically chosen by inhabitants. They found that integration of
only one of the two production resources reduces countries￿redistributive ability because
of tax competition. If both the input factors are integrated, instead, ￿scal competition
turns out to be reduced. If the two countries have similar economic and political con-
ditions, unilateral tax cuts attracts more capital and, consequently, raise wages and per
capita social transfers. If, in addition to capital, also labour is integrated, then larger
wages and public transfers causes detrimental immigrations. Thus, incentives to exploit
unilateral tax cuts to get more capital fall as labour becomes more and more integrated
across national markets. However, assuming ex-ante asymmetries in population size might
change the outcome of their analysis: particularly, integration could be worsening for the
smaller country. Kessler, Lulfesmann and Myers (2003) set up a two-country model where
goods are producing by combining domestic labour and capital. The redistributive policy,
that is chosen by the majority of inhabitants, relies on taxing capital that is locally em-
ployed and redistributing bene￿ts. Furthermore, per-capita stock of capital owned by the
country￿ s decisive majority is less than that owned the whole country￿ s one. They showed
that if countries are symmetric according to their per-capita endowment but asymmet-
ric according to the capital endowment of the majority of voters, world output might be
reduced by integration. On the other side, in the opposite case, that is countries di⁄er
by per-capita endowment but are similar by capital endowment of the decisive majority,
integration is socially preferred to autarky.
2.1.6 Constitution and e¢ ciency of trade blocs
One further strand of literature I might relate to is that about trade blocs. The latter are
forms of international agreements aimed at reducing or eliminating trade barriers among
the participating states. Some examples of trade blocs around the world are: EU (Euro-
pean Union), NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), LAFTA (Latin American
Free Trade Agreement), MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market, in South America) and
ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations). Thus, I might start by mentioning
the work by Krugman (1989). In his model, he split the world into basic geographical
units called "provinces", that are symmetric by size and preferences. Each of them is
specialized in the production of one good that is an imperfect substitute with the single
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ric "trading blocs", each of which contains the same number of components. In particular,
"blocs" are de￿ned as areas with internal free trade and a common external ad valorem
tari⁄. Thus, because provinces are assumed to be symmetric, blocs formation does not
a⁄ect the internal income distribution. Moreover, it will reduce the interbloc trade and it
is also likely to decrease the world welfare. However, considering both high transport costs
and high negotiation costs (that are needed to set real world trade policies) can weaken the
latter result. Wei and Frankel (1995) made an e¢ ciency analysis of "continental" trade
blocs, that are particular trade blocs grouping more countries on the same continent (they
are also de￿ned as "natural" trade blocs by Krugman, in order to distinguish them from
"unnatural" trade blocs, that are trade agreements between countries that are far away).
Particularly, they exploited the idea of "open regionalism" in order study in which cases
trade blocs can be Pareto-improving. Thus, by open regionalism they meant a type of
international agreement that aims at reducing the external trade barriers: participating
countries are supposed to collectively reduce their external barriers from countries that
are outside the area. Thus, they found that this trade strategy, that is based on a modest
external liberalization, can lead to Pareto-improvement. Furthermore, it turned out to be
a more plausible strategy than that implied by the McMillan condition: that is trade blocs
should not lower trade volume with no-member countries. However, the latter condition
would mean a dramatic reduction in trade barriers, that is normally hard to achieve for
political reasons. Frankel, Stein and Wei (1996) shed light on the trade-o⁄ between trade
diversion and trade creation in case of trade blocs strategy. They argued that the opportu-
nity of Regional Trade Agreements actually depends on the magnitude of transport costs,
that determines the optimal level of the extent of regionalization. Thus, if such optimal
level is exceeded, then RTA￿ s become detrimental. More speci￿cally, they set monopo-
listic competition model of trade featuring increasing returns to scale in production and
love for variety from the consumers￿side. Furthermore, they assumed the world split into
three continents, each of which comprising the same number of nations. So, they mainly
focused on intermediate values of transport costs and found out by simulation the optimal
level for the formation of RTA￿ s. In fact, for the extreme values of those costs (i.e. zero
or "prohibitively large"), the answer about the opportunity of RTA￿ s was already clear.
As already argued by Krugman (1991), in case of prohibitive trade costs the formation
of continental ("natural") blocs was optimal. On the other side, in case of no transport
costs, a three-blocs world was considered detrimental: this is because each of the large
trade blocs would have been keen to overexploit its monopolistic power by levying too
high trade barriers; furthermore, the elimination of tari⁄ barriers within blocs generates
more distortions than it eliminates. Bond and Syropoulos (1996) set up an exchange
model featuring N countries and N goods. Moreover, they assumed preferences on goods,
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analyzed the consequences of splitting the world into trading blocs, that are identical in a
￿rst stage, and then of di⁄erent size. In particular, blocs were assumed to work as custom
unions and to set external tari⁄s on imports from the rest of the world in a non-cooperative
fashion. So, they found that, when blocs are symmetric, their market power may be either
increasing or decreasing in the absolute size: it is increasing if they have a large degree of
comparative advantage; it is decreasing when the demand is really large. However, when
blocs are asymmetric, the market power of trading blocs is increasing in the size. Finally,
the e¢ ciency of bloc expansion depends on the number of trading blocs.
Sang-Seung Yi (2000) also shed light on the welfare e⁄ects of the formation of free-
trade area. Here, it might be worth mentioning the di⁄erence between free-trade areas
and custom unions: members of the ￿rst ones set external trade tari⁄s individually, while
member of custom unions set common external tari⁄s. So, this work proved that the wel-
fare of nonmember countries of large trading blocs depends on whether member countries
can exploit their monopoly power in changing terms of trade. In particular, on the one
hand, setting a free-trade area makes nonmember countries better o⁄ as member coun-
tries do not jointly exploit their market power in order to in￿ uence terms of trade; on the
other hand, setting a custom union makes nonmember countries worse o⁄as, in this case,
member countries can exploit their monopoly power to a⁄ect terms of trade. Therefore,
this work led to the conclusion that the formation of free-trade areas is Pareto-improving
as member countries are expected to maximize their individual welfare. Nevertheless, a
global free-trade area may not be stable solution because of free-riding problems.
Furthermore, Bond and Park (2002) studied the welfare e⁄ects of the "new regional-
ism", that is trade agreements between small and large countries. Historically, two fairly
famous examples were the Accession Agreement (1971) between the UK and the European
Community and the Interim Agreement (1992), between Poland and the European Union.
Further and larger examples are the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Euro-
Mediterrenean Partnership (1995). Bene￿ts from this type of agreements are di⁄erent for
small and large countries. In more detail, on the one hand, small countries aim at gains in
terms of terms of trade through a reduction of tari⁄ barriers to larger markets and an ex-
emption from antidumping duties and other forms of protection; on the other hand, large
countries bene￿t , for instance, from concessions on protection of intellectual property
and laws concerning foreign investments. Thus, turning to the model, partial equilibrium
model of trade featuring two goods and two countries (one "small" and one "big"). Prefer-
ences of each country on trade agreements are derived from maximizing respective national
welfares. Then, a trade agreement results to be a sequence of tari⁄s and side payments
to be paid by each country at each time; particularly, that agreement is self-reinforcing
in a repeated tari⁄-setting game between the member countries. Thus, this framework
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constraints in trade agreements between asymmetric countries and how to reach a gradual
reduction of tari⁄ rates by time. In summary, they used an intertemporal distortion to
reduce the static trade distortion over time. Fung and Schneider (2005) also focused on
trade agreements among asymmetric countries. So, they set up a standard repeated game
framework with imperfect competition, that showed, in summary, as integration is not
welfare improving. In particular, they allowed for asymmetries in market size, wage levels
and labour productivity. The ￿rst result is that in case of market size heterogeneity, the
relatively larger market country is more likely to defect; in fact, cooperation turns out to
be a decreasing function of such asymmetry: therefore, the agreement becomes feasible
only by transfers from the small country to the large country. Secondly, in case of cost
asymmetries (in terms of both labour productivity or wages), they showed that making
countries more similar to each other does not necessarily enhance cooperation and, even-
tually, might also reduce that. Particularly, the more e¢ cient country is more likely to
defect; furthermore, cutting production costs in the relatively less e¢ cient country might
make the agreement less feasible. Finally, in case of asymmetries in both market size and
production costs, they found that either the countries might defect depending on how such
asymmetries are. In more detail, the relatively smaller and less e¢ cient member country is
more likely to defect from the agreement, so that it is possible to observe transfers from the
North to the South (such as those observed during integration into the European Union
of Portugal and Spain). Moreover, they showed that the larger the domestic market, the
lower the feasibility of trade agreement; on the other side, the larger the size of the foreign
market, the larger the opportunity of the agreement. Furthermore, the latter resulted
to be an increasing function of the relative e¢ ciency of home country￿ s industries. One
further work that studied trade agreements among asymmetric participating countries is
that by Melatos and Woodland (2007). In their framework, they assumed there are three
countries trading with each other in three di⁄erent goods. Each country is endowed with
a ￿xed amount of each good and, in equilibrium, it is the only exporter of only one of the
goods and an importer of the other two ones. Crucially, countries are allowed to di⁄er
by preferences. Thus, in equilibrium, there are three di⁄erent possible agreements among
those countries: the ￿rst one is unilateral tari⁄ setting, that is when all countries decide
to stay alone and set independent trade policy settings. Secondly, the countries might
choose to join preferential trade agreements; in particular, they could decide to form ei-
ther custom unions, where nations set zero trade tari⁄ within the union and a common
external tari⁄ with nonmember countries, or, alternatively, free trade areas, where mem-
bers decide to set a zero trade tari⁄within the union and independently set tari⁄s outside
the union. Finally, the third possible outcome is global free trade, that is a duty free
world, where each country raises zero trade tari⁄ on all the goods. Therefore, global free
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of both preferences and endowments of their respective export good. On the other side,
custom unions are Pareto dominant if preferences or endowments are "su¢ ciently di⁄er-
ent", that is member countries have got "adjacent" preferences or endowments. Moreover,
if di⁄erences in preferences or endowments are even more pronounced, free trade areas
and unilateral tari⁄settings may also Pareto dominate global free trade (however, each of
those two outcomes is never the unique equilibrium). Finally, Oladi and Beladi (2008) set
up a theoretical model that supports the feasibility of global free trade. More speci￿cally,
their model features n countries all having the same preferences. Moreover, there are as
many commodities as countries and goods are assumed to be imperfect substitutes. Thus,
they found that splitting the world into regional blocs is not a viable solution. This is
not because regional blocs can not be a welfare maximizing solution, but because such a
partition is not a stable solution. In fact, they proved that member countries that maxi-
mizes their welfare are better o⁄ if they extend their free trade areas in order to include
the whole globe. In particular, if the size of the trade bloc is relatively small, then as it
increases slightly, the trade diversion e⁄ect is larger than the trade creation e⁄ect because
many potential trading partners are left out of the bloc. Nevertheless, if the trade bloc is
relatively large, as it increases by including one or more countries, the trade creation e⁄ect
will dominate the trade diversion e⁄ect because a fewer countries will remain out of the
bloc. Then, as the bloc tends to include all the countries, trade diversion will completely
disappear. Therefore, global trade area will turn out to provide a more stable equilibrium
with respect to trade blocs.
2.2 Purchasing Power Parity Theory and Pricing-to-Market
The second part of the my thesis focuses on another crucial issue in international eco-
nomics, that is the Purchasing Power Parity puzzle. The latter consists in a weak con-
nection between exchange rates and national price levels (see Obstfeld and Rogo⁄[2000]).
Some de￿nitions (see Foundations of International Economics, Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, The
MIT Press, 1996) might be helpful to understand what is going to be argued in this section
of my work. First of all, I start from the de￿nition of the real exchange rate between two
countries, that is the relative cost of a common reference basket of goods, where the costs
of the baskets in the two countries are expressed by a common numeraire. Thus, on the
one hand, according to the Purchasing Power Parity (or absolute PPP) theory, the real
exchange rate is equal to one or, alternatively, tends to turn back to the unity when the







32where Pi is the domestic-currency price of good i, P ￿
i is the foreign-curreny price, and E
is the exchange rate, de￿ned as the home-currency price. On the other hand, a weaker
version of the latter hypothesis is the relative PPP, according to which changes in national











Finally, an even stronger version of the absolute PPP is the Law of One Price (LOP),
stating that if trade barriers (either natural or government imposed) are absent, any




Balassa (1964) highlighted some problems with both the absolute and the relative
versions of the Purchasing Power Parity theory and, particularly, pointed to the need of
general price indexes in order to evaluate properly exchange rate adjustments. So, that
work argued that it is possible to observe a systematic relationship between purchasing
power parities and exchange rates if non-traded goods are incorporated in the model. More
speci￿cally, it was assumed that international productivity di⁄erences in the production of
traded goods are larger than productivity di⁄erences in the production of non-traded goods
(i.e. services); therefore, since services a⁄ect the calculation of purchasing power parities
but not the calculation of exchange rates, then the purchasing power parity between two
di⁄erent currencies, in terms of the currency of the relatively higher productivity country,
turns out to be lower than the equilibrium exchange rate. This is because the currency
of the country with higher productivity will be overvalued from the point of view of the
purchasing power. Furthermore, the relationship between purchasing power parities and
exchange rates can also be related to the cross-countries comparison of living standards
and aggregate incomes. In particular, if per capita income di⁄erentials are seen as proxies
of productivity levels di⁄erentials, then the ratio between purchasing power parity and
exchange rate will result to be increasing in income levels. Samuelson (1964) reviewed and
argued about some of the most important versions of the Purchasing Power Parity theory.
First, he mentioned the Cassel-Ricardo Neutral-Money version of the theory, according to
which money was neutral, so that the absolute level of prices were able to change with-
out a⁄ecting price ratios in the long-run classical model. Second, he presented Keynes￿
de￿nition of the PPP, that was meant as a simple theory of spatial arbitrage without
considering transport costs; particularly, there were not included any arbitrage relations
for wage rates or production costs. The third de￿nition, instead, concerns costs of living:
without trade costs or other barriers, foreign exchange rate is given by the ratio of costs
of the same good in di⁄erent currencies; the latter turns out to be equal to the ratio of
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costs of living in di⁄erent countries were calculated with di⁄erent goods weighting and,
moreover, transport costs and trade barriers could not be ignored. Fourth, one further
de￿nition of PPP was as ratios of export price indexes from any two countries (however,
even in this case, the unequal weighting can be misleading.) Rogo⁄ (1996) ￿rst described
the major variants of PPP (Purchasing Power Parity): the law of one price (LOP), ab-
solute and relative purchasing power parity. In more detail, about the absolute PPP, the
author claimed how di¢ cult measuring it is: ￿rst, di⁄erent governments do not build in-
dexes for an internationally common basket of goods; second, it is based on the (strong)
assumption that PPP holds on average in the base year. On the other hand, turning to
the relative PPP, Rogo⁄argued about di¢ culties in interpreting the value of this measure
in di⁄erent periods as this really relies on the base year chosen. Furthermore, the work
also provided a review of some empirical evidence about the volatility of deviations from
the law of one price. Particularly, it reported the main result of the comparison between
international and intra-national price volatility made in Engle (1993): the relative prices
of similar goods across the US and Canada are really more volatile than the relative prices
of di⁄erent goods within each country. The work also considered other possible sources of
international divergence of prices, such as transportation costs, tari⁄s, nontari⁄ barriers,
information costs and pricing-to-market; in addition, there exist some particular items,
such as automobiles, for which international arbitrage turns out to be really hard because
of di⁄erent national standards. At the end of this review, Rogo⁄ concluded by explaining
the PPP puzzle with the fact that international goods markets are not yet as integrated as
the domestic ones due to signi￿cant trade barriers for several goods. Obstfeld and Rogo⁄
(2000) addressed six of the major puzzles in international economics by introducing trade
costs. One of those puzzles concerned the Purchasing Power Parity theory: in particular,
the authors tried to explain the persistence of real exchange rate deviations for a range
of countries, that are Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the US. More speci￿cally,
the mean half-life across real exchange rates was found equal to more than three years.
First, in terms of mean reversion in shocks, they did not ￿nd much di⁄erence between
prices of tradable and nontradables. This is because, as they argued, at the retail level,
the distinction between the two types of goods is arbitrary and probably endogenous too:
several traded goods already include many nontraded components. Second, they found
further empirical support to a faster adjustment of prices to exchange rate changes for
importers with respect to consumers: this is revealed by their empirical results accord-
ing to which a depreciation of the exchange rate actually worsens the terms of trade, as
expected by the conventional view. Third, they claimed that monopolistically supply of
goods is an appealing but incomplete explanation of the persistence in international price
di⁄erentials: this works for "big-ticket" commodities such as cars but not for smaller ones,
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ular, they distinguished between bulk wholesale and individual consumer shipping costs:
the latter ones are likely to be far larger than the former ones. Thus, they pointed out
that it is fairly easy to understand why individual consumers can not arbitrage di⁄erences
in prices across di⁄erent countries, but it is much harder to understand what prevents
arbitrage at the wholesale level. The answer they provided concerned national marketing
licenses: ￿rms can buy legal rights to control distribution of their product in one country.
Furthermore, nominal rigidities (i.e. ￿nal consumer goods, both those that are domesti-
cally produced and importables result to have sticky prices in domestic currency terms
) and pricing-to-market are also reported as important explanations of the PPP puzzle.
Backus and Crucini (2000) aimed at shedding further light on the source of international
price movements. In particular, they studied the variability of terms of trade with re-
spect to real output and trade volumes, that is found to be largely varying over time and
countries. Thus, they set up a dynamic equilibrium model of international business cy-
cle featuring two large industrialized countries which produce imperfect substitutes using
capital, labour and oil as input factors. The goods produced by the two countries are ag-
gregated into ￿nal consumption and investment goods. Finally, there is one third country
that produces oil and consumes ￿nal goods. The aim of this setting was to represent trade
between large industrial countries and large non-industrial oil producers. So, they found
out that the volatility and comovements of terms of trade are related to the source of
shocks. More speci￿cally, there were assumed three types of shocks: domestic productiv-
ity shock, foreign productivity shock and oil supply shock. The ￿rst two ones turned out
to produce poor volatility of terms of trade: this is because the model yielded only a little
variability in trade volumes. However, small shocks in oil supply resulted to generate large
variation in its relative price. On the other side, movements of terms of trade and output
were found to be positively correlated as long as they were both generated by productivity
shocks. In turn, such correlation was negative if movements were produced by oil supply
shocks: this is because, for instance, a negative shock of oil supply yields a decrease in
the domestic output of industrialized countries and then an increase in the relative price
of the domestic good (i.e. the terms of trade falls). Imbs, Mumtaz, Ravn and Rey (2005)
addressed the PPP puzzle by focusing on the relevance of a dynamic aggregation bias. In
particular, they argued and empirically (through Eurostat data) showed that a positive
bias in aggregate persistence was due to the fact that the heterogeneity in price adjust-
ments dynamics at the individual good level was not taken into account: in turn, this led
to a too slow mean reversion of aggregate exchange rate. In fact, they claimed that there
is no reason why every good should converge to parity homogeneously at the same time:
thus, the relative price dynamics varies across goods, that can crucially di⁄er according
to, for instance, degree of tradability, degree of competition, or transportation costs. In-
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good level: if persistence was homogeneously lower for all individual goods, then it would
result to be lower at the aggregate level too and the PPP puzzle would not exist. So,
their study seemed to give an important contribution in understanding the estimated real
exchange rate persistence, that had been resulting to be too high with respect theories
that explained that persistence by limits to arbitrage or nominal rigidities. More generally,
this work showed how important heterogeneity at the microeconomic level is in order to
address macroeconomic aggregate facts. Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2005) devel-
oped an empirical study on the Law-of-One-Price (LOP) theory, that states the identical
goods should be priced the same in di⁄erent countries, once their prices are turned into
a common currency. Thus, they measured good-by-good deviations from the LOP for a
really large range of goods and services across all European Union countries. Moreover,
their measures are made at ￿ve-year intervals between 1975 and 1990. In more detail,
they studied the cross-section distribution of the LOP deviations; the deviation of each
good is meant as relative to that good￿ s average price across the European Union. Thus,
for each country they calculated the average LOP deviation across goods. They found
that, after controlling for national income and Value-Added Tax, most of the means were
near to zero: that meant there were around as many overpriced goods as there were un-
derpriced goods. In addition, for each good they calculated the variance across countries.
They showed, exploiting classic characteristics of the goods, that good-by-good dispersion
in the absolute LOP deviations depended negatively on the tradeability of the good and
positively on the share of non-traded inputs used for the production of that good. Crucini
and Shintani (2008) also studied the persistence in LOP deviations through a very large
international micro-price panel. Using US sectoral data, they found a positive correlation
between LOP persistence and the distribution margin as expected according to the clas-
sical dichotomy: in particular, those margins included costs needed to move goods and
services from the producer to the consumer plus markups over marginal costs. Further-
more, they showed that the median level of persistence across goods is low and there was
no clear evidence of a border e⁄ect (the persistence of deviations across OECD countries
was not that di⁄erent from the persistence across US cities). In particular, they found
aggregation bias on the US data but they did not ￿nd it in their international dataset:
this made their results in contrast with the conclusions of Imbs et al. (2005) in that they
argued that the PPP puzzle can not be generally solved by the aggregation bias. Berka
and Crucini (2009) built up an alternative measure to the standard terms of trade, that
is the consumption terms of trade. They criticized the models of terms of trade: ￿rst,
those models normally comprise too few countries (most of the times, only two) so that
one of them is likely to be large enough to a⁄ect its terms of trade. Second, those settings
consider too few goods; however, including into the analysis more countries that specialize
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tional trade concerns ￿rm-to-￿rm or intra-￿rm exchanges of intermediate inputs; on the
other side, consumers buy most of the items from local retailers. Thus, it could be worth
to consider both producers and consumers within smaller segmented markets. So, this
work developed a study about the sources of terms of trade over a panel of 38 countries
in the period 1990-2005: using micro-price data from the Economist Intelligence Unit, it
aimed at detecting the contributions of individual goods to the variance of the aggregate
terms of trade. Speci￿cally, the use of retail prices allowed to distinguish between relative
prices of traded goods that are faced by national consumers and relative prices of the
same goods that are calculated according to trade prices at the border. If producers and
consumers cope with the same prices, then there is no di⁄erence between consumption and
production terms of trade. In turn, in case of improvements in terms of trade, domestic
producers have incentives to turn production resources into the production of exports,
while domestic consumers turn consumption into the opposite direction, that is towards
imports. So, they found that most of the variation of terms of trade is due to oil, automo-
biles and medicine; the other goods tend to be trade balanced. Furthermore, they found
that consumption terms of trade at local price is more volatile than production terms of
trade at world prices, even though they are correlated to each other. In particular, using
retail prices to measure imports and exports made deviations from the Law of One Price
a⁄ect the terms of trade. The largest contribution to the variation of terms of trade shifted
from oil to medicine: this presumably came out as international deviations from LOP are
larger for medicine than for oil. Berka and Devereux (2010) built up a dataset of price
levels on several similar goods across several European countries over time; more specif-
ically, data are relative to 31 countries, including both high income countries of Western
Europe and emerging countries of Eastern and Southern Europe. Thus, through that data
set, they measured real exchange rates at both disaggregate and aggregate level and found
that the Purchasing Power Parity did not hold for any European country. In more detail,
deviations from PPP turned out to be larger for non-tradable goods than for tradable
ones. Furthermore, they showed that real exchange rate is signi￿cantly determined by
relative GDP per capita across di⁄erent countries, times and levels of aggregation. In
particular, looking at disaggregated real exchange rates, they did not ￿nd much di⁄erence
in terms of volatility between countries belonging to the eurozone and ￿ oating exchange
rate countries. In conclusion, the set up a general equilibrium model according to which
real exchange rates are determined by di⁄erent growth rates between trade and non-traded
sectors. Finally, results of simulations showed how that model was able to closely match
the patterns of real exchange rates for most countries.
372.2.1 The Pricing-to-Market Issue
Krugman (1986) started from two empirical facts: ￿rst, movements of US import prices are
not perfectly correlated with movements of exchange rates: this is to make some evidence
of pricing-to-market by foreign sellers to the American market. However, pricing-to-market
did not seem to hold for all commodities; instead, data on US-Germany trade revealed that
PTM (Pricing-to-Market) concerned two particular industries, that were transportation
equipment and machinery. Thus, Krugman considered di⁄erent theoretical models, both
static and dynamic, in order to explain those facts. From the static point of view, he ￿rst
exploited a simple supply-and-demand model: this did not seem to provide a su¢ cient
explanation of PTM as based on too strong assumptions, that did not match actual data.
Second, he turned to a monopolistic price competition model: in order to have pricing-
to-market, demand elasticity has to be increasing in the price. However, this theory did
not result very convincing to the author either as it relied too much on the shape of the
demand curve. Thus, he turned to an oligopoly model: ￿rms are involved in a Cournot
competition; in particular, each ￿rm deals with a perceived demand elasticity that is equal
to the ratio of the market elasticity (constant) to the ￿rm￿ s market share. Even in this
case, the assumptions of the model were considered to be fairly unrealistic. In particular,
assuming perfect substitution between goods produced by domestic and foreign ￿rms was
not as plausible as assuming domestic and foreign competitors producing di⁄erentiated
products. Turning to dynamic settings, Krugman ￿rst focused on dynamics coming from
the supply side: according to this approach the degree of PTM depends on both how
recently the exchange rate has changed and how persistent this change is expected to
be. Secondly, he asked whether a slow adjustment of the price might be due to a slow
adjustment of demand to the market price. Finally, this work stressed reputation as the
mechanism the rules price adjustments: thus, for example, an unexpected (and not very
large) increase in marginal costs will not be straight turned into higher prices in order
to not lose reputation. Krugman￿ s conclusions were that the understanding of pricing to
market mostly relied on dynamic models of imperfect competition; he particularly focused
on both the role of supply dynamics (coming from the adjustment costs of distribution in-
frastructure related to imports) and the role of demand dynamics (coming from the ￿rm￿ s
investments in reputation). Feenstra, Gagnon and Knetter (1996) set up a Bertrand com-
petition model featuring di⁄erentiated products. The aim of their work was to explain
why import prices do not fully respond to exchange rates, that is incomplete pass-through.
The most important result was that pass-through mainly depends on the export country￿ s
market share in a particular import market. More speci￿cally, if the market share is very
high, then exporter will deal with poor competition from the other ￿rms and will more
completely pass through an exchange rate for a given demand. Thus, pass-trough resulted
to be full when market share tends to the unity for a group of exporters from a given
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dictions of the theory mentioned above on a panel data set on automobile exports from the
United States, Germany, France and Sweden to twelve destination countries. In summary,
they found that pass-through is increasing in the market share; in particular, the larger
the market share, the larger the increasing rate. Furthermore, US and German exporters
pass-through a larger part of exchange rate changes with respect to French and Swedish
exporters. Goldberg and Verboven (2001) studied large and persistent di⁄erences in car
prices across European countries. This was an important issue even for the Commission
of the European Communities that saw such price di⁄erentials as a potential danger for
the e⁄ectiveness of European market integration policies. Thus, the work provided an
oligopoly model featuring product di⁄erentiation. According to that a model, there are
three potential sources of price di⁄erences across countries: price elasticities leading to
di⁄erences in markups, costs and import quotas constraints. Turning to the empirical side
of the work, the latter relied on a dataset comprising information about 150 car models
(sales, list price and physical characteristics) across ￿ve markets (Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Italy and the UK) over the period 1980-1993. So, the ￿rst source of international
price di⁄erentials they analyzed concerned the demand side, that is a strong bias in con-
sumption patterns towards domestic brands. According to their estimates, both French
and British consumers regarded goods from the same country origin as closer substitute
with respect to goods coming from di⁄erent countries. Therefore, if, for example, the
price of a French car went up, then French consumers resulted to be more likely to switch
to another French car than to a foreign model. Moreover, for Italian consumers, the do-
mestic/foreign distinction was found even stronger. However, in Germany, domestic and
foreign goods belonging to the same market segment turned out to be viewed as equally
substitute. Indeed, di⁄erences in prices are also re￿ ected into cross-country di⁄erences in
markups. In particular, there was found evidence of signi￿cantly larger markups in Italy
with respect to the other countries. Thus, it seemed that a strong bias to domestic cars in
Italy led to a high level of markup over that country. The latter was presumably because
of the almost monopoly position of Fiat over the national market. The second source of
cross-country price di⁄erentials considered was quota constraints, that resulted to be par-
ticularly higher in Italy and France with respect to the other three countries in the panel
(this would explain such high prices of Japanese cars in those two countries). Finally,
the last international prices di⁄erentials source taken into account was unobserved costs,
that in empirical work were proxied by country ￿xed e⁄ects within the pricing equation.
One further fact that this work aimed at explaining was the large year-to-year volatility,
that was mostly due to the incomplete response of local currency prices to exchange rate
￿ uctuations. Such inertia could be related to local costs for a larger part and to monop-
olistic price discrimination for a smaller part. Cheung, Chinn and Fujii (2001) studied
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rates for a panel of 14 OECD countries. They pointed out that one crucial source of
the real exchange rate is given by pricing-to-market, that is di⁄erent pricing behaviour
of ￿rms across di⁄erent countries. In particular, PTM (Pricing-to-Market) resulted to be
determined by the market structure. Therefore, di⁄erent degrees of market imperfections
across countries and/or industries led to di⁄erent degrees of real exchange rate persistence.
The main result was that the more imperfect the industry market structure, the larger
the tendency to pricing-to-market and, then, the slower the rate of sectoral Purchasing
Power Parity reversion. Atkeson and Burstein (2008) built up a model to explain large
and systematic deviations from the relative purchasing power parity (i.e. the hypothesis
according to which the relative price of a trade good should stay constant over time.) So,
they aimed at theoretically address to empirical facts: ￿rst, the terms of trade of man-
ufacturing goods, de￿ned as a country￿ s ratio of export and import prices relative to its
partners of trade, are much less volatile than the Producer Price Index-based real exchange
rate for the same type of goods; second, movements in Consumer Price Index-based real
exchange rates for manufacturing goods are almost as volatile as movements in Producer
Price Index-based real exchange rates for manufactures. The common explanation that
the authors gave to both the issues was related to pricing-to-market, that is the choice
of individual producers to change the relative price of her output abroad and at home
as a response to aggregate international shocks. More speci￿cally, their model relies on
two main characteristics: imperfect competition with variable markups and international
trade costs (both ￿xed and "iceberg" costs.) Thus, ￿rms did not result to completely pass
through variations in marginal costs to prices due to the fact that markups depended on
the market share. However, imperfect competition with variable markups is a necessary
but not su¢ cient condition in order to have pricing-to-market: in fact, without any trade
costs, ￿rms have to face the same competitors both abroad and at home, so that they will
have the same markups and charge and the same prices in both the markets. So, their
model turned out to be able to match many relevant characteristics of international trade
and market structure and, particularly, to reproduce actual deviations from the relative
purchasing power parity in the US.
2.2.2 Fixed costs of production and economies of scale
Ethier (1982) set up a model to study the relation between the traditional national re-
turns to scale theory, the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) trade model assumptions
and international returns to scale. Thus, the model makes national scale economies (that
are internal to individual ￿rms), international scale economies (that are, instead, exter-
nal to individual ￿rms) and modern international trade theory￿ s assumptions on factor
endowments interact. The work reached four main results: ￿rst, international returns are
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ternational), that is also the interaction between internal and external economies relative
to individual ￿rms. Second, the work turned out to support the crucial results within the
factor endowments theory even if it introduced both the two types of scale economies.
Third, both intraindustry trade and interindustry trade are based on factor endowments
assumptions; however, such trade resulted to be complementary to international factor mo-
bility. Finally, the degree of intraindustry trade did not result to be crucially determined
by the degree of internal scale economies and product di⁄erentiation, even though they
are both very important for the theory. Indeed, a crucial role in determining economies
of scale is the presence of ￿xed costs of production. Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) set a
up a very famous monopolistic competition model with the aim to understand the e⁄ects
of aggregate demand, that depends on real money balances, on output. The main result
of that work is that monopolistic competition leads to a too low output due to aggregate
demand externality. Particularly, such externality, along with small menu costs, leads
to a relationship between movements in demand and output and welfare. Furthermore,
if there are ￿xed costs, the movements in output, productivity and pro￿tability turned
out to be positively correlated. One of the implications of introducing ￿xed cost is the
procyclical behaviour of pro￿ts: if nominal wages and prices are ￿xed, pro￿t resulted
to be increasing in the output. In turn, the latter result led to implications in terms
of entry (consider that real money balance is measured as a ratio of nominal money to
nominal wage, since the ￿xed markup on wages that leads to prices). In more detail, if
￿xed costs imply a reduction of aggregate demand, then the pro￿ts earned by all ￿rms
can be negative; moreover, imperfect competition prevents new entrants from catching
all the demand by lowering prices with respect to existing ￿rms. Therefore, very high
nominal wages can stop new ￿rms from entering the market. Hornstein (1993) extended
a neoclassical growth model in order to include monopolistic competition and increasing
returns to scale. More speci￿cally, the model comprised a large number of price-setting
monopolistic competitors, each of which produced an intermediate good by employing
labour and capital as inputs and an increasing returns to scale technology. Furthermore,
the ￿nal good was produced within a competitive industry by using those intermediate
goods as inputs and a constant returns to scale technology. Finally, the ￿nal good was
exploited both for consumption and investment. The intuition at the origin of this work
was that the impact of a shock to aggregate ￿ uctuations is determined not only on the
magnitude of the shock, but also on the propagation mechanism. Indeed, it is reason-
able that the reaction to aggregate productivity changes di⁄er by the economic structure:
thus, noncompetitive economies featuring increasing returns to scale are expected to react
in a di⁄erent manner with respect to competitive economies with constant returns. The
main result was that introducing noncompetitive market with increasing returns to scale
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ments in aggregate productivity kept being really important in terms of output volatility.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1993) studied the importance of taking into account imperfect
competition in order to accurately measure the e⁄ects of various shocks to the economy.
In particular, the reason why imperfect competition is so important is that it a⁄ects the
relationship between wage and marginal product of labour. In particular, in case of im-
perfect competition, materials inputs determines the wedge between wage and marginal
product of labour: the larger the share of material costs in the value of gross output, the
larger that wedge, for a given markup. Therefore, for positive shares of material, the inef-
￿ciency wedge is larger than the individual ￿rm￿ s markup. Furthermore, the assumption
of market power makes that of increasing returns more plausible. In terms of economies
of scale, they found that zero pure pro￿ts are compatible with a wedge between marginal
costs and factor prices if the average returns to scale are equal to that wedge (larger than
one): intuitively, in case of increasing returns, average cost is larger than marginal cost
so that price can equal average cost (and pro￿ts can be zero) even if price is larger than
marginal cost. Thus, the work introduced imperfect competition of product markets into
standard dynamic models of aggregate ￿ uctuations. Devereux, Head and Lapham (1996)
built up a business cycle model of monopolistic competition. There were assumed to be
monopolistically competitive suppliers of intermediate goods used to produce a ￿nal good
in a competitive sector. Individual producers of intermediate goods showed increasing
returns to scale because of both ￿xed costs of production and decreasing marginal costs.
Moreover, there might also be increasing returns at the aggregate level that is referred
to as returns to specialization and is interpreted as a large market e⁄ect; in particular,
returns to specialization existed if the ￿nal good output turned out to be positively cor-
related to the variety of intermediate goods produced (for a given stock of input factors).
So, aggregate productivity shocks led entry and exit of ￿rms, and returns to specialization
resulted to a⁄ect aggregate ￿ uctuations through this mechanism (that was motivated by
the evidence of procyclical net business formation). The main results of this work follow.
On the one hand, market power and increasing returns implied by ￿xed costs did not
turn out to a⁄ect reactions of aggregate output to productivity shocks (with respect to
standard, perfectly competitive real business cycle model). On the other hand, reactions
of aggregate variables to aggregate productivity shocks resulted to be lowered by returns
to specialization. Furthermore, returns to specialization and scale both seemed to be able
to a⁄ect the measurement of productivity changes. More speci￿cally, increasing returns
to scale led the variance of the Solow residual to be lower than the variance of the "true"
productivity shock, while returns to specialization led to the opposite bias. Thus, if both
increasing returns to scale and increasing returns to specialization were considered, the
variance of output turned out to be larger with respect to a standard competitive model
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Matsuyama (1999) studied the cases in which dynamic nonconvexities at the disaggregate
level turn into dynamic nonconvexities at the aggregate level. They set up a model that
represent an economy producing three types of goods: investment goods, consumption
goods, and di⁄erentiated intermediate inputs which are allowed to vary endogenously. At
each time, only a ￿nite range of such intermediate inputs can be produced; however, that
range can be increased over time by driving some units of the investment goods to start-up
operations. In particular, consumption goods were produced by using both labour input
and the di⁄erentiated intermediate inputs that are aggregated according to a standard
CES function, so that all the intermediate inputs are involved in a symmetric manner.
Moreover, also the production of investment goods employed both labour and interme-
diate inputs but through a di⁄erent technology with respect to the production of the
consumption goods. Thus, they compared equilibrium and optimal allocations in case of
dynamic increasing aggregate returns that are determined by Hicks-Allen complementar-
ities between di⁄erentiated intermediate goods. One of the main results was that return
to investment is increasing with respect to the aggregate level of investment because of
Hicks-Allen complementarities. Kim (2004) developed a theoretical setting that comprises
four di⁄erent relevant characteristics of models with scale economies, namely ￿xed costs,
variety of products, decreasing marginal costs and market power. The work led to two
major conclusions. First, if ￿xed costs do not vary and pro￿ts are driven to zero in every
period, then the aggregate increasing returns to scale only depends on the degree of re-
turns to variety. This is due to endogeneity of the number of ￿rms, that is determined
by a mechanism of entry and exit: movements in the number of ￿rms can be regarded as
movements in productivity in reaction to exogenous shocks to inputs. Secondly, if ￿xed
costs are allowed to react to changes in aggregate activity or the zero-pro￿t condition does
not hold in the short-run, then aggregate returns to scale turned out to be determined by
product variety, diminishing marginal costs and market power. In particular, when there
is no period-by-period adjustment, the only determinant of the degree of returns to scale
resulted to be the degree of market power. However, independently of assumptions about
adjustments, the degree of market power did not turn out to determine input prices, that
are crucial to lead to the uniqueness of equilibrium: in fact, movements in input prices are
determined by movements in gross output rather than in net output, because ￿xed costs
and the number of ￿rms are exogenous with respect to the ￿rm￿ s choice about inputs.
2.2.3 The home bias e⁄ect
Indeed, international trade patterns (and prices) resulted to be also a⁄ected by the home
bias e⁄ect. One of the major works about this is Krugman (1980). The latter is a monop-
olistic competition model with free entry (i.e. monopoly pro￿ts are driven to zero). The
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returns yield gains from trade between them even if they are homogeneous by tastes, tech-
nology and input factors endowment. In particular, this work focused on the home market
e⁄ect, according to which, in presence of increasing returns, countries will be more keen
to export those goods for which they have relatively larger markets. Thus, the larger the
trade costs, the larger the taste specialization and, ￿nally, the larger the scale economies
(meant as the ratio between ￿xed costs and variable costs of production), the larger the
specialization in the production of one particular good: in turn, this specialization in-
creases the opportunity to become a net-exporter of that good. In more detail, because
of transport costs, wages might result to be di⁄erent across countries. Workers will be
better o⁄ in larger economies where they earn larger wages. However, if production costs
are the same, it is more pro￿table to produce within the relatively larger market in order
to minimize transportation costs; wage di⁄erentials must compensate such an advantage
in order to keep employment in both the countries. Furthermore, the degree in production
specialization depends on the degree in tastes: the more dissimilar tastes across countries,
the larger the opportunity to specialize. Thus, if two countries di⁄er by tastes, they will
choose to specialize in the production of that good for which they have a larger domestic
market. Indeed, the more important economies of scale and the less important transporta-
tion costs, the lower the opportunity of incomplete specialization. Hillberry and Hummels
(2002) studied the relationship between the home bias e⁄ect and the co-location decisions
of both intermediate and ￿nal goods producers. In their model, consumers have identical
preferences: in particular, they are of Cobb-Douglas type over di⁄erent commodities and
Dixit-Stiglitz type over di⁄erentiated varieties within the same commodity group. More-
over, di⁄erentiated goods are produced by ￿rms using intermediate inputs, capital and
labour and can be used to produce ￿nal goods, intermediate goods or both. Labour and
capital are assumed to be mobile across sectors within the same region but segmented at
the region level. Finally, small trade costs imply co-location between producers of inter-
mediate goods and producers of ￿nal goods: industrial demands turned out to be more
oriented towards goods that are locally available because ￿rms move in order to mini-
mize trade costs. Therefore, demand resulted to be endogenously home biased in general
equilibrium. The model was empirically tested on commodity-level data drawn from the
1997 US Commodity Flow Survey; particularly, the dataset matched the detailed regional
geography of shipments to the features of the shipping establishments. The main results of
their empirical analysis are following. First, regional absorption of goods resulted to vary
over space depending on the location of ￿nal goods production. Second, the more local
the production of a good, the larger the absorption of that good. Third, within a narrow
industrial classi￿cation, the characteristics of shipments turned out to vary over space:
goods at the ￿rst steps of the value chain travelled short distances while goods at the last
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resulted to be more likely to cross national borders. Fourth, trade barriers were found
to vary signi￿cantly over goods. Finally, it was found no evidence that the increasing
e⁄ect of trade barriers disappeared if production location was controlled for (this result
was probably due to the fact the goods classi￿cation system used was not enough de-
tailed to capture intermediate-￿nal goods relationships that might occur for really speci￿c
products). Hanson and Xiang (2004) built up and estimated a model aiming at studying
variation of home-market e⁄ects across di⁄erent industries. On the theoretical side, they
developed a monopolistic competition model of international trade. There were assumed
to be two countries, one large and one small, each of which has one input factor, that
is labour. Moreover, there was a continuum of monopolistically competitive industries.
Consumers had the same Cobb-Douglas preferences over products of all industries. Indus-
tries were allowed to di⁄er by the number of varieties, elasticity of substitution between
varieties and iceberg transport costs. Furthermore, there was assumed no international
specialization at the industry level. The main implication of such a model was that the
home-market e⁄ects depends on the number of industries with di⁄erentiated products
within the whole economy. On the one hand, in case of such industries, those industries
with larger transport costs and lower substitution elasticity will tend to concentrate more
within the large country with respect to those industries featuring lower transport costs
and larger substitution elasticity. This occurs because moving production from the small
country to the large one yields larger savings in terms of trade costs and lower increases
in production costs for high transport/low demand elasticity ￿rms. On the other hand,
in an economy with only two industries, industries with high transport cost and lower
demand elasticity will concentrate within the large country in absolute and not in just rel-
ative terms. On the empirical side, this work employed a "di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence" gravity
speci￿cation in order to test the predictions of the theoretical model. That is a three-stage
approach: ￿rst, they selected pairs of countries coping with common trade barriers in their
export destination markets; second, they selected two groups of industries, one with high
transport costs and low demand elasticity (the "treatment" subsample) and one with low
transport cost and high demand elasticity (the "control" subsample); third, they tested
whether larger countries resulted to have larger exports of relatively higher transport cost
and more di⁄erentiated goods. Thus, the "di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence" estimation methods
led to correct both the bias depending on bilateral exports determinants that are speci￿c
to the importer country (such as import tari⁄s, import-country remoteness, home bias
in demand) and the bias depending on the large country￿ s tendency to export more of
all goods. In particular, the ￿rst di⁄erence tackled the former bias while the second dif-
ference aimed at eliminating the latter one. Therefore, empirical results con￿rmed that
international trade is a⁄ected by imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale
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Pagoulatos, Gonzalez (2006) measured the degree of home bias for processed food and
beverage products within the US and showed some of its determinants. Within this scope,
they exploited an Armington model that is based on product di⁄erentiation by country
of origin. The motivation of this work was given by the small import shares within the
US food-processing sector even though trade barriers were fairly low. Thus, one possible
explanation for such evidence was the "home bias", that worked as a natural barrier to
imports. As also showed in other studies developed in many countries /industries, the
work provided evidence of strong "home bias" that signi￿cantly prevented foreign import
from entering the US domestic market; furthermore, they showed that imports levels, on
average, would be nine times as large as the actual ones if the home bias did not exist.
Turning to some details, the level of home bias in the US food-processing industry resulted
to be related to raw agricultural sector, ￿nished rather than intermediate goods, imports
from neighboring markets, such as Canada and Mexico and industries with non-tari⁄bar-
riers. Therefore, the main conclusion is that the home bias is not only determined by
the supply side (such as had been showed through gravity models) but also by demand
preferences. So, an eventual model aiming at providing a complete explanation of home
bias should include aspects related to both the sides (supply an demand). If previous
works had mostly focused on trade barriers, transport costs and income changes as de-
terminants of trade growth, Whalley and Xin (2007) turned the attention on preferences.
More speci￿cally, they set up a global numerical general equilibrium model in order to
measure the e⁄ects of changes in home bias within regions on the worldwide trade growth
over the last decades (data referred to the period 1975-2004). They found that changes
in home product preferences over the period considered could have led to a reduction in
global trade by 27 percent with respect to 2004 levels. In more detail, larger e⁄ects (19
percent) came from home bias changes in developing countries with respect to e⁄ects (8
percent) from the developed countries. These results seemed to be indicating the growing
importance of regionalization within the global economy, probably due to an increase in
the number of trade agreements. In order to develop the quantitative analysis, they set
up and calibrated a simple international trade model of inter bloc trade. Further results
concerned some other sources of the growth of international trade: in particular, income
growth, income convergence and decreasing trade costs resulted to account for, respec-
tively, 76 percent, 4 percent and 7 percent of the growth rate. Finally, the work raised one
further issue (to be addresses in future works) about an eventual regionalization within
the trade blocs themselves. Mylonidis (2008) studied the relationship between home bias
towards domestic tradable goods and deviations from absolute PPP. Within this scope,
the work provided a simple theoretical framework modeling a two-country (home and
foreign country) economy. In particular, the model featured in￿nitely living consumers
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foreign consumers are assumed to buy two types of traded goods: a domestically produced
good and a foreign produced good. Empirically, the "home" country is a pool of countries
(Germany, Japan, France, Italy, Canada and the UK) while the "foreign" country is the
US. In addition, data on bilateral nominal exchange rates against the US dollar and the
producer price index (that is preferred to the consumer price index as it includes largely
tradable goods) are drawn from the International Financial Statistics database. Thus,
the main result from the empirical analysis was that the home bias can explain a large
part of the PPP deviations. Balta and Delgado (2009) explored the home market bias
within the European Union. The main aim of this work is to assess whether the inte-
gration policies within the Union had been successful or not by observing the level and
the over time pattern of home bias across the European countries in goods and services
and in equity portfolio holdings. Indeed, a large level of integration of goods and capital
markets was thought of as necessary in order to tackle asymmetric shocks, particularly
in the euro area. That was because exchange rates and interest rates had turned to be
managed at central common level. Thus, in order to develop the analysis of home bias,
￿rst a "Frictionless Economy" scenario was built up: that is a market where all countries￿
production is pooled so that consumers randomly take products from that pool (the share
of a country in each consumption basket was assumed to depend on the relative share of
that country in the pooled production). So, the ￿rst result is that the policies aimed at
building up the Single Market did not result to be so e⁄ective as long as all the EU-15
countries turned out to consume home products and invest in home equity largely more
than in the benchmark scenario. Furthermore, with respect to their economic size, EU-15
countries were more home biased than Japan and the US. Turning to the second result, in
terms of over time pattern of home bias, the latter resulted to be stuck at the same level
since 2000 for goods and services, while it decreased for equity markets. Third, a signi￿-
cant di⁄erence in the level of home bias was found across the EU countries. Speci￿cally,
there are some countries, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Germany, that
seemed to be integrated, while there are other countries, such as Greece and Spain, whose
demand resulted much less oriented to foreign products and equity. Moreover, the new
EU member states turned out to be close to the EU-15 countries in terms of home bias in
products, even though their equity portfolios seemed to be strongly home-biased.
2.2.4 Heterogeneity in tastes
I now turn to another issue that is related to the home market e⁄ect and concerns how
much di⁄erent tastes are across countries and, particularly, what determines them. Roy
and Viaene (1998) set up a Ricardian model featuring country bias in consumer prefer-
ences, but neither market imperfections nor economies of scale. More speci￿cally, identical
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di⁄erent countries. Such a perception might be due to di⁄erent factors, like the reputa-
tion of quality of goods produced in some particular countries, information and beliefs on
the production process in other countries, considerations of noneconomic nature related
to social or political bias. As an example, you might think of the case that production
leads to less environmental damages in some countries than in others (this might be due
to di⁄erences in the abatement capacity of the ecosystem). If consumers are concerned
for the health of the global environment for not really large price di⁄erentials, they will
chose to buy from those countries where the environmental damage is relatively lower. So,
the ￿rst contribution of this work is that production specialization across countries can
be a⁄ected by the preference structure. Di⁄erently from what predicted by the classical
Ricardian model, this model implies some equilibria in which specialization in produc-
tion is incomplete across the two countries that, consequently, trade all the commodities
in the economy; furthermore, in other possible equilibria, specialization and trade follow
reverse patterns from those predicted within the Ricardian world. The second major re-
sult of this paper is that both interindustry and intraindustry forms of trade can happen
at the same time despite of the absence of market imperfections, strategic behaviours
or product di⁄erentiation. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) studied the e⁄ect of identity on
economic outputs. So, they included identity within a model of behaviour; in particular,
they analyzed di⁄erent examples of behaviours that are related to identity, such as gender
discrimination in the labour market, the household division of labour and the economic
mechanics of social exclusion and poverty. So doing, they reached conclusions that di⁄er
from what predicted by previous economic models about. The ￿rst result was that people
take identity-based payo⁄s from their own actions. This could explain bahaviours that
might seem detrimental or even self-destructive from people with di⁄erent identities; how-
ever, those behaviours could be determined by the willing to enhance the sense of self or to
keep self-image high. In fact, focusing on the gender discrimination within the workplace,
they found that a lower utility for women working in a "man￿ s" job: this, of course, turned
out to a⁄ect the labour supply. Secondly, the work showed that people take identity-based
payo⁄s also from others￿actions. So, identity could also have an externality e⁄ect as what
one person does might a⁄ect behaviours of others. As an example, they used the dress as
a symbol of femininity: therefore, if a man wore a dress, he would threaten other men￿ s
identity. Third, third parties can produce persistence changes in people￿ s payo⁄s. Prefer-
ences can change over the whole society and, particularly, they can be manipulated from
someone that has incentives to do that (see advertisements or public policies). In their
poverty model, the larger the extent of social exclusion, the more the chances that people
avoid remunerative actions. Finally, some people might choose an identity that might
be forbidden for others. Thus, individuals might be willing to choose a type of identity
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terms. In particular, changes in social categories and behavioural prescriptions could a⁄ect
identity-based payo⁄s: this turned out to be really important when they focused on social
exclusion. Francois and Ypersele (2002) gave the de￿nition of cultural goods as those
goods that domestic consumers value in a di⁄erent manner with respect to foreigners and
that are produced by increasing returns to scale technologies. A real case reported in
this work is that of Hollywood movies that, according to the popular press, were threat-
ening traditional cultures within European countries. In fact, exploiting characteristics
that are appreciated in di⁄erent countries, Hollywood ￿lms could crowd out European
competitors that would not be able to compete internationally by their domestic-oriented
products. Thus, they set up a theoretical model in order to ￿nd out those conditions that
make the imposition of a tari⁄ on the homogeneosuly valued goods Pareto improving. In
more detail, the model assumed an economy with two countries (say France and the US)
and three goods. In one of the two countries, the US, there are two potential producers:
one produces a homogeneously valued good across the two countries, while the other one
produces a good that is internationally valued in a heterogeneous manner. In the other
country, say France, there is only one producer that produces a good that has got di⁄erent
values in the two countries and, particularly, has got no value for American consumers.
So, as an example, the work led to the conclusion that a tari⁄on the import of ￿lms from
Hollywood to France can actually be welfare improving for both the countries. Giannetti
and Yafeh (2008) focused on the e⁄ects of cultural di⁄erences within ￿nancial markets. In
particular, they empirically studied, through a large dataset of international syndicated
bank loans, whether such di⁄erences between professional decision-makers are able to af-
fect ￿nancial contracts. In terms of results, they ￿rst found that decision-makers are keen
to give better contractual conditions and share risk with counterparties that result to be
more alike. In more detail, cultural di⁄erences turned out to prevent lead banks from
lending a certain amount of funds to borrowers and participant banks from investing in
the syndicate. Thus, on the one hand, lead banks resulted to concede lower amounts of
loans at a higher interest rate to borrowers that were more culturally distant; moreover,
the larger the cultural gap with borrowers, the larger the probability that those banks
required third-party guarantees. On the other hand, participant banks turned out to fund
syndicated loans from culturally distant banks for lower portions. Furthermore, cultural
similarity seemed to matter both in debt markets and in equity markets. Finally, cul-
tural biases did not result to be signi￿cantly decreased after repeated interactions with
the same counterpart or with other foreign agents. Olivier, Thoenig and Verdier (2008)
developed a model aimed at examining the relationship between international trade and
the dynamics of cultural identity. So, in their model, they included a cultural good, that
was meant as a positive group externality among individuals having the same culture
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types of agents: standard homo economicus, whose preferences over all goods (included
the cultural good) are well de￿ned and who does not bene￿t from the group externality,
and homo culturalis, who bene￿ts from both individual consumption and positive group
externality (and, consequently, pays a premium for the cultural good). Furthermore, the
share of agents that bene￿t from the group externality related to the cultural good is
endogenous and depends on a dynamic process of parental and peer socialization. Thus,
the relationship between cultural identity and market equilibrium is twofold. On the one
hand, cultural identity a⁄ected both prices and the allocation of resources through the
standard demand channel: the lager the size of a given cultural community, the larger
the demand for the relative cultural good, the larger the price of that good in equilibrium
(reciprocally, the larger the price of the cultural good, the lower the utility of consuming
that good). On the other hand, there is also a cultural identity e⁄ect leading to cultural
homogenization over the society. The consequence of this interaction between cultural
identity and economic equilibrium is that preferences are endogenous and are dependent
on the supply side of the economy (i.e. factor endowments and technology). Thus, the
work studied the e⁄ect of three types of trade integration on cultural identity. In the
￿rst case, they focused on the integration of standard goods markets. Indeed, this type
of trade is worth for consumers of those goods, but it is costly for proponents of cultural
goods that are substitute to standard goods. Therefore, trade openness increases cultural
divergence across the world. In the second case, the work turned to the e⁄ects of trade of
cultural goods. Particularly, there was a distinction between local cultural goods (that can
be only produced and consumed locally) and global cultural goods (that, instead, can be
produced and consumed everywhere). So, they found that the local culture of the country
with comparative advantage in the global cultural good will result to be expanded; on the
other side, the local culture of the other country will face an erosion process. Finally, the
attention is turned to virtual integration, that means socialization across heterogeneous
groups through, for example, migration, student exchanges or tourism. Of course, social-
ization of individuals from di⁄erent countries occurs only if they are sensitive to the global
culture: therefore, in this case, integration led to the erosion of the local cultures and
homogenization of tastes across the countries. Auer (2009) focused on a two-sided het-
erogeneity: on the one hand, products are heterogeneous in their attributes; on the other
hand, consumers are heterogeneous in their taste for those attributes of products. So,
this theoretical work led to an equilibrium that matches consumer valuations with good
attributes; in particular, the model extended Krugman (1980) by introducing product and
taste heterogeneity. The ￿rst result of the model is a within-industry generalization of the
home market e⁄ect studied by Krugman: each country￿ s industry is oriented to the tastes
of local population. If, taking the car industry as an example, French consumers focus
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will become a net exporter of fuel e¢ cient cars, while Germany will become a net exporter
of fast cars. However, none of them will become a net exporter of cars. The second result
of the model is that, in the short run, consumption turned out to be home biased after
trade liberalization: this means that the volume of trade was found lower than expected
according to transportation costs and demand elasticity. Thus, taste di⁄erences across
countries resulted to be a limit to international trade. The third result of this paper is
that, in the long run, the within industry market e⁄ect increases as countries specialize
even more while the home bias disappears: therefore, the long-run volume of trade turned
out be the same as in the case of no taste di⁄erences across countries. The latter means
that Linder￿ s (1961) theory according to which taste heterogeneity across countries is an
impediment to international trade only in the short-run.
2.2.5 The role of trade costs in international pricing
Samuelson (1954) studied the e⁄ects of di⁄erent types of trade impediments by a simple
two-country two-good model. The ￿rst type of impediment is given by real transport
costs, that are de￿ned in a manner that will become famous in the modern literature on
international trade. The idea was that part of the value of the good shipped abroad is
consumed during the act of shipment. So, these impediments were thought of as "real"
as they implied the use of resources in shipping goods. As an example, the author used
ice: only a part of ice exported to another country will arrive at destination as unmelted
ice; the other part will be melted away. Thus, this type of trade costs will take the name
of "iceberg costs". By comparing the balances of payments of the two countries in the
model, it resulted that goods are cheapest in their origin country because over there both
transport costs on the export good and trade costs on the import good are saved. The
other trade impediments considered in this work are of arti￿cial type and are given by
tari⁄s or quotas. In order to make arti￿cial impediments comparable with the real one
previously described, it was assumed that US Customs Service taxed imported goods in
the form of part of those imported goods themselves. In terms of international prices
consequences, arti￿cial impediments led to the same implications as real impediments:
goods resulted to be cheapest in the origin country. However, balance of payments in the
two countries turned out to be a⁄ected by this type of trade impediments in a way that
was di⁄erent from the former one. This happened because the government was assumed to
distribute tari⁄ receipts to the representative consumer in lump-sum manner. Therefore,
consumers can think of the true import prices for them as equal to the actual domestic
prices. For example, imports valued inside the US were equal to exports valued in the US
plus a lump-sum tari⁄ rebate.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) aimed at providing gravity equations with a the-
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gravity equations by considering and correcting the omitted variable bias and, moreover,
to correctly measure the impact of trade frictions through comparative statics. So, they
set up a model featuring multiple regions and multiple di⁄erentiated goods. In particular,
each region was assumed to be specialized in the production of one good and the total
supply of each good was ￿xed. Furthermore, in every region, consumers maximize a CES
function that aggregates goods coming from all the regions and also includes a distribu-
tion parameter. In this model, prices were allowed to di⁄er across destinations because
of trade costs, that arose from the exporter side. Aggregate price indexes turned out to
be "multilateral resistance" variables as determined by all bilateral resistances within the
economy. Trade costs are thought of as information costs, legal and regulatory costs and
transport costs. In more detail, the trade barrier between any pair of regions were split
into three components: the bilateral trade barrier between the two regions themselves
and each region speci￿c resistance to trade to all regions. Thus, bilateral trade was de-
termined by relative trade barriers, that is the bilateral trade barriers relative to average
trade barriers that each of the two regions have to face with all trading partners. The
three main comparative statics implications from this framework, in terms of e⁄ects of a
uniform increase of national border barriers across all countries, follows. First, relative
trade barriers increased less for small countries, so yielding to a lower reduction in bilateral
trade. This was because multilateral trade resistance increased more for small countries
than for big countries. Second, the increase in trade within small countries resulted to be
larger than the increase of trade within large countries. Third, once size was controlled
for, trade within country, say, 1 increased relative to trade between country 1 and coun-
try, say, 2: the smaller country 1, the larger country 2, the larger such an increase came
up. Thus, empirically they exploited this framework in order to address the McCallum
puzzle and found that national border made trade between industrialized countries fall
by a 20-50 percent. Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003) studied the relationship between
distribution costs and the behaviour of real exchange rate during exchange rate-based
stabilization. The major aim was to explain how come that a large part of the move-
ments in the US real exchange rate had resulted to be due to movements in the prices
of tradable goods (see Engel [1999]). In fact, standard real exchange models assumed
the purchasing power parity to hold for tradable goods, so that deviations from the PPP
only depended on prices of non-tradable goods. So, they ￿rst showed really large extent
of distribution costs for the average consumer good: it amounted to around 40 percent
of the retail price in the US and 60 percent of the retail price in Argentina. Then, they
set up a model in which no good is traded for free. More speci￿cally, all goods need
distribution services (such as wholesale and retail services, marketing and advertisement
and local transportation services) that are intensive in local labour and land, so that they
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country speci￿c, they contribute to generate price di⁄erentials for traded goods across
countries. Therefore, non-tradable goods are included into the standard theory of PPP in
the form of distribution costs: if the latter are zero, then the standard PPP results to be
holding again. On the other side, the larger the distribution margin across the economy
(de￿ned as the gap between retail price and producer price), the larger the fraction of
RER due to ￿ uctuations of prices of tradable goods. Finally, in calibration exercises, the
model employed seemed to be able to generate large RER appreciations. Anderson and
van Wincoop (2004) surveyed di⁄erent measures of trade costs. In a broad way, trade
costs are those costs faced to ship a good to the ￿nal consumer. Some examples follow:
transportation costs (concerning both freight and time), policy barriers (of both tari⁄and
non-tari⁄ types), cost of switching from one currency to another one, information costs,
security costs, contracts enforcement costs, legal costs, wholesale and retail distribution
costs. They resulted to be really large particularly in the industrialized countries (accord-
ing to an estimate of the tax equivalent of representative trade costs, they accounted to
170 percent). Furthermore, they also showed to be very variable across both goods and
countries. This work provided evidence of three types of trade costs, that are international
policy barriers, transport costs and distribution costs, and argued about relative measure-
ments problems and limitations. The major data source for international policy barriers
to trade is the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development￿ s Trade Analysis &
Information System (TRAINS). The main limitation of that database is that it does not
provide ad valorem equivalents of speci￿c tari⁄s: this turns out to be a problem especially
for those industries where speci￿c tari⁄s are common (see agriculture in many countries).
In terms of evidence, tari⁄s resulted to be fairly low (less than 5 percent) in developed
countries and higher (more than 10 percent) in developing countries. In addition, disper-
sion across countries is also large: tari⁄s go from 0 percent (in Switzerland) to 30.1 percent
(in India); in the US tari⁄s amount to 1.9 percent. Turning to non-tari⁄ barriers, they
can be de￿ned in both a narrow and a broad way: the narrow de￿nition includes control
measures on price, quantity and quality; the broad de￿nition, instead, includes the former
plus antidumping measures. However, in this case, data limitations are even stronger in
this case as the number of countries for which information are available is lower than in
case of tari⁄ barriers. For the US, the trade-weighted NTB (Non-Tari⁄ Barriers) cover-
age is much larger than the arithmetic NTB coverage: this proved that NTB mostly a⁄ect
traded goods. Finally, NTB￿ s seem to be more concentrated in a low number of industries:
in particular, textiles/apparel, wood and wood products, plus some other manufacturing
industries. About transport costs, these can be of two major types: direct costs (such as
freight charges and insurance related to freight charges) and indirect costs (such as holding
cost for goods in transit, inventory costs and shipment preparation costs). The latter need
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US Census and the IMF. The trade-weighted average trade cost ranges from 3.8 percent
of the f.o.b. price in the US to 13.3 percent in Paraguay. Moreover, across commodities
in the US. the arithmetic averages are included between 5.7 percent (for machinery and
transport equipment) and 15.7 percent (for mineral fuels). Finally, wholesale and retail
distribution costs are included in retail prices and vary across countries. As in Burstein,
Neves and Rebelo (2003), domestic distribution costs can be constructed using national
input-output data for tradable consumption goods. Thus, the average distribution costs
range from 42 percent in Belgium to 70 percent in Japan (in the US they account to 68
percent of producer price); they vary even more across goods: in particular, in the US,
they range from 14 percent on electronic equipment to 216 percent on ladies clothing.
Arkolakis (2008) set up a monopolistic competition model with product di⁄erentiation
and productivity heterogeneity. The aim of their work is to shed light on market pen-
etration costs that are thought of as marketing costs. The latter were assumed to have
two main features: ￿st, the larger the population size of a market, the lower the cost of
selling goods to a given number of consumers within that market (in fact, some evidence
is provided about how cost of advertising varies by population size); secondly, the larger
the number of consumers reached, the larger marginal cost of marketing, that means that
a ￿rm entering into the market is going to cope with increasing marginal costs in order to
reach additional consumers (even in this case, evidence of decreasing returns to scale of
advertising costs within a certain market was reported). In terms of results, ￿rst the work
explained the existence of many small exporters in exporting destinations as showed in the
past literature (see Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz [2008]). The uniform ￿xed cost models
(see Melitz [2003]) implied large ￿xed costs at the entry but, so doing, they were not able
to explain why there were so many small exporters. Thus, in larger market reaching the
￿rst consumers implied a relatively lower cost due to the increasing returns to scale of
adverting with respect the population dimension; moreover, the increasing marginal costs
of marketing implied that the less productive ￿rms could reach only a few consumers and,
then, export only a little amounts. Moreover, this work, through comparative statics, also
showed a large increase of trade volumes after trade liberalization for those goods with
low trade volumes before such liberalization. Empirically, the increase in the trade of
such goods between the US and Mexico after the NAFTA liberalization in the 90s￿seemed
to match well the theoretical conclusions of the model. Helpman, Melitz and Rubistein
(2008) set up a model able to catch two important characteristics of international trade:
￿rst, zero trade ￿ ows between many pairs of countries; second, the varying number of
exporting ￿rms across destination countries. They provided evidence that, on a panel of
158 countries, the largest share of country pairs did not trade with each other, while the
lowest share of country pairs traded in both directions (the middle share, instead, traded
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arate channels: the intensive margin, that is the trade volume for each exporter, and the
extensive margin, the number of exporters. In order to separate those two channels in the
empirical analysis of international trade, the work relied on a international trade model
featuring heterogeneous ￿rms and yielding a gravity equation that takes into account the
self-selection of ￿rms into export and the e⁄ect on trade volumes. Producers willing to
export were assumed to deal with two additional costs, that were a transport cost and
a ￿xed cost of exporting to a speci￿c country. Particularly, those additional costs were
not assumed to depend on the identity (productivity) of exporting producers but on the
identity of origin and destination countries. Thus, empirically, they exploited a two-stage
estimation procedure: it employed, in the ￿rst stage, an equation aimed at selecting trad-
ing partners, while, in the second stage, a trade ￿ ow equation. In more detail, the second
stage equation addressed two sources of bias related to standard gravity equations: a se-
lection bias and an unobserved heterogeneity bias, that came from heterogeneity in the
share of ￿rms exporting from a source to a destination national market. So, it turned out
that estimates of the impact of trade barriers by a standard gravity equation were biased
upward: higher trade volumes did not result to depend only on lower trade barriers, but
also on a larger number of exporters to a speci￿c destination country. In fact, the ￿xed
costs of trade turned out to be reduced by sharing a common language or religion or by
joining the same Free Trade Area with the trade partner: indeed, those common elements
did not a⁄ect the export volumes but only an exporter￿ s choice of the destination country.
In addition, asymmetries in bilateral trade ￿ ows resulted to also depend on asymmetries
in extensive margins; in turn, the latter asymmetries depended on ￿xed trade costs het-
erogeneity. Corsetti and Dedola (2005) set up a two-country model of real and monetary
transmission in case of international price discrimination. In this work, upstream mo-
nopolistic ￿rms sell tradable goods to competitive retailers that are located in di⁄erent
places. Such vertical interaction between monopolistic producers and local retailers, that
leads to market segmentation, is exploited to study the implications of distributive trade
on the level of exchange rate pass-through into import prices. In particular, the elastic-
ity of demand for the same good turns out to di⁄er across markets due to the fact that
distribution services are intensive in local nontraded inputs. Thus, the main implications
from the model follow. First, optimal pricing by monopolistic ￿rms lead to endogenous
deviations from the law of one price at both the wholesale and the retail level (notice
that in setting optimal prices, it must hold the constraint that does not allow for oppor-
tunities of arbitrage across wholesalers and retailers placed in di⁄erent markets). Second,
optimal price discrimination across national borders leads to incomplete exchange rate
pass-through into import prices. Finally, nominal depreciations have a negative e⁄ect in
terms of terms of trade (however, the more ￿rms can set prices independently of exchange
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of domestic and foreign goods). In conclusion, according to this model, large movements
in the nominal and real exchange rates (positively correlated) turn into small movements
in price levels, consumption and employment in equilibrium: thus, ￿ uctuations in nominal
and real exchange rates are more volatile that ￿ uctuations in fundamentals. Finally, some
criticism to iceberg costs was made by McCann (2005), that reviewed some properties of
those costs in order to show the implications for new economic geography models. The
work ￿rst described the Samuelson iceberg transport cost function. According to the lat-
ter, transportation costs impose a step-wise discontinuity for the home and foreign prices
of the same goods. In particular, the extent of such discontinuity depends on the percent-
age of the value of the good that is consumed by during the shipment. That percentage
is actually used to represent transport costs: the larger it is, the larger the discontinuity
between home and foreign prices. It was highlighted that discontinuity does not depend
on any geographical features: spatial pricing results to be not related to distance at all.
Then, the paper turns to the new de￿nition of iceberg costs by P. Krugman (1991), that
explicitly related those costs to geographical distance. Krugman iceberg costs have three
main properties. First, they are convex with respect to distance, that is the absolute
quantity of the shipped good￿ s value that is consumed for each kilometer of the shipment
falls as the distance to be covered increases. Second, the degree of convexity increases
with the original value of the good that is being shipped: the larger the original value,
the larger the rate at which the delivered price grows with distance. Third, the transport
cost per ton-kilometre does not depend on the total quantity shipped. Next, the work
presented a broader de￿nition of iceberg costs that was considered necessary in order to
bridge the gap between new economic geography models and empirical gravity models:
more speci￿cally, this larger de￿nition should also include information costs, institutional
barriers, linguistic di⁄erences as well as quality standards. Finally, it is concluded that
iceberg costs assumptions are always problematic as an empirical evaluation of them is
something hard to do. Thus, as long as these costs are crucial within many important
models, it is necessary to be cautious when moving from those models to reality or policy
implications.
2.3 Summary of the literature review
2.3.1 Economic integration: is it always e¢ cient?
￿ Productivity heterogeneity and trade. Melitz (2003) explained welfare gains from
international trade through intra-industry reallocation: the most e¢ cient ￿rms in-
crease their market shares and pro￿ts, while the least productive agents are pushed
o⁄ the market. Bernard and Jensen (1999), Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000) and
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which exporting boosts ￿rms￿performances and productivities for, respectively, the
US, Taiwan and Chile.
￿ Trade, market size and competition toughness. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) the-
oretically showed that bigger markets have a larger number of competitors and a
higher level of product variety; therefore, international trade turned out to have
pro-competitive e⁄ects due to the reduction of markups and, then, prices. Empirical
evidence of such an e⁄ect is reported in Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) and Chen,
Imbs and Scott (2009) for, respectively, the US and the EU.
￿ E¢ ciency of input factors allocation. Epifani and Gancia (2011) showed that asym-
metric exposure to international trade can contribute to markup heterogeneity across
industries; in turn, this leads to intersectoral misallocation of production factors. On
the empirical side, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) revealed that input factor misallocation
can explain the lower aggregate total factor productivity in China and India with
respect to the US.
￿ Di⁄erent sources of market power. The degree of market competition toughness can
be determined by di⁄erent sources: horizontal product di⁄erentiation across ￿rms
(Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977); the number of competitors (Dunne, Klimek, Roberts and
Xu, 2009); preference for variety (Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz, 2007; Epifani and
Gancia, 2011); producers￿ clusters, geographic segmentation and transport costs
(Syverson, 2004); institutional factors, such as barriers to entry, price controls, op-
erational restrictions, public sector size (Hopenhayn, 1992; Aghion, Harris, Howitt
and Vickers, 2001; Ryan, 2006).
￿ Some issues concerning economic integration and ￿scal competition. Cremer and
Pestieau (1996) and Bolton and Gerard (1997) pointed out that it is important
to make preferences over ￿scal policies across the EU members more homogeneous
in order to minimize the costs of integration. Thus, reducing income distribution
di⁄erences as well as enhancing labour (and capital) mobility (see Hindrinks, 2001
and Kesslerm Lulfesmann and Myers, 2002) turned out to be crucial in order to
achieve that target.
￿ Constitution and e¢ ciency of trade blocs. Krugman (1989) showed that the con-
stitution of trade blocs, de￿ned as areas with internal free trade and a common
external ad valorem tari⁄ can reduce the interbloc trade and decrease the world
welfare. However, as argued in Krugman (1991) and Frankel, Stein and Wei (1996),
in case of prohibitive trade costs, the formation of continental ("natural") blocs is
optimal. Bond and Park (2002) and Fung and Schneider (2005) dealt with trade
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the ￿rst work studied how to exploit variations of payo⁄s over time in order to relax
only one country￿ s incentive constraints in trade agreements.
2.3.2 Purchasing Power Parity theory and Pricing-to-Market
￿ The PPP puzzle. Balassa (1964) argued that it is possible to observe a systematic
relationship between purchasing power parities and exchange rates if non-traded
goods are considered. International productivity di⁄erences in the production of
traded goods are larger than productivity di⁄erences in the production of non-traded
goods (services): the latter a⁄ect the calculation of purchasing power parities but
not the calculation of exchange rates. Rogo⁄(1996) and Obstfeld and Rogo⁄(2000)
considered some possible sources of international divergence of prices, such as trans-
portation costs, tari⁄ and non-tari⁄ barriers, information costs, di⁄erent national
quality standards, nominal rigidities and pricing-to-market. Crucini, Telmer and
Zachariadis (2005) and Crucini and Shintani (2008) empirically found a negative
correlation between Law of One Price deviations and tradeability of goods for, re-
spectively, the EU and the US.
￿ The PTM issue. Krugman (1986) theoretically pointed out that the understand-
ing of pricing-to-market mostly relies on dynamic models of imperfect competition.
Feenstra, Gagnon and Knetter (1996), Goldberg and Verboven (2001) and Cheung,
Chinn and Fujii (2001) found empirical evidence that PTM is determined by the
market structure. Finally, Atkeson and Burstein (2008) explained PTM by both
imperfect competition and international trade costs.
￿ The home bias e⁄ect. Krugman (1980) studied the home market e⁄ect, according to
which, in presence of increasing returns, countries will be more keen to export those
goods for which they have relatively larger markets. More recently, Hanson and
Xiang (2004) showed that industries with larger transport costs and lower substitu-
tion elasticities tend to concentrate within larger countries with respect to industries
with lower transport costs and larger substitution elasticities. Lopez, Pagoulatos and
Gonzalez (2006) and Balta and Delgado (2009) provided evidence of the home bias
e⁄ect in, respectively, the US and the EU.
￿ Heterogeneity in tastes. Roy and Viaene (1998) pointed out that the same goods
can be perceived di⁄erently according to the origin country, because of reputation
of quality, beliefs on the production process and political/social bias. Akerlof and
Kranton (2000) studied identity-based economic payo⁄s that people take from their
own actions or from others￿actions. Francois and Ypersele (2002) and Olivier,
Thoening and Verdier (2008) de￿ned the cultural goods: the ￿rst as goods that
58domestic consumers value in a di⁄erent manner with respect to foreigners; the second
as positive group externality among individuals sharing the same culture and the
same consumption patterns on a particular goods.
￿ The role of trade costs. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) surveyed di⁄erent mea-
sures of trade costs: transport costs, policy barriers (of both tari⁄ and non-tari⁄
types), cost of switching from one currency to another one, information costs, secu-
rity costs, contract enforcement costs, wholesale and distribution costs. Moreover,
they showed how trade costs can vary across both countries and goods. Helpman,
Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) set up a model that catches two important features of
international trade: ￿rst, zero trade ￿ ows between many pairs of countries; second,
the varying number of exporting ￿rms across destination countries. In particular,
they showed that trade barriers can a⁄ect trade through two di⁄erent channels: the
intensive margin, that is the volume for each exporter, and the extensive margin,
that is the number of exporters.
593 Industrial Structure, Trade and Regional Economics:
Market Segmentation
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I study the economic e¢ ciency of input factors mobility across both
symmetric and asymmetric markets. Thus, the primary aim is to contribute to shed light
on whether a full integration of countries, regions or industrial sectors is always Pareto-
e¢ cient or not. In case it is not, I seek to ￿nd out in which cases and to which extent
such mobility should be restricted in order to obtain Pareto-improvements at the global
level. Finally, I turn to individual markets￿side to establish, eventually, which one gains
and which one loses after integration with the other markets.
More speci￿cally, I analytically compare two di⁄erent frameworks. The ￿rst one is
a fully integrated economy, where both the production factors, i.e. capital and labour,
are assumed to be free mobile across markets. The second one, instead, is a partially
integrated economy, where only one factor is assumed to be free mobile, while the other
one is constrained by each individual market￿borders. So, capital is assumed to be the
free mobile input factor, that freely ￿ ows across countries and regions; in addition, labour
is segmented so as to model di¢ culties of labour migrating across international barriers
(in a trade context) or from a poor region to a richer one (in a regional context). Thus,
from a more empirical point of view, the model I set aims at analyzing the impact of com-
petition regulations on wages and ￿nancial ￿ ows both in the regional and international
context, and the potential output, welfare and ￿nancial implications of relaxing immigra-
tion laws. Furthermore, these issues will be addressed both at the aggregate level and at
the individual market level.
In more practical terms, by this framework, I wish to contribute to a better under-
standing of how e⁄ective current agreements on production factors mobility are, especially
within the European Union. Moreover, I would also argue about the economic opportunity
to further extend such agreements to other countries.3In fact, most of the concerns about
the latter point are not so di⁄erent from those that came up before the enlargement to the
Central and Eastern countries in 2004. More speci￿cally, as argued in Boeri and Br￿cker
(2001), large income and wage asymmetries between member states and candidates had
raised many issues about labour markets and income distribution. In particular, those is-
sues regarded living standards of low-skilled workers, that were threatened by an expected
increase of both the in￿ ow of low-cost workers and the out-￿ ow of plants from the West to
the East. Indeed, it is not di¢ cult to ￿nd out a large literature somehow supporting those
fears that, actually, might also sound as fairly intuitive. Samuelson (1964) already pointed
3Currently, candidate countries to access the EU are: Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro and
Turkey.
60out that after World War I constraints to immigration were trying to keep native workers￿
wages high. Card (2001), in an empirical work on US data, found that migration in￿ ows
were related to larger unemployment rates among natives and earlier immigrants (even
though the e⁄ects on the wage structure was marginal). Particularly, they estimated that
the arrival of immigrants between 1985 and 1990 reduced the employment rate of low-
skilled natives in the most important US cities by 1-2 percents on average. Borjas (2003),
instead, discovered some signi￿cant e⁄ects of immigration in terms of wages. He focused
on the migration ￿ ow that between 1980 and 2000 had increased the labour supply of male
workers in the US by 11 percent. Despite of positive e⁄ects of the arrival of low-skilled
workers on the wages of the high-skilled ones, he estimated that the in￿ ow of foreign work-
ers had reduced the wages of native workers by 3.2 percent. Of course, the e⁄ect was
larger for low-educated workers, that loss 8.9 percent of their wage on average.
Turning back to my model, it particularly aims at studying the implications of hetero-
geneity in market competition degrees within the context of integration of regional/national
markets. In fact, one of the crucial targets at the origin of the European Union is to gen-
erate and promote a Single Market and, of course, full mobility of input factors, namely
both capital and labour, turns out to be really important for that purpose.4 My ambition
is to assess the optimal degree of input market integration both in case of symmetry and
in case of asymmetry. Is full integration of input factors always Pareto-e¢ cient ? In the
cases in which it is not, which is the optimal extent of integration or, from another point
of view, which is the optimal extent of inputs restriction? Thus, what I argue is that, once
markets get integrated, free trade of input factors across borders might raise problems
as consequences of such heterogeneity in market competitiveness. One of the possible
problems I consider is that if migration barriers are lowered, then an excess of migratory
￿ ows to more competitive national markets could be expected and lead to welfare losses.
Intuitively, this would happen because, in relative terms, markets with larger demand
elasticities, ceteris paribus, will result to have lower prices of the goods and, consequently,
larger real wages. Then, the latter might push (too) many workers to leave markets where
￿rms￿monopoly power is relatively higher. Moreover, too many workers moving to one
side of this single market might are also associated to an excess of capital investments
into the same direction: this is because capital and labour are normally thought of as
having some degree of complementarity with each other. Therefore, the ￿nal outcome
is that there are some parts of the single market producing "too much" and other parts
producing "too little", so leading to welfare losses.
So far, problems related to factors mobility within the European Union have been
mostly studied from the economic geography perspective. More speci￿cally, it has been
4See Mario Monti￿ s report to the President of the European Commission, JosŁ Manuel Barroso, " A
new strategy fo the single market" (2010) as an important document that reveals the policy targets that
are pursued by the European Union.
61showed that the common European market has enhanced processes of concentration of eco-
nomic activities and specialization of economic areas and, so doing, has increased the risk
of asymmetric shocks. Making some examples, Amiti (1998) found an increase in the geo-
graphical concentration of production within EU countries. Furthermore, she also showed
that the majority of industrial sectors tend to be more agglomerated within the European
Union as a whole. She explained that result by Krugman￿ s argument: increasing return-to-
scale sectors are more likely to be geographically concentrated within large demand areas
and to employ a large proportion of intermediate inputs. Thus, she expected the mon-
etary union to enhance such a geographical concentration and, consequently, to increase
the likelihood of asymmetric shocks. Ottaviano and Puga (1998) stated that integration of
national markets within the European Union was making "central" regions stronger and
stronger because they were able to attract the most modern production sectors; on the
other side, this was weakening the "peripheral" areas as they could only keep traditional
and less productive industries. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2001) showed that
OECD countries and US states that are more industrially specialized have output shocks
that are relatively less correlated to aggregate output in respectively, OECD and the US.
They found that higher specialization is due to the removal of trade barriers, that allows
to spread the risk of specialization in international capital market. Midelfart, Overman
and Venables (2003) provided some empirical evidence about clustering and specializa-
tion within the EU area: labour intensive industries seem to be more concentrated in the
South of the EU, while service sector is more concentrated in the central regions. More
particularly, some countries, such as Greece, Portugal and Finland, have manufacturing
production structures that are very di⁄erent from the other countries. They pointed out
that trade integration is an incentive to cluster in order to exploit comparative advantages.
This is because it lowers the producers￿need of producing next to consumers. The ex-
pected consequence of production specialization is to make EU members more vulnerable
to asymmetric shocks. Furthermore, market forces seem to move economic activity from
the "periphery" to the central regions and this cannot be o⁄set by factor price di⁄erences
anymore. Thus, with respect to the New Economic Geography literature, I do not fo-
cus problems deriving from heterogeneity in demand size across integrated areas but on
problems deriving on heterogeneity in market structure. More speci￿cally, the reference
literature highlights that trade integration can be an incentive for producers to cluster over
large-demand areas in order to exploit increasing returns to scale: in turn, this increases
the risk for asymmetric shocks. Instead, as it will be shown next, my work points out
that input factors integration can yield overproduction within relatively larger demand
elasticity markets and underproduction within relatively lower demand elasticity areas, so
as to lead to an ine¢ cient amount of production at the aggregate level.
623.2 The model
3.2.1 Outline
I present a static general equilibrium economy, such that all the production is consumed.
There is one ￿nal good produced according to a nested standard CES production function
a l￿ Bhaskar. There are three distinct levels of production: individual producers, industrial
sectors 5 and aggregate economy. Thus, on the one hand, the aggregate economy produces
one ￿nal good according to a standard CES function that aggregates products coming from
industries. On the other hand, industrial sectors produce according to a CES function
that aggregates intermediate inputs. Finally, the latter are produced by heterogeneous
monopolistically competitive ￿rms that have to hire both the input factors, which are
labour and capital. Notice that I assume there is a large number, that is S, of industrial
sectors; in addition, within each industry, a large number of monopolistically competitive
￿rms, that is Ns, operates. In terms of notation, industries are indicated by the index
s 2 [1;S]; whilst ￿rms within sector s are indicated by the index n 2 [1;Ns]:6
I set two di⁄erent economic frameworks7: in the ￿rst one, labour is allowed to be free
mobile across sectors; in the second one, labour is restricted at the industry level such as
capital in both the settings. The two models￿equilibria turn out to be crucially di⁄erent
in terms of aggregate production, intermediate inputs costs and factors allocation. In
particular, in the fully integrated economy equilibrium wage is unique such as the rental
in both the settings, whilst in the second setting, where labour mobility is restricted, wages
di⁄er across industries.
Furthermore, there is one representative agent, which inelastically supplies an exoge-
nously ￿xed amount of capital K through all the economy and a ￿xed amount of labour,
that is Ls to the individual industries in the ￿rst setting, and the aggregate L through all
the economy in the second one. I add one more production factor, namely capital, in order
to also exploit my model to investigate the e⁄ects of market integration not only on wages
but also on ￿nancial ￿ ows. Furthermore, this gives me the opportunity to compare the
full integration case, in which all the input factors are mobile, with the partial integration
case, in which one factor in segmented and the other is free to move across borders (see
Ottaviano and Thisse, 2002 and Kessler, Lulfesmann and Myers, 2002).
Figure 3.1 below graphically shows the two settings.
5In a ￿rst stage, I mainly de￿ne sectors as industries. However, in a second stage, I am going to exploit
them according to a broader meaning, such that I can also use them to study some issues concerning
international economics.
6Notice that the number of monopolistic ￿rms, Ns; is allowed to di⁄er across industries.
7In the appendix, I also provide one more setting in which both capital and labour are segmented at
the sector level.
63Figure 3.1. Description of the model
3.2.2 Preferences and technology
Final good sector and industrial sectors
On the one hand, the ￿nal good sector, operating under perfect competition, uses
the very large number of goods produced at the industry level to produce the ￿nal good












; ￿ 2 (0;1); (1)
where Y is the aggregate output of the ￿nal good sector. The latter will make zero
pro￿ts, as well as the industrial sectors, since the production function shows constant
returns to scale in the inputs, that are the industry level products, Ys , and since this
sector is perfectly competitive. Moreover, given the production technology, one unit of
the output produced by sector s, is used as a composite input for producing one unit
of the aggregate ￿nal output. The elasticity of substitution between any two products is
1=(￿ ￿ 1): Furthermore, the global sector generates a derived demand for the di⁄erentiated
products produced by industries, that will be shown next.
On the other hand, each industrial sector also produces according a standard CES
aggregation function using the very large number of specialized inputs qn;s,
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where Ys is the aggregate output of the industry s, and qn;s is output of monopolistic ￿rm
n within sector s. Even in this case, since the production function shows constant returns
and this sector is perfectly competitive, the pro￿ts made will be zero. As for the ￿nal good
sector, one unit of the output produced by ￿rm n in sector s is used as a composite input
for producing one unit of the aggregate output of sector s. The elasticity of substitution
between any two products within sector s is 1=(￿s ￿ 1) and, crucially, it is allowed to
vary across the industries. This is to capture the heterogeneity in the toughness of price
competition across markets. Indeed, many factors, some potentially related to each other,
can determine such an asymmetry: horizontal product di⁄erentiation across ￿rms (Dixit,
Stiglitz, 1977), the number of competitors (Dunne, Klimek, Roberts, Xu, 2009), preference
for variety (Bilbiie, Ghironi, Melitz, 2007; Epifani and Gancia, 2011), producers￿clusters,
geographic segmentation and transport costs (Syverson, 2004), institutional factors, such
as barriers to entry, price controls (upper), operational restrictions, public sector size (see
Hopenhayn, 1992; Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers, 2001; Ryan, 2006) 9 . Of course,
the latter is just a short list, but the point I am trying to make here is that demand
elasticity can well summarize several economic structure features, at least from a static
point of view. Then, the industrial sector creates a derived demand for the di⁄erentiated
products, that will be shown next.
Derived demand
Cost minimization of (1) generates the derived demand for the industry level good
Ys as a function of its own price e ps; the price of the ￿nal good p, that is taken as the



















with ￿ ￿ ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) 2 R+:
Cost minimization of (2) generates the derived demand for the specialized input qn;s
as a function of its own price e pn;s; of the price of the region level good e ps and of the total























with ￿s ￿ ￿s=(1 ￿ ￿s) 2 R+:
Putting the derived demand for the industry good (3) into the latter yields















In an industry s, there is a ￿xed large number Ns of monopolistically competitive ￿rms,
each one producing a di⁄erentiated product. Firm n;s produces according to a standard





n;s ; ￿ 2 (0;1); (5)
where qn;s is its output, ￿n;s is its technical e¢ ciency, whilst kn;s and ln;s are the inputs of,
respectively, capital and labour used up by the ￿rm.
3.2.3 Labour integrated economy
Welfare
Within an industrial sector / s, the welfare function, Is, is given by summing up all Ns




e ￿n;s +e i b Ks + e wLs; (6)
where b Ks is the capital owned by sector s,e i is the nominal rental rate,Ls is the exogenous
labour supply in industry s and, ￿nally, e w is the nominal wage rate. At the aggregate
level, the welfare is given by adding up all the industry level welfare.
Producer optimization
The monopolistic ￿rms have to hire physical capital and labour on competitive, re-
spectively, capital and labour markets, because they do not own any input factor. The
nominal pro￿t of ￿rm n;s is
e ￿n;s ￿ e pn;sqn;s ￿
￿
e ikn;s + e wln;s
￿
;
where e pn;s is the nominal price of the product,whilst kn;s and ln;s are, respectively, the
capital and labour demand from the producer n;s. As both the labour and the capital
market are fully integrated, the wage rate and the rental rate are unique over the whole
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n;s = qn;s: (7)
Thus, each monopolistically competitive ￿rm n;s faces the minimization problem in (7),
66in order to derive the minimal unit cost. The result is that each agent over all the economy
















In order to make both the capital and the labour market clear, it must be that the sum of
all ￿rms￿demand for capital and labour is equal to the stocks of, respectively, capital (K)
and labour (L), that are inelastically supplied at the aggregate level. Thus, since all the
￿rms in this economy will use the same capital/labour ratio (8), the two input markets




















As a monopolist, the intermediate input ￿rm seeks to maximize its pro￿t by charging
price e pn;s that is equal to a ￿xed mark-up (1=￿s) over marginal cost. Using the optimal
capital/labour ratio (8) and the derived demand for capital and labour (9) yields the price
















Using sector level price aggregation (4) and sector level productivity aggregation (11)




























Therefore, the sector relative price turns out to be a decreasing function of both in-
dustry level aggregate productivity, ￿s, and industry level demand elasticity, ￿s: the more
competitive and/or the more productive markets will turn out to have relatively lower
aggregate prices. In addition, notice that, according to this setting, sector relative price
is scaled up by an aggregation of all industry level aggregate productivities and all intra-
industry demand elasticities. Using the labour and capital demand (9), the derived de-
mand for specialized good (4), the sector level productivity aggregation (11) and the
assumption that both capital and labour are inelastically supplied at the global level, I
derive that the optimal capital/labour ratio is simply equal to the ratio between the ex-
ogenous global capital stock (K) and the exogenous global labour stock (L). From the
latter and the equation of the sector level price (13), it turns out that the real rental rate





























Both the real wage, w, and the real interest rate, i, are functions of the aggregate capital
stock and the aggregate labour stock: particularly, the larger the capital stock with respect
to the labour stock, the larger the wage rate, the lower the rental rate. Moreover, they both
result to be increasing functions of an aggregation of industry level aggregate productivities
and demand elasticities: the larger the productivity and the larger the demand elasticity
in each sector, the larger the remuneration of both the two input factors.
Factor allocation and ￿nal output
Substituting the price ratios (12 and 13) into the derived demand for specialized input





















So, the aggregate output turns out to be an increasing function of both aggregate capital
and aggregate labour stocks. Furthermore, all the industry level aggregate productivities
and all the intra-industry demand elasticities are arguments of this function. Using the

























Thus, it results that the distribution of the aggregate production across ￿rms within each
sector is a function of the aggregate stocks of both capital and labour, K and L, the
industry level demand elasticity, ￿s, the industry level aggregate productivity, ￿s and ￿rm
level productivity, / ￿n;s. Indeed, the value of the ￿rm level production is scaled down
by an aggregation of the aggregate productivities and the demand elasticities of all the
industries other than by the number of producers within the respective sector, Ns. Finally,
substituting the ￿rm level production and the optimal capital/ labour ratio into the derived







































Therefore, at the ￿rm level, both capital and labour allocations turn out to be increasing
functions of the ￿rm level productivity, ￿n;s, the relative industry aggregate productivity,
￿s, the relative industry demand elasticity, ￿s, and the aggregate stocks of, respectively,
capital and labour. In addition, allocations are scaled down by the number of competitors
within the relative sector, Ns, and an aggregation of all the industry level productivities
and demand elasticities.
3.2.4 Labour restricted economy
In this second framework, I assume labour mobility to be restricted at the sector level,
while capital is free mobile such as in the ￿rst setting.
Welfare
In an industry s, the welfare function, I￿
s is given by summing up all ￿rms￿pro￿ts,
e ￿
￿









￿ b Ks + e w
￿
sLs; 10 (20)
10Within an international framework, (20) represents the aggregate income of country s, given the
stock of population, Ls, and the stock of capital owned by country s￿population, b Ks. I will exploit this
function, along with (6), for comparative statics exercises in section 3.4, where I compare the integrated
69where b Ks is the amount of capital assumed to be owned by sector s,e i￿ is the nominal value
of the interest rate, e w￿
s is the nominal wage rate in industry s and Ls is the exogenous
labour supply in sector s. At the aggregate level, the total welfare is given by adding up
all the industry level welfares. Notice that I use asterisk as a superscript to indicate the
variables from the labour restricted model, and di⁄erentiate them from the ones coming
from the ￿rst setting, where labour markets are perfectly integrated.
Producer optimization
Even in this setting, the monopolistic ￿rms have to hire both physical capital and
labour on competitive input factor markets, because they do not own any input factor.
The nominal pro￿t of ￿rm n;s is
e ￿
￿

















n;s is the nominal price charged by ￿rm n;s, k￿
n;s and l￿
n;s are, respectively, the
demand of capital and labour from the same ￿rm. Notice that, as the labour market
is segmented, nominal wages result to be di⁄erent across industries. The interest rate,
instead, is the same over all sectors, as capital is assumed to be free mobile.




























Each monopolistically competitive ￿rm faces the minimization problem in (21), in order
to derive the minimal unit cost. The result is that each agent within the same industry
































In order to make both the capital and the labour market clear, it must be that the sum
of all ￿rms￿derived demand for capital and labour is equal to the stocks of inputs that are
inelastically supplied at the aggregate level in case of the capital market, K, and at the
sectoral level in case of the labour market, Ls. Thus, since all the ￿rms within each sector
share the same capital/labour ratio (22), the two input markets will clear if the following
condition holds:








As a monopolist, the intermediate input ￿rm n;s seeks to maximize its pro￿t by
charging a price e p￿
n;s that is equal to a ￿xed mark-up (1=￿s) over marginal cost. Using
the optimal capital/labour ratio (22) and the derived demand for capital and labour (23)











Using the latter and the sector level price aggregation (4) yields that, within sector s, ￿rm









Using the latter, the aggregate production function (1), the derived demand for specialized
inputs (4), the optimal capital-labour ratio (22), the input market clearing condition (24),
the optimal price charged by ￿rm n;s (25), and the assumption that labour is inelastically


























Thus, industry level relative price turns out to be a decreasing function of the labour
inelastically supplied in that sector, ￿ Ls, the industry level aggregate productivity, ￿s,
and the within industry demand elasticity, ￿s; indeed, it also results to be scaled up
by a function of all the industry level aggregate productivities, demand elasticities and
exogenous labour supplies. Particularly, with respect to the industry level relative price in
the integrated market, in this case industry relative labour supply is one of the arguments
of the function: the larger the exogenous allocation of labour in sector s, the lower the unit
cost (through lower wage rate), the lower the relative price. Furthermore, di⁄erently from
the previous case, the elasticity of ￿rms￿output elasticity of capital, i.e. ￿, also results to
a⁄ect the industry level relative price.
Rearranging the optimal price at the ￿rm level (25) for the real wage and substituting
the result into the optimal capital-labour ratio (22), and then what I ￿nd into the input
market clearing equation (24), and recalling the industry relative price (27), I can derive
the real rental rate, that, as expected, turns out to be a decreasing function of the capital





























￿ K1￿￿ : (28)
Using the latter, the optimal capital/labour ratio (22) and the sector relative price (27)








































Even for input factors prices, in the labour segmented economy, industry level labour
supplies are arguments of the respective functions. Namely, in terms of sector relative
wage rate, the larger the aggregate capital stock, ￿ K, the larger the demand elasticity,
￿s, the larger the industry relative aggregate productivity, ￿s, the larger the labour price
in industry s. Thus, the relatively more competitive, more productive and less labour
intensive industries will have higher real wages. On the other side, the real interest rate
is decreasing with respect to the aggregate capital stock, ￿ K:
Factor allocation and ￿nal output
Substituting price ratios (26) and (27) into the derived demand for specialized input (4),
and using the latter to replace qn;s into the ￿rms￿demand for labour (23), and aggregating
labour demand over all monopoly ￿rm by recalling that labour is inelastically supplied at
















Thus, considering the optimal capital/labour ratio (22),the equations for real rental rate



























Even in this case, the aggregate economy output is a function of all the intra-industry
demand elasticities of the economy, along with all the exogeneous labour supplies at the
industry level and industry level aggregate productivities. Of course, the larger the ag-
gregate capital stock, the larger the aggregate economy output. From the latter and the






























Thus, in the framework with restrictions to labour mobility, production distribution across
￿rms within each sector s depends on both the ￿rm level and the industry level produc-
tivities, along with capital and labour stocks and sector relative demand elasticity.
Finally, substituting the ￿rm level production (32) ,the optimal capital-labour ratio
(22), along with the real rental rate and the real wage rate (28 and 29), into the derived









































Therefore, at the ￿rm level, capital allocation turns out to be a function of all the para-
meters ruling this economy. Instead, labour is allocated according the average size and
relative productivity of the ￿rm within its own sector7. Particularly, labour distribution
is a⁄ected only by the parameters at the sector level: this result exactly matches what I
would ￿nd in a one sector economy8.
3.3 Social planner solution and e¢ ciency analysis
3.3.1 The social planner solution
In order to evaluate and compare the e¢ ciency of the two types of market illustrated
before (i.e. fully integrated and labour restricted), I solve the social planner problem and
use the solution as a benchmark. More speci￿cally, I imagine a benevolent planner that
maximizes the utility of a representative household by allocating input factors across all
the ￿rms in the economy directly, subject only to the aggregate resources constraints,
i.e.K and L (see Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz, 2008; Epifani and Gancia, 2011.) Thus,
the social planner optimizes the distribution of input factors over the whole economy.
Assuming both capital and labour to be inelastically supplied at the global level, she faces
the following optimization problem :
7In the appendix, I will show that in a framework in which both capital and labour are segmented at
the sector level, the two input factors are distributed as labour in (34), that means they both turn out to
be functions of the ￿rm￿ s relative productivity and its average size.































































The model with full integration of input factors matches what found by the social
planner only if within sector demand elasticities are equal. Furthermore, the distribution
of production factors according to the model in which labour is assumed to be restricted
at the sector level also matches (35), if within sector demand elasticities are the same and,

















3.3.2 E¢ ciency analysis
As it can be easily observed, neither the integrated setting nor the labour segmented one
are able to provide a fully e¢ cient allocation of input factors, namely capital and labour,
across industries and monopolistic ￿rms, as long as industry level demand elasticities are
heterogeneous. This means that, in both the cases, market solution does not actually
match the Social Planner allocation of input factors and, in turn, does not produce as
much as the Social Planner does. Here, the aggregate output can be thought of as a
measure of welfare for the entire economy. This is because transfers across all the agents
11The right-hand side of that equation comes from aggregating the labour demand given by (35) at
the sector level.
74in this economy, aimed at compensating them for eventual losses due to movements in
prices, are assumed to be allowed.
Indeed, I have to explain such an ine¢ ciency and how the integrated and the labour
restricted settings di⁄er in terms of distance from the Social Planner solution. Thus, the
ine¢ ciency is simply explained by the fact that in both the competitive market models,
in case of heterogeneity of intra-industry demand elasticities, the marginal rate of substi-
tution between any two intermediate goods, say 1 and 2, that is the amount of good 2,
Y2, that the consumer must be given in order to compensate her for a one-unit marginal
decrease in the consumption of good 1, Y1, is di⁄erent from the marginal rate of trans-
formation, that is the rate at which they can be transformed into each other11 Therefore,
suppose that there are only two industrial sectors, 1 and 2 and, particularly, the two
sectors di⁄er by demand elasticity, that is:
￿1 6= ￿2:
As I said above, in order to have an e¢ cient allocation, it must be:
MRSY1;Y2 = MRTY1;Y2:





On the other hand, the Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) takes on di⁄erent values






So, as evident, there is a wedge between the MRT and the MRS, that is given by the intra-
industry demand elasticities ratio, ￿2=￿1.
12 Where does that wedge come from? It actually
depends on the asymmetry in monopoly power across sectors. As long as producers have
got some monopoly power, the marginal cost of production will be lower than the product
price by the markup.13 The larger the markup, the larger the gap between marginal cost
and price of the produced good. If demand elasticities are heterogeneous, then production
resources will tend to be overallocated within those sectors where the demand elasticity is
lower, that is where the gap between marginal cost and price is relatively lower. However,
11See Adao, Correia and Teles (2003) and Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2008) as references for ine¢ cient
allocations of input factors.
12Indeed, if ￿2 = ￿1, then the wedge disappears and we turn to an e¢ cient allocation.
13See also Epifani and Gancia 2011 as a reference for ine¢ cient allocation cases.
75as Lerner (1934) argued, when markups are homogeneous, their distorting e⁄ect vanishes.

















Thus, the MRS is not only a function of both the relative productivity and the relative
demand elasticity, but also of the exogenous sector-level labour allocation. Intuitively,
this might lead to an improvement in terms of e¢ ciency as the distortion implied by
the demand elasticity ratio might be, even partially, compensated by the distortion given
by the ratio of sector-level labour supplies, if they go to the opposite direction. For
example, demand elasticity in sector 1 is larger than demand elasticity in sector 2, then
it will result there is overallocation of production resources into sector 1; however, such
overallocation can be mitigated if the exogeneous labour allocation in sector 1 is lower
than the exogeneous labour allocation in sector 2 (assuming that industry level aggregate
productivities are the same).
Particularly, if exogenous labour allocation matches the Social Planner allocation, it
results that in the labour segmented context, the marginal rate of substitution between
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:
As long as the power to which the demand elasticities ratio is raised is lower than one,
that is
￿ < 1;










So doing, even though I can not turn to the ￿rst best solution, an exogeneous distribution of
labour across industrial sectors can be Pareto improving with respect to the fully integrated








76that is the larger the output elasticity of capital, i.e. ￿, the larger ￿, and then the relatively
farer I am to the ￿rst best solution (i.e. ￿ = 0). In conclusion, when ￿1 is larger than ￿2 ,
there is overallocation of both capital and labour within sector 1: by labour segmentation,
I can exogenously withdraw labour from that sector and move that to sector 2 (where it
was originally underallocated), so as to reduce the overallocation of labour. In particular,
the lower the output elasticity of capital ￿, i.e. the lower the contribute of capital to
production, the more e⁄ective labour restriction will be in the direction of a ￿rst best
allocation of input factors.
3.4 An application of the model to international labour market
integration.
3.4.1 Comparative statics
In order to exploit my model to analyze the e⁄ects of relaxing barriers to international
migration and, particularly, to compare di⁄erent distributions of labour force across coun-
tries, I ￿rst need to rede￿ne sectors as countries. I can do that by using the Armington
assumption, according to which goods coming from di⁄erent places are imperfect substi-
tutes. Thus, under monopolistic competition, each country specializes in a particular set
of goods.
Several works actually rely on this assumption (see Anderson, 1979 and Bergstrand,
1989). More recently, Gal￿ and Monacelli (2005) assumed imperfect competition between
goods coming from di⁄erent countries within a small open economy model setting optimal
monetary policy. Furthermore, Epifani and Gancia (2009) also made some examples to
justify the use of that within their model and to explain that prices charged by exporters do
not have to be takes as given. The ￿rst example is that of Madagascar, that is an exporter
of vanilla: as long as Malagasy vanilla is world-wide regarded as of higher quality, vanilla
exporters from Madagascar have some market power. Furthermore, the Finnish Nokia
mobile phones and the American Motorola ones are not perceived as the same, so that
even exporters from a small country such as Finland do have some market power and are
able to impose domestic taxes a⁄ecting the prices of their goods on foreign consumers.
Furthermore, there is evidence for Europe that consumer bias can explain border e⁄ects
on international trade better than no-tari⁄barriers. Head and Mayer (2000) reported that,
on average, Europeans were buying from domestic producers 14 times more than from
foreign producers placed at same distance; moreover, the tari⁄ equivalent of the border
(in 1984-1986) was estimated at around 37 percent. Thus, they evaluated the measures
included within Europe￿ s Single Market Programme, that were aimed at reducing market
fragmentation across the European area by reducing non-tari⁄ barriers. They did that
by setting a monopolistic competition model and estimating border e⁄ects for 3-digit
77industries in the European Union. What they found is that there is a poor relation
between market fragmentation and such barriers and pointed to consumer bias as the
main explanation for market fragmentation and border e⁄ects. Furthermore, Anderson
and Van Wincoop (2003) estimated a gravity model with CES preferences to disentangle
the "McCallum border puzzle". Particularly, they assumed that products are di⁄erentiated
by place of origin. They mainly found that national borders are able to reduce trade
between industrialized countries by 20-50 percent.
So, suppose that the world economy features only two countries, that are imperfect
substitutes by Armington assumption. Moreover, the market of the homogeneous ￿nal
good, that is produced by combining the outputs of the two countries, is assumed to be
fully integrated. In addition, in each of the two national markets, there is a large number of
monopolistically competitive sectors, that are heterogeneous by productivity. Production
requires two input factors: labour and capital. Capital is assumed to be free to cross
the borders. Instead, labour force is initially assumed to be constrained at the original
population level, because of immigration barriers. Thus, I wish to exploit my framework
to illustrate the e⁄ects of relaxing such immigration constraints and, more speci￿cally, to
compare di⁄erent cross-country allocations of labour force through some simple numerical
exercises, whose mechanics is explained in the following Figure 3.2:
Mechanics of comparative statics
Notice that it is possible to observe the production outcome of the whole economy
not only at the original population level in the two countries and in the fully integrated
context, but also at points in which labour mobility has been only partially allowed. This
is because I consider the outcomes coming from all the possible distributions of labour
78across the two countries in a labour segmented economy (given that no country can be
empty).
Thus, I aim at comparing two di⁄erent scenarios: in the ￿rst one, producers in the two
countries are similar in terms of both monopoly power and productivity; particularly, I
assume there is the same number of producers and the same distribution of productivities
among them. Therefore, countries can only di⁄er by size (i.e. the population amount). In
the second case, instead, producers in the two national markets di⁄er by monopoly power,
but keep being similar in terms of productivity.
First, I want to show how total income changes for di⁄erent distributions of population
across the two countries according to the two di⁄erent scenarios. Particularly, in each of
the two countries, before integrating the respective labour markets, the population can be
lower, equal or larger than the labour force allocated after relaxing immigration barriers.
Thus, depending on the starting position of the population with respect to the integrated
market allocation of the labour force, countries will deal with migration in￿ ows, if the
population size is lower than the labour force amount dictated by the market within the
integrated setting, or migration out-￿ ows, in the opposite case. Thus, I am going to
illustrate the welfare outcome both at the global level and at individual country level.
Then, I am turning to the e⁄ects of cross-border labour movements on the three com-
ponents of total income, that are capital income, labour income and pro￿ts. In more detail,
in a labour restricted economy, capital income also changes according to the population
distribution as the latter a⁄ects the interest rate equilibrium.14 In addition, the e⁄ects of
relaxing migration barriers on labour income also change according to the distribution of
population across the two countries. In fact, when migration ￿ ows are constrained, wages
can be di⁄erent across countries: ceteris paribus, the larger the population, the lower the
average wage. Therefore, when barriers are set o⁄, labour movements make the wages of
the two countries equalize: of course, the equalized wage will turn out to be higher than
the starting wage for the country coping with migration out￿ ows and lower for the country
facing migration in￿ ows. However, the impact on labour income at the individual country
level must also take into account remittence that emigrants send back to their original
country.
Finally, the e⁄ects on pro￿ts are not trivial. First, it must be reminded that ￿rms
can not change location; thus, what can actually change is only the distribution of input
factors across ￿rms, sectors and the two countries. Furthermore, it is worth highlighting
that when labour moves from one country to the other one, it is also followed by capital
as the latter is, at a certain degree, its complementary production factor. Indeed, moving
production factors from one country to the other one increases the output of the latter;
14I assume capital ownership to be equally shared by the two countries as, at this stage, I prefer focusing
on population asymmetries.
79moreover, it also a⁄ects input costs and prices, so that the ￿nal outcome in terms of pro￿ts
might be ambiguous.
Thus, I am going to present the results of the numerical exercises, in order to try to
address some of the issues raised so far. First of all, in Figure 3.3, I compare the aggregate
economy outputs in the two scenarios: in the ￿rst one, the demand elasticity is the same
across the two countries (i.e. ￿1 = ￿2 = 0:55), while, in the second one, country 1 is
assumed to be more competitive with respect to country 2 (i.e. ￿1 = 0:8;￿2 = 0:55). On
the horizontal axis, I measure the amount of population in country 1, L1, while on the
vertical axis I represent the total income at the aggregate level. Particularly, notice that
L1 is assumed to be strictly larger than zero and strictly lower than L, that is the sum
of the population sizes in country 1 and country 2; this is because I assume no empty
countries. Thus, for each scenario, I compare the outcome in three di⁄erent frameworks:
the fully integrated economy, where both capital and labour are free to cross national
borders; the labour restricted economy, where labour force is constrained at the population
size while capital is still assumed to be free mobile across countries; the social planner
economy, that provides the ￿rst best solution. So, in the ￿rst scenario, I can observe that
the total outcome reached by a completely integrated economy exactly matches the ￿rst
best solution by the Social Planner. Particularly, the endogenous labour force allocation
according to the fully integrated economy, L1, is equal to the labour force allocation
according to the Social Planner, L￿
1. Furthermore, the labour constrained economy can
also produce as much aggregate output as the Social Planner does, when the population
size in country 1 matches the optimal labour force allocation. Turning to the second
scenario, in this case, it results that the integrated economy is not able to catch the ￿rst
best solution. In fact, the endogenous labour force allocation in country 1 according to
the competitive economy does not match the optimal allocation by the Social Planner. In
more detail, the competitive integrated economy allocates more labour force in country 1
than how much the Social Planner would do; this is because, as I should in the theoretical
part before, in case of asymmetric demand elasticities, production resources will result to
be overallocated within the relatively more competitive markets. However, it seems that,
in this scenario, the labour segmented economy can, for some exogeneous distributions of
population across the two countries, perform better than the integrated one even though
it is also unable to reach the optimal solution. Indeed, a partially segmented market can
actually yield a Pareto-improvement when the population size is equal to the optimal
labour force allocation. However, as I explained in the theoretical part, this economy will
not catch the ￿rst best as long as the capital keeps being free mobile across countries
and deal with the distortion implied by the demand elasticity heterogeneity. Of course,
the two competitive economies produce the same aggregate output when the population
size in country one is equal to the endogenous labour force allocation according to the
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worth and cases in which it is not. In particular, if the population size in country 1 is
larger than the endogenous labour force allocation according to the integrated market,
then integrating labour markets results to be worth, as it leads the economy to larger
levels of production; however, if the population size in the ￿rst country is in between
the optimal allocation and the endogenous allocation, then integration decreases the ￿nal
output. Finally, if the population living in country 1 is lower than the optimal allocation
of labour force according to the Social Planner, integration can be either Pareto-improving
or Pareto-worsening, depending on the original amount of country 1 inhabitants.
Figure 3.3. Total income
Turning to Figure 3.4, it describes the partial components of the total income at
the aggregate level in the two di⁄erent scenarios. In more detail, it shows how much
￿rms, capital owners and workers earn in aggregate terms both when the economy is fully
integrated and when labour force is constrained at the population size. Thus, I report
the outcome of three variables for di⁄erent distributions of the population across the two
countries: total pro￿t, that is the sum of the pro￿ts earned by all the ￿rms in the whole
economy; total labour income, that is the sum of the labour income of country 1 population
and the labour income of country 2 population; total capital income, that is the aggregate
rental rate by the aggregate capital stock. So, if demand elasticities are homogenous (i.e.
￿1 = ￿2 = 0:55 in my numerical example), it comes out that a restricted economy is
never better than an integrated one for anybody (i.e. ￿rms owners, workers and capital
owners). However, if the population distribution across the two countries exactly matches
the endogenous distribution of the labour force (that, in this case, also equals the ￿rst best
81allocation, i.e. L1 = L￿
1), then all the three components of total income (pro￿ts, labour
income and capital income), in aggregate, are equal in both the scenarios. However,
in the second scenario, where country 1 relative demand elasticity (￿1 = 0:8) is larger
than country 2 relative demand elasticity (￿2 = 0:55), labour constrained economy can
perform better than the fully integrated economy for everybody: ￿rms owners, workers and
capital owners. Indeed, if the population size in country 1 (L1) is equal to the endogenous
allocation of labour force in the same country (L1), total pro￿ts, total labour income and
total capital income are equal in the two scenarios. Furthermore, if L1 is larger than L1,
then ￿rms owners, workers and capital owners would be strictly better o⁄in an integrated
context; in the opposite case (L1 < L1), instead, they can be either better o⁄ or worsen
o⁄, depending on the population size.
Figure 3.4. Total pro￿t, labour income, capital income
Next, turning to Figure 3.5, I show how input factor prices change for di⁄erent popula-
tion distributions in the two di⁄erent scenarios. First of all, it might be worth reminding
that if labour force is constrained at the population level, then average salaries can dif-
fer across the two countries; in an integrated context, instead, wages in the two national
markets equalize. Indeed, rental rate is always unique across the two countries, as capital
market is integrated in both the competitive economies that I am studying. Thus, in the
￿rst scenario, where within-country demand elasticities are the same (i.e. ￿1 = ￿2 = 0:55),
both average wage in country 1 and average wage in country 2 in the labour segmented
economy, are equal to the cross-country common wage in the integrated economy, if pop-
ulation distribution matches the endogenous labour force allocation according to the inte-
grated context (in turn, the latter is equal to the ￿rst best allocation, i.e. L1 = L￿
1), that
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wage in that national market in case of labour segmented market. So, on the one hand,
if population in country 1, L1, is lower than the endogenous allocation of labour force in
that market according to the integrated economy , L1, then the constrained market wage
in country 1 is larger than the equalized wage in the integrated market; on the other hand,
if L1 is larger than L1, then the labour restricted economy wage in country 1 is lower than
the cross-country common wage after integration. In terms of country 2, the opposite
turns out to be true: if L1 is lower than L1 (that is actually equal to L2 as the two coun-
tries are assumed to be perfectly symmetrical by both aggregate productivity and demand
elasticity), then L2 (that is equal to the total population, L, minus L1) will be larger than
L2 (that is equal to the total aggregate labour force, L, minus L1) and then the restricted
market average wage in country 2 will be lower than the cross-countries equalized wage
after labour integration; instead, if L1 is larger than L1, then L2 is lower than L2 and the
labour restricted economy wage in country 2 will result to be larger than the common wage
in the integrated economy. About the rental rate, capital price in a labour constrained
economy is never larger than a fully integrated economy; nevertheless, the two compet-
itive economies yield the same value of rental rate if the population distribution across
the two countries is perfectly equal to the endogenous labour force distribution according
to the integrated market (and to the Social Planner too). In the second scenario, where
the demand elasticity in country one, ￿1, is larger than the demand elasticity in country
2, ￿2, the amount of labour force endogenously allocated in country 1 (L1) is larger than
the optimal amount (L￿
1). Therefore, on the one hand, as before, the constrained market
speci￿c wage in country 1 will cross the equalized wage after integration in correspondence
of L1 that, in this case, is larger than L￿
1: On the other hand, in the labour constrained
economy, country 2 wage will cross the integrated economy common wage for a value of
L2, that is lower than the social planner allocation of labour force in that market (L￿
2).
Indeed, this is a key result in order to understand the ine¢ cient allocation of labour force
in case of within-country demand elasticities heterogeneity: country 1 will attract an in-
e¢ cient number of workers from country 2 and, in turn, country 2 will lose an ine¢ cient
number of workers moving to country 1, as the labour segmented economy relative wages
in the two countries equalize in correspondence of an ine¢ cient allocation of the labour
force across the two countries. Finally, in terms of rental rate, for some distributions of
population, the labour restricted economy can yield a larger capital price than the fully
integrated economy. Particularly, if L1 is larger than L1, integration leads to an increase
of the capital price; however, if L1 is lower than L1, then the rental rate might result to
be either increased or decreased under labour markets integration.
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Next, Figure 3.6 outlines how total income in the two country changes for di⁄erent
distribution of the aggregate population, when full labour mobility is allowed. In the ￿rst
scenario, country 1 gains when markets are integrated if its population, L1, is larger than
the labour force allocated under an integrated economy, L1 (that, as I said, matches the
optimal allocation in this case). Instead, if L1 is lower than L1 , then country might either
gain or lose by letting foreign workers in their market. On the other side, if country 2 has
got a population size, L2, that is lower than L2, then it will lose from integration. Instead,
if L2 is larger than L2, than country 2 total income could be either better or worse o⁄.
Then, turning to the heterogeneous demand elasticities case (i.e. ￿1 = 0:8 and ￿2 = 0:55),
as in the previous case, country 1 gains from integration if its population, L1, is larger
than L1. However, as L1 is larger than the optimal allocation of labour force (L￿
1), L1 will
have to be larger than before in order to make the integrated economy worth. Instead, if
L1 is lower than L1, then country 1 seems to always lose in case of full mobility of input
factors. On the other hand, country 2 will gain from integration even for a population
size, L2 that is lower than in the ￿rst scenario: if fact, as the demand elasticity in country
2 is relatively lower than that in country 1, the labour force endogenously allocated, L2,
will be lower than the optimal amount, L￿
2. However, if the population size is lower than
L2, then country 2 might either gain or lose in case of labour markets integration.
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Finally, by Figures 3.7 and 3.8, I try to give more details about gainers and losers from
integration at the individual country level. Particularly, in this case, I distinguish between
pro￿ts earners, workers and capital owners (recall that I assume capital ownership equally
shared between the two countries). So doing, I am possibly going to make what has been
seen in Figure 3.6 clearer. As usual, I ￿rst look at the homogeneous demand elasticities
scenario. Thus, starting from country 1 (Figure 3.7), this, as I saw before, will turn out
to be better o⁄in case of integration if the population, L1, is larger than L1. Particularly,
this means that when labour is allowed to be free mobile across borders, workers will move
out of country 1 towards country 2. Thus, country 1 wages will result to be increased (see
Figure 3.5) and who keeps staying and working in that country will gain. Moreover, capital
owners can never be worse o⁄in the perfectly integrated market, as the maximum interest
rate in a segmented economy is equal to the rental rate in an integrated economy (see
Figure 3.5); as that maximum value is reached when the population distribution matches
the endogenous labour force allocation under integration, then if L1 is larger than L1, then
capital owners will also gain. Nevertheless, pro￿ts￿path is not as linear as both capital
income￿ s and labour income￿ s. In fact, as seen in Figure 3.5, the larger the population, L1,
the larger the (positive) gap between the integrated economy speci￿c remuneration of input
factors and the segmented economy relative wage/rental rate. This means that, for very
large L1, integration would yield to a big increase in the production costs, so as to make
integration detrimental for country 1 in terms of pro￿ts. On the other side, for population
size that are lower than L1, the labour force in country 1 will lose in an integrated economy
context as wages will be pushed down by immigration in￿ ows. Nevertheless, capital owners
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the second scenario (i.e. ￿1 > ￿2), for L1 larger than L1 (that, in this case, is larger
than the optimal allocation of labour force in country 1, L￿
1), pro￿t earners, wage earners
and capital owners are better o⁄ by relaxing immigration barriers. Thus, by reducing the
labour force in country 1 (as part of the population will move to country 2), wages will
turn out to be increased so as to make workers in that country gain and rental rate will
also increase. However, in this case, the increase in the production costs do not make pro￿t
earners necessarily lose: the possible amount of migration out￿ ows is lower as the labour
force endogenously allocated in country 1 is larger (because of relatively larger elasticity of
demand). Thus, the consequent increase in labour costs as an e⁄ect of dropping migration
barriers is lower than in the ￿rst scenario, so that it will not overturn the positive e⁄ects on
the revenues from a larger demand of the country 1￿ s intermediate good in an integrated
economy. In turn, if the population in country 1, L1, is lower than L1, then integration
will be detrimental for workers as migration in￿ ows will make wages decrease. Capital
owners will be either better or worse o⁄: for a population size not so far from the the
labour force allocation in country 1 in an integrated economy, the rental rate in a labour
restricted economy will be larger than migration unconstrained framework. Furthermore,
the closer L1 to L1, the lower the (positive) gap between the restricted economy speci￿c
wage and the labour integrated economy relative wage, the lower the gain of country 1￿
pro￿t earners from integration. Turning to Figure 3.8, the latter shows that in country 2
the paths of capital income, labour income and pro￿ts when free labour mobility is allowed
for. In case of the ￿rst scenario, what I said before for country 1 also holds for country
2, as I assume perfect symmetry between the two countries. In case of heterogeneity in
demand elasticities (i.e. ￿1 = 0:8 and ￿2 = 0:55), instead, I can say something more. In
fact, in this case, the labour force allocated in country 2 after integration is lower than
the optimal amount (as country 2 is relatively less competitive than country 1). Thus,
dropping migration constraints will yield that wages be either increased, if L2 is larger
than L2, or decreased, in the opposite case. In terms of capital income, it will follow the
path of rental rate described in Figure 3.5: if L2 is lower than L2, then country 2 capital
owners will gain from integration; if L2 is larger than L2, than they can be either better or
worse o⁄. Particularly, if L2 is not so larger than the labour force endogenously allocated
in country 2, L2, then capital owners will be better o⁄in a segmented economy; otherwise,
that is L2 much larger than L2, capital income will be larger in an integrated framework.
Finally, turning to pro￿t earners, di⁄erently from the country 1￿ s case, they can be worse
o⁄in case of labour integration, if L2 is larger than L2. In fact, labour integration leads to
a suboptimal allocation of labour force in country, that consequently produces too little.
Therefore, if L2 is larger than L2 and the labour force is constrained at the population
level, then country 2 production will increase, turning closer to the e¢ cient level. However,
86for a very large size of L2 , pro￿t earners will result to be better o⁄in an economy without
constraints to migration ￿ ows.
Pro￿t, labour income, capital income in country 1
Figure 3.8. Pro￿t, labour income, capital income in country 2
3.4.2 The European Union case
Since the Treaty of Rome (1957) that established the European Community, the free
movement of workers was a cornerstone of the European Union. In fact, article 39 of
87that agreement gave member countries￿workers several rights to ensure as much mobility
of workers as possible across the European area, such as the right to look for a job,
to work, to reside and to remain in another member country; particularly, that article
also guaranteed European workers the right to equal treatment in terms of access to
employment and working conditions in order to enhance the integration of immigrants
with the host country￿ s workers.
Immigration paths across European Union after enlargements
It might be worth to see what happened in terms of immigration movements around the
European Union after the latest enlargements, especially to the Eastern Europe countries.
This is because most of the candidate members, namely Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Turkey, are placed in the east part of Europe. Therefore, I might use those
data to make some (rough) predictions about expected migration patterns after an eventual
further enlargement of the European Union to those countries. The major aim is to
possibly evaluate whether misallocation issues I have theoretically raised before can be
somehow realistic and plausible with respect to the actual case of the EU size. Zaiceva
and Zimmermann (2008) found an increase in immigration from countries which entered
the Union in 2004, namely Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia into most of EU-15 countries.15Particularly, most of the in￿ ows
were actually coming from Poland. Focusing on the speci￿c case of Germany, Brenke,
Yuksel and Zimmermann (2009) found that, despite of some restrictions imposed to both
workers and companies from the "EU-8" countries, the net in￿ ow of immigrants from
those countries after enlargement (2004) had become 2.5 times larger than in the past four
years. Turning to the Swedish case, Wadensj￿ (2007) showed that, although an increase in
immigration is already evident since the ￿rst years of 2000s, it became much larger after
2004. Furthermore, in￿ ows from EU-8 countries resulted to be larger than out￿ ows, so
highlighting one clear direction for migration movements. Finally, even for Sweden, most of
immigrants came from Poland, followed by Baltic countries. Kaczmarczyk and M. Ok￿lski
(2008) reported a signi￿cant increase in migration out￿ ows from Poland and Baltic states,
after the 2004 enlargement, especially towards Ireland and the UK. The UK, along with
Ireland and Sweden, was a particular case as, di⁄erently from the other "old members" of
the European Union, they decided to not impose any restriction to migration in￿ ows from
the new member countries from the beginning. Thus, Gilpin, Henty, Lemos, Portes and
Bulle (2006) also showed that the number of immigrants from the EU-8 countries to the
United Kingdom rose after the agreement. Turning to the speci￿c case of Ireland, Doyle,
Hughes and Wadensj￿ (2006) reported an increase in the number of foreigners between
2003 and 2005, and the majority in 2005 were from the new member states. Barrett and
15They are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
88McCarthy (2008) found that immigrants form the new member states constituted three
percent of the whole Irish population in 2006.
Moreover, in terms of the countries where migration ￿ ows depart from, the World Bank
(2006) documented that Lithuania had got the largest emigration rate among the new
member countries: 3.3 percent of its population emigrated straight after the enlargement
agreement. Lithuania is then followed by Latvia, with 2.4 percent of emigrants, and
Poland, with one percent. Particularly, the WB report highlights the fact that the major
destination countries were Germany and the UK.
Entry barriers in the current EU members and in the candidate members
One of the crucial points that I make in this chapter is that heterogeneity in com-
petitiveness across markets can generate misallocation problems, namely overallocation
of production resources within relatively more competitive markets and underallocation
of resources within relatively less competitive markets. So, I argue that if markets that
compete within a perfectly integrated context di⁄er by markups, then I can expect an
excess of movements of input factors towards the more competitive areas. Consequently,
the latter will produce "too much", while the areas that face out￿ ows will produce "too
little".
As studied in Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001), the degree of market com-
petitiveness can depend on the entry barriers that prevent new competitors from entering
the market and competing with the incumbents. Of course, such entry barriers might
crucially depend on institutional and political factors, that a⁄ect the market structure.
More speci￿cally, such barriers can concern both product market regulation and sectoral
regulation.
So, in order to give a quantitative idea about how they can (sometimes) heavily
di⁄er across countries within the European area, I exploit the OECD database. The
latter provides Indicators of Product Market Regulation, that "are comprehensive and
internationally-comparable set of indicators that measure the degree to which policies
promote or inhibit competition in areas of the product market where competition is vi-
able". In more detail, those indicators concern formal regulations in the following areas:
legal and administrative barriers to entrepreneurship; barriers to international trade and
investment and state control of business enterprises.16In addition, the OECD database
contains cross-section Indicators of Sectoral Regulation, that measure concern regulatory
conditions in the both the professional services and the retail distribution sectors. In par-
ticular, the professional services indicators are about entry and conduct regulation in the
legal, accounting, engineering and architectural professions. Finally, the same database
also provides Indicators of Regulation in Energy, Transport and Communications. The lat-
16However, OECD alert that because of some fast reforming countries, the actual situation might not
be fully re￿ ected by those data.
89ter concern regulatory provisions in the following sectors: telecoms, electricity, gas, post,
rail, air passenger transport and road freight. Thus, I report all the analytical indicators
of Product Market Regulation (Table 3.1) and the analytical indicator of regulation of
the retail market, along with two synthetic indicators of, respectively, the entry/conduct
regulation in all professional services and the regulation in energy, transport and commu-
nications (Table 3.2). In more detail, I show the values of those indicators at the latest
available year, that is 2008 for all of them, except for the Indicators of Regulation in
Energy, Transport and Communications, for which the latest year available is 2007.
Aiming at evaluating the actual e⁄ects of the latest EU enlargements and, possibly,
the potential e⁄ects coming from the access of some of the EU candidates, I report entry
barriers data about three sets of countries: EU-15, that are the EU state members before
the enlargement in 2004 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK); EU-8, that are
those countries that entered the EU in 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia17; EU candidates, that are Iceland and Turkey.18 Indeed, I would
also include in the analysis the other two countries that joined the EU in 2004 so called
"EU-2", that are Cyprus and Malta, along with Bulgaria and Romania that entered the
Union in 2007, but no data are currently available. Therefore, the idea is that by comparing
the market structures of the latest countries that entered the EU with those of the EU
state candidates, I might formulate some (even rough )expectations about migration ￿ ows
that a further EU enlargement could lead to.
Thus, looking at the Table 3.1 below, I can compare the values of the indexes of
Product Market Regulation for the di⁄erent sets of countries selected. First, in terms
of legal and administrative barriers to entrepreneurship, the average value of the index
for EU-8 countries (1.601) is de￿nitely larger than that for EU-15 state members (1.242).
Within the EU-15 group, the countries with the largest values are Greece, Luxemburg and
Belgium (respectively, 1.953, 1.696 and 1.428), while the state members with the lowest
values are UK, the Netherlands, Sweden (respectively, 0.824, 0.871 and 0.959). Within
the "EU-8" set of countries, instead, the country with the largest value is Poland (2.323),
followed by Hungary (1.702), Czech Republic (1.55) and Slovakia (1.545). Finally, within
the member candidates, Turkey has actually got an index value (2.436) that is much larger
than the largest values in the other two groups, while Iceland￿ s value is equal to 2.001.
Next, I turn to the second index of product market regulation, which concerns barriers
to trade and investment. Even in this case, the EU-8 group￿ s average value (0.863) is
far larger than the EU-15 one￿ s (0.561). On the one hand, among the EU-15 group, the
17The list of the eight countries would be complete if I also included Latvia and Lithuania. However,
no data about those two countries are available (as they do not belong to OECD).
18Even in this case, the remaining countries that would complete the list (Croatia, Macedonia, and
Montenegro) are currently missing in the data.
90countries with the largest values are Greece (1.323), Austria (1.163) and Italy (0.717), while
the states with the lowest values are really far from the ￿rst ones: UK (0.199), Ireland
(0.317) and Belgium (0.318). On the other hand, the EU-8 countries with the largest index
value are: Slovakia (1.731), Poland (1.117) and Czech Republic (0.88). Moreover, within
the member states, Turkey￿ s value (0.823) can be placed in within the largest values of
the EU-15 group, while Iceland￿ s value (0.155) is within the lowest ones (actually it seems
that in Iceland barriers to trade and investment are even lower than in the UK).
Finally, in terms of the latest index, concerning the state control, EU-8 countries seem
to be facing larger barriers than EU-15 ones: in fact, for the ￿rst group the average index
value is 2.327, while for the second one, the average value is 2.138. Among the original
EU member states, the largest values are for Greece (3.847), Portugal (2.651) and France
(2.616), while the lowest ones are for the Ireland (1.271), Denmark (1.371) and the UK
(1.504). Within the countries that entered the EU in 2004, instead, those with largest
values are Poland (3.352), Slovenia (2.647) and Czech Republic (2.434). Finally, turning
to the EU candidates, Turkey has got a very large (only slightly lower than the Greek
one), that is 3.793, while Iceland has got an index value (0.854) that is actually lower than
the lowest one in the EU-15 group.
In summary, in terms of product market regulations, among the EU-15, the largest
barriers are in Greece, that has got the largest values for all the three indeces analyzed so
far. Instead, the lowest barriers are the in the UK and Ireland. Thus, on the one hand, the
new member states seem to have, on average, larger barriers than the original members; in
particular, the countries with the largest barriers are Poland and Czech Republic. Within
the candidate members, on the other side, Turkey￿ s indeces values always exceeds the
EU-15 average values and can be generally placed in within the top values of both the old
and the new members. On the other hand, Iceland has got very low barriers; particularly,
they result to be always lower than the EU-15 members￿lowest ones.
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Entrepreneurship Trade and investment State control
EU15
Austria 1:178 1:163 2:015
Belgium 1:428 0:318 2:533
Denmark 1:15 0:649 1:371
Finland 1:36 0:451 1:752
France 1:284 0:464 2:616
Germany 1:315 0:712 1:958
Greece 1:953 1:323 3:847
Ireland 1:165 0:317 1:271
Italy 1:081 0:717 2:333
Luxemburg 1:696 0:472 2:51
Netherlands 0:871 0:329 1:708
Portugal 1:17 0:459 2:651
Spain 1:202 0:278 1:621
Sweden 0:959 0:568 2:378
UK 0:824 0:199 1:504
average 1:242 0:561 2:138
EU8
Czech Republic 1:55 0:88 2:434
Estonia 1:402 0:524 2:011
Hungary 1:702 0:285 1:905
Poland 2:323 1:117 3:352
Slovakia 1:545 1:731 1:612
Slovenia 1:083 0:643 2:647
average 1:601 0:863 2:327
EU candidates
Iceland 2:001 0:155 0:854
Turkey 2:436 0:823 3:793
average 2:218 0:489 2:323
Source: OECD database
Thus, I now turn to the second category of entry barriers indeces, that concern sectoral
regulation. I ￿rst look at the data about the index that measures regulatory conditions in
professional services. It comes up that, on average, EU-15 countries have got much lower
barriers (1.967) with respect to the new members (2.634). Particularly, among EU-15
state members, the countries that report the largest values for that index are: Luxemburg
(3.536), Italy (3.234), Germany (2.852) and Greece (2.809); instead, the countries with the
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within EU-8 countries, those reporting largest index values are Slovenia (3.33), Hungary
(3.144) and Poland (2.658). Finally, regarding the candidate members, Turkey￿ s index
value is de￿nitely larger than the averages values of the two groups of current members
and only slightly lower than the largest one (in Luxemburg); Iceland, instead, has got
lower barriers with respect to the average of both EU-15 members and the EU-8 ones.
Next, I describe the data about the second index, that measures toughness of entry
barriers to the retail trade sector. In this case, the old EU member countries have got an
average index value (2.707) that is larger than the average value for the new EU members
(1.743). This means that, from the point of view of this particular sector, entry barriers
are lower in EU-8 countries. Thus, on the one hand, EU-15 countries with the largest index
values are: Luxemburg (4.282), Belgium (3.735), Austria (3.561) and Greece (3.488); on
the othe hand, those with the lowest index values are: Sweden (0.504), Ireland (1.009)
and the UK (2.032). Turning to the new EU members, those with the largest index values
are: Poland (3.184), Hungary (2.105) and Estonia (1.777). Finally, about the candidate
members, Turkey￿ s value (1.544) is actually lower than the average values in the two
current groups of EU members; Iceland, instead, has got an index value (2.428) that is
larger than the average value for the new EU members and lower than the average value
for the old members.
Finally, I turn to the third index, that measures that strictness of entry barriers for
the sector of energy, transports and communications. So, in this case, the old EU member
countries show an average index value (1.917) that is lower than the average value for
the new EU members (2.148). In more detail, on the one hand, the EU-15 members
that have got the largest values for this index are: Greece (3.07), Ireland (2.58) and
Luxemburg/Portugal (2.43); on the other hand, those with the lowest index values are:
the UK (0.95), Germany (1.08) and Denmark (1.22). Regarding the new EU members,
those reporting the largest entry barriers to this sector are: Slovenia (2.67), Poland (2.28)
and Slovakia (1.98). Last, among the candidate members, Turkey has got a really large
index value (3.55), that is much larger than the largest values in both the old members
and the new members groups; Iceland, instead, reports an index value (2.12) that is larger
than the average value of the EU-15 group, but lower than the average value of the EU-8
group.
Summarizing, it turns out to be slightly harder than in the previous case to make
conclusions about entry barriers. For both the professional sector and the energy, trans-
port and communications sector, the new EU members show higher barriers than the old
members. Particularly, among the EU-8 members, countries with the highest barriers
are Poland and Slovenia. Nevertheless, in terms of the retail distribution sector, the old
members result to have larger barriers than the new members. Furthermore, among the
93candidate members, Turkey is far above the average indeces values in the two current EU
members groups with respect to entry barriers to professions and the energy, transport
and communications sector. However, in terms of barriers to the retail distribution sector,
Turkey seems to have a less tough regulation of entry. Iceland, instead, has got lower
barriers to the professions sector with respect to the index average values for the current
EU members. Instead, it is above the average of the new member countries with respect
to the retail distribution sector and above the average of the old member countries with
respect to the energy, transport and communications sector.
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All professions Retail trade Energy, transport and communications
EU15
Austria 2:651 3:561 1:75
Belgium 2:183 3:735 1:85
Denmark 1:189 2:922 1:22
Finland 0:954 3:122 2:19
France 2:107 3:11 2:17
Germany 2:852 2:438 1:08
Greece 2:809 3:488 3:07
Ireland 0:864 1:009 2:58
Italy 3:234 2:614 2:01
Luxemburg 3:536 4:282 2:43
Netherlands 1:204 2:131 1:65
Portugal 2:534 3:003 2:43
Spain 2:061 2:658 1:63
SIden 0:6 0:504 1:74
UK 0:735 2:032 0:95
average 1:967 2:707 1:917
EU8
Czech Republic 2:274 1:637 1:97
Estonia 2:111 1:777 N:A:
Hungary 3:144 2:105 1:84
Poland 2:658 3:184 2:28
Slovakia 2:313 0:846 1:98
Sweovenia 3:33 0:909 2:67
average 2:638 1:743 2:148
EU candidates
Iceland 1:82 2:428 2:12
Turkey 3:385 1:544 3:55
average 2:602 1:986 2:835
Source: OECD database
In conclusion, ￿rst, in terms of product market regulation, the old EU members have
got, on average, lower entry barriers than the new members, among which Poland and
Czech Republic report the largest values of entry barriers indeces. Secondly, in terms
of sectoral regulation, the old EU members have, on average, lower entry barriers than
the new EU members with respect to the professions sector and the energy, transport
and communications sector. However, with respect to the retail distribution sector, the
95new members seem to have, on average, lower barriers. Thus, turning to the candidate
members, it comes up that Turkey has got very high entry barriers in almost all the sectors;
Iceland, instead, looks to have a not that tough entry regulation, often softer than that of
the old EU members.
Therefore, the evidence reported shows that my model could catch a possible problem
that the EU might have to deal with in case of further enlargement to some countries, like
Turkey. In fact, on the one hand, the new EU members seem to have tougher restrictions
to market competition (this does not surprise so much as most of those countries were
part of the area under the Soviet in￿ uence, where a strong state control was imposed to
the economy). On the other hand, large migration ￿ ows have been recorded from those
countries to the old EU member countries, where entry barriers are generally lower. In
particular, it came up that one of the largest out￿ ows departed from one of the new
members with the largest entry barriers to the market, that is Poland. Furthermore,
favourite destinations of such migration ￿ ows are those old EU members that generally
have very low restrictions to market entry, such as Germany, the UK and Ireland. Thus,
even though the empirical evidence reported is really rough, it seems to support one of the
issues raised through my theoretical work: if you integrate markets that are heterogeneous
in terms of competition toughness, production resources might tend to (over)move towards
the relatively more competitive markets. Then, my model could be helpful because it could
quantitatively assess exogenous distributions of labour forces that can make asymmetric
aggregates better o⁄.
3.5 Conclusions
My work developed a study about the economic e¢ ciency of market integration. Partic-
ularly, it focused on misallocation problems coming from integrating markets featuring
heterogeneous internal competition toughness degrees. Thus, I analytically derived the
equilibria in two di⁄erent frameworks. The ￿rst one is characterized by full integration of
both the capital and the labour markets; the second one, instead, is only partially inte-
grated: capital is assumed to be free mobile across markets, while labour is restricted at
the individual market level.
Indeed, in analytical terms, the crucial result is about the di⁄erence in production
factors allocation between the labour restricted economy and the integrated economy.
According to the Social Planner, input allocation only follows the relative productivity
of the agents operating in the economy. Indeed, both the competitive economies that
I derived are able to catch that allocation as long as demand elasticities across all the
markets are the same. However, they resulted to crucially di⁄er in case of cross-industry
markup heterogeneity. In the integrated setting, industry level allocation of production
factors depends not only on the relative productivity but also on the demand elasticity of
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the allocation of both capital and labour. In the labour constrained economy, instead, the
labour allocation in each industry is given, while the capital allocation turned out to
be not only a function of both the industry speci￿c relative productivity and demand
elasticity as before, but also of the amount of labour exogenously allocated. Therefore,
in the latter case, the allocation distortion implied by demand elasticity heterogeneity
across industries can be (partially) corrected by labour segmentation: by constraining
the mobility of labour, you can exogenously withdraw (part) of the ine¢ ciently excessive
amount of labour allocated in the relative more competitive market and move that into
the relative less competitive market. Nevertheless, this resulted to be not a ￿rst best
solution. The reason is that I constrain only one of the two input factors: capital keeps
being free mobile even in a (partially) restricted context and, then, is distorted as well
as in the integrated setting. In particular, the lower the output elasticity of capital, the
more e⁄ective labour restriction will be: intuitively, the lower the contribute of capital to
production, the more labour restriction will be able to work into the direction of a more
e¢ cient allocation of input factors.
Turning to the context of regional integration, one of the most relevant results from the
analytical work in this chapter is that heterogeneity in demand elasticities across coun-
tries/regions can lead to an ine¢ cient allocation of production resurces. More speci￿cally,
internationally mobile factors will over-move towards those regions with relatively larger
demand elasticities and lower markups. This happens because those regions have rela-
tively lower prices and then relatively larger real wages. Of course, the crucial assumption
made here is that intra-region markups are exogenenous, as the number of ￿rms oper-
ating within each region/country is assumed to be very large and constant. However,
even allowing for endogeneous markups, i.e. they depend on the number of ￿rms, that is
determined by an entry/exit mechanism, the ￿nal result would be similar: regions with a
larger price elasticity demand would be likely to comprise a larger number of ￿rms that,
in turn, would lead to a larger demand for labour and, consequently, a larger real wage.
Indeed, in case of markup endogeneity, it might be interesting to study why di⁄erent coun-
tries would have a di⁄erent number of ￿rms and, in turn, di⁄erent markups. Thus, for
example, keeping the size homogeneous across regional areas, a di⁄erent amount of ￿rms
could depend on heterogeneous entry costs (see Epifani and Gancia, 2011) or heteroge-
neous ￿rm-level productivity distributions. Therefore, on the one hand, asymmetric entry
barriers (see Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers, 2001) might depend on di⁄erent institu-
tional and political environments; on the other hand, even assuming homogeneity in entry
costs, countries with relatively lower markups will be likely to have a larger number of
￿rms that are productive enough to cover those costs and enter the market. Furthermore,
another key assumption I made is the absence of aggregate scale economies via the variety
97e⁄ect on productivity. Nevertheless, as long as entry is assumed to be restricted, markup
homogeneity is a necessary and su¢ cient condition to reach a ￿rst best allocation of input
factors (as shown in Epifani and Gancia, 2011.)
In order to illustrate the di⁄erences between the two settings (i.e. integrated market
and restricted market), I also employed some simple comparative statics exercises. The
major aim was to graphically compare the outcomes, in terms of both aggregate and
individual country level income and in terms of remuneration of input factors, of a two-
country economy in a constrained context and in an integrated one. In the constrained
setting, labour force is restricted at the population level, while in the integrated setting,
labour force can actually di⁄er from the original population due to migration out- or in-
￿ ows. In particular, I considered two di⁄erent scenarios: in the ￿rst one, the two countries
have the same degree of internal competition toughness; in the second one, one country is
more competitive than the other. In aggregate terms, I showed that in the ￿rst scenario
a completely integrated economy yields a ￿rst best result, while the segmented economy
produces as much as the one without migration constraints if the population distribution
matches the labour force distribution according to the integrated market. In the second
scenario, instead, the integrated economy can not yield an optimal result because of ine¢ -
cient allocation of production factors. In case of exogenous restrictions to labour mobility,
the economy can improve its welfare even though the result will be always suboptimal, as
long as the other input factor, that is capital, is kept free to move across national borders.
Going further into the analysis at the aggregate level, it came up that pro￿ts, capital in-
come and labour income, that are the three components of the total income, can all reach
larger amounts in the labour constrained economy in the demand elasticity heterogeneity
case. Turning to the implication of relaxing the immigration barriers for production fac-
tors costs, of course, the ￿rst crucial result is that wages in the two countries become equal
(the rental rate is always homogeneous across countries in both the settings). This will
make the original populations of the two countries either better or worse o⁄. In particular,
in the country where the population is lower than the labour force allocation after integra-
tion, wages will turn out to be lowered, while in the country where the population is larger
than the amount of workers allocated after dropping migration barriers, wages will result
to be raised. However, the break even point, the is the point at which wages equalized,
correspond to the optimal allocation of the labour force in the ￿rst scenario (i.e. demand
elasticity homogeneity); instead, it corresponds to the ine¢ cient allocation of labour, in
case of cross country markup heterogeneity: the integrated market will allocate too many
workers in the relatively more competitive country and too few workers in the relatively
less competitive national market. Furthermore, in the ￿rst scenario, the equilibrium rental
rate in a segmented context reaches the same value as in an integrated economy, if the
population distribution matches the e¢ cient distribution of labour force. However, in the
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the population size in the relative more competitive economy is larger than the optimal
allocation of labour force and lower than the allocation according to an integrated frame-
work. Finally, turning to the point of view of the individual country, it resulted that,
assuming the capital ownership equally distributed across the two countries, the country
with a population that is larger than the labour force allocated in the integrated economy
will be always better o⁄. Nevertheless, if the population size is lower than the labour
force allocated after integration, then the country can be either better or worse o⁄. In
particular, it will be worse o⁄ if the original population size is very small.
In more practical terms, one of the major scopes of this paper is to possibly contribute
to the debate about integration of asymmetric markets. Of course, I mainly study in-
tegration of production factors market; however, my results might also be used in more
general trade context as long as inputs factors mobility a⁄ects costs of production and,
then, prices and quantities of tradeable goods. In particular, I focus on the European
Union, in terms of e⁄ectiveness of both the current aggregate and the possible future
one in case of further enlargements (there are already some candidate members, that are
Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey). Thus, I reported some data about
the migration ￿ ows that followed the EU enlargement in 2004, when ten countries joined
the previous ￿fteen members. Moreover, I tried to match those data with the values of
some indices (from the OECD database) that measure the level of internal competition
toughness for the both the "old" and the "new" members of the European Union, along
with the candidate members. In particular, I looked for any empirical relationship be-
tween migration ￿ ows and gaps in country relative market competitiveness: this was to
prove that the theoretical problems raised by my model can be realistic and plausible.
Thus, I ￿rst wanted to evaluate the e⁄ectiveness of the current Union and then to ￿g-
ure out what would happen in case of a further increase of the EU size. So, data about
migration ￿ ows revealed that after the enlargement in 2004, most of the movements of
migrants departed from Poland and Czech Republic and were directed to the UK and
Ireland, along with Germany within the continental area of the Union. Turning to the
values of the selected OECD indices, the latter are of two types: indicators of product
market regulation (i.e. entrepreneurship barriers, trade and investment barriers and state
control barriers) and indicators of sectoral regulation (i.e. all professions barriers, retail
trade barriers and energy, transport and communications barriers). About the ￿rst type,
in summary, I found that, among the old EU countries, the largest barriers are in Greece,
that has got the largest values for all the three indeces. Instead, the lowest barriers are in
the UK and in Ireland. Thus, on the one hand, the new member states seem to have, on
average, larger barriers than the original members; in particular, the countries with the
largest barriers are Poland and Czech Republic. On the other hand, among the candidate
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generally placed in within the top values of both the old and the new members. Moreover,
Iceland has got very low barriers; particularly, they resulted to be always lower than the
old members￿lowest ones. In terms of indicators of sectoral regulation, it turned out to
be slightly harder than in the previous case to make conclusions about entry barriers. For
both the professional sector and the energy, transport and communications sector, the
new EU members show higher barriers than the old members. Particularly, among the
new members, countries with the highest barriers are Poland and Slovenia. Nevertheless,
in terms of the retail distribution sector, the old members result to have larger barriers
than the new members. Furthermore, among the candidate members, Turkey is far above
the average indeces values in the two current EU members groups with respect to entry
barriers to professions and the energy, transport and communications sector. However,
in terms of barriers to the retail distribution sector, Turkey seems to have a less tough
regulation of entry. Iceland, instead, has got lower barriers to the professions sector with
respect to the index average values for the current EU members. In addition, it is above
the average of the new member countries with respect to the retail distribution sector and
above the average of the old member countries with respect to the energy, transport and
communications sector.
In terms of the literature I can refer to, my framework is analytically consistent with
Epifani and Gancia (2011) (EG 2011, hereafter). The latter is a static model featuring
a continuum of industries. Those industries, that are heterogeneous by productivity, are
aggregated according to a standard CES function. Within each industry there are possibly
di⁄erentiated varieties; in this case, the perceived elasticities depends on the number
of ￿rms at the industry level (that can be heterogeneous across industries) and/or the
elasticity substitution in consumption across varieties. Firms are owned by the totality
of consumers, so that any pro￿ts are rebated. Indeed, there are some relevant di⁄erences
between that framework and mine. First, the number of ￿rms within each sector is low19
and each ￿rm￿ s decision a⁄ects the others, so that markups turn out to be endogenous;
furthermore, the monopoly power at the industry level is a weighted average of elasticity
of substitution between varieties and industries. Thus, the number of competitors results
to a⁄ect prices and quantities at the ￿rm level. In my model, instead, the number of
di⁄erentiated competitors in each industry is assumed to be very large, so that markups
are exogenous; in addition, they only depend on the within industry demand elasticity.
Second, in EG 2011, ￿rms competing in the same industrial sector are homogeneous in
terms of productivity: consequently, they all charge the same price, produce the same
quantity and, ￿nally, share the same amount of the production factor. In my framework,
19The number of ￿rms is exogeneous in the restricted entry version of the model; instead, it is endoge-
neous in the free entry version of the model.
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produce di⁄erent quantities and they will not share the same amount of input factors.
Third, they capture the preference for variety by a proper parameter, that can also be
heterogeneous across industries. Turning to my setting, that parameter is assumed to be
always equal to one, so that the model results to be neutral with respect to preference for
variety. Fourth, another crucial di⁄erence between the two settings is in the industry entry
mechanism. Epifani and Gancia distinguish between two separate frameworks. In the ￿rst
one, there is restricted entry and sunk ￿xed costs are assumed to be zero, so that ￿rms can
make positive pro￿ts; in the second one, there is free entry and sunk ￿xed costs are larger
than zero, so that competitors will keep entering the industry until pro￿ts are turned to
zero. My setting relies on the restricted entry assumption: the (heterogeneous) number
of ￿rms within each industry is given; sunk ￿xed costs are assumed to be zero and ￿rms￿
pro￿ts can be positive. Finally, assumptions on production factors also di⁄er. First of all,
production in the reference model relies on one input factor (i.e. labour), while my model
on two production factors (i.e. labour and capital). Secondly, in the ￿rst setting, labour
is inelastically supplied at the aggregate level and then distributed across all producers; in
my setting, instead, capital is always assumed to be inelastically supplied at the aggregate
level; labour is assumed to be inelastically supplied at the aggregate economy level in the
￿rst setting, but segmented at the industry (country) level in the second one. However,
both EG 2011 with restricted entry and the model that I presented both lead to the same
results in terms of labour allocation across industries and welfare.
So, with respect to important recent works about misallocation problems due to
markup heterogeneity, such as Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2008) (BGM 2008, hereafter)
and EG 2011 itself, it might be worth stressing that I consider a production function that
has got two input factors (i.e. labour and capital) rather than only one (i.e. labour). This
leads to possibly more complicated cases of distortion since the two inputs must inter-
act in the production process and, at the same time, the respective markets they come
from can crucially di⁄er in terms of degree of mobility allowed. Furthermore, I suggest
a di⁄erent solution to market ine¢ ciency, that does not imply lump-sum transfers as in
BGM 2008 nor subsidies to production as in EG 2011. My solution might be thought
of as more feasible, especially in an international context, where ￿scal policy instruments
are generally hard to be implemented because of di¢ culties in coordinating them across
national borders. On the one hand, from a theoretical point of view, restrictions to factor
mobility as a policy tool ￿nd support in Ottaviano and Thisse (2002), among others. On
the other hand, from a more empirical point of view, support comes from what stated by
the European Commission in 1999: "it could be an advantage of the new members [of the
EU] to restrict this right [i.e. labour mobility across borders] for a set period of time. The
economies of applicant countries are more likely to su⁄er a brain drain and loss of valuable
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Finally, Hindrinks (2001) indicated some practical ways to restrict labour mobility, such
as zoning requirements, immigration policies and housing markets.
Indeed, the work is expected to be further extended in the future through both a the-
oretical development of the model and, possibly, an empirical validation of my economic
predictions based on actual data. Thus, on the one hand, my framework might be devel-
oped by making markups endogenous through a free entry mechanism: within this scope,
I would introduce sunk ￿xed costs in order to make the number of competitors within each
industry not given. Keeping ￿rms heterogeneous in terms of technical productivity, one of
the scopes of this extension would be to model the relationship between the market spe-
ci￿c competition toughness and the productivity distribution across competitors in that
market. More speci￿cally, the individual market speci￿c markup would not just depend
on the number of competitors as in EG 2011 and many other models featuring endogenous
markups but rather on the number of ￿rms that are productive enough to cover ￿xed costs
and make nonzero pro￿ts if they choose to compete in the market. Therefore, it would
be possible to establish a link not only between markup and aggregate productivity but
also between markup and productivity distribution. In fact, there might exist markets
with a very large aggregate productivity but with only a few very strong competitors that
are able to enter the markets, so that those market would result really productive despite
of a low internal competition. Furthermore, considering a dynamic perspective instead,
I might consider ￿rm level productivities coming from the same distribution across all
the industries; moreover, I might also assume that the starting number of ￿rms in each
industry is the same. Thus, the shock a⁄ecting only one ￿rm in only one industry could
then change the number of ￿rms within that industry and, if the markup depends on the
number of ￿rms, that shock involving only one ￿rm could lead to markup heterogeneity
and then to misallocation of input factors. Therefore, this extension would give a more
precise picture of competition, particularly at the international level, as it would represent
and link with each other very important features of market structure, such as competition
toughness and productivity distribution of producers.
On the other hand, I am also going to try to ￿nd empirical evidence of what my model
predicts. In particular, the plan is to measure average price-cost margins and aggregate
productivities for the member countries that have joined the European Union so far and,
then, to estimate an e¢ cient allocation of both labour force and investments in each of the
member country according to those measures and my model￿ s predictions. Thus, I would
be able to compare the results from those estimates with actual allocation of labour and
capital across the Union in order to possibly verify the power of my theoretical predictions.
Finally, within this scope, I could exploit the large database provided by Amadeus (Bu-
reau van Dijk), that collects data at the company level on standardized annual accounts,
102￿nancial ratios, sectoral activities and ownership for 38 European countries, so that it
seems to be very useful for this research project.
1034 Pricing-to-Market and Trade Costs Meet Country-
Speci￿c Tastes: Closing the Gap on the PPP Anom-
aly
4.1 Introduction
The fourth chapter of my thesis aims at addressing an issue that Obst￿ ed and Rogo⁄
(2000) (OR 2000, hereafter) de￿ned as one the six major puzzles in international eco-
nomics: the purchasing power parity puzzle. Thus, the ￿rst goal is to study the impact
of cross-country preference asymmetry on di⁄erences in international prices. A lot of evi-
dence has been reported about how the same goods can be priced di⁄erently according to
the (national) markets in which they are sold. One of the resons might be linked to the
fact that consumers from di⁄erent areas in the world have di⁄erent tastes that can a⁄ect
international trade in terms of both quantities and prices. Di⁄erent tastes can be due to
several factors, of cultural or environmental type. For example, selling Italian co⁄ee in
India can be not as easy as in Italy simply because Italian consumers like Italian co⁄ee
more than Indian consumers do; selling Chinese noodles in Italy can be a hard business
as consumers normally prefer Italian pasta over there. Furthermore, the geographical en-
vironment can also matter. In particular, climatic characteristics of markets could a⁄ect
expenditure preferences. For instance, selling umbrellas in desertic areas might be some-
thing really di¢ cult to do with respect to, say, Scotland, such as selling air conditioners
in North Africa countries can be much easier than selling them in Arctic areas.
Therefore, even in a more and more integrated international market, the country level
total expenditure of households can be distributed in a very di⁄erent manner over the same
items. This could make selling a particular good abroad easier or harder than at home,
according to the tastes of the destination countries. Moreover, preference asymmetry
across di⁄erent national markets might also a⁄ect international prices. In fact, tastes could
contribute to determine the size of the market of a particular good; in turn, this could
a⁄ect the degree of competition between the producers of that good and, consequently,
the market power and pricing strategies of each of them. More speci￿cally, the smaller
the size of the market for a good, ceteris paribus, the lower the expected competition in
the production of that good, the larger the market power held by competitors and, then
prices charged.
Furthermore, the e⁄ect of preference heterogeneity on international trade may become
even more plausible in the form of home bias by taking also into account economies of
scale. More speci￿cally, the latter imply that national economies tend to produce more
those goods that domestic consumers like more than others. This is to exploit increasing
returns to scale, that is cost advantages implied by larger sizes of businesses, due to ￿xed
104costs of production. Thus, producers might have to charge di⁄erent prices in di⁄erent
countries not only because they have to deal with trade costs when they sell abroad, but
also because country speci￿c preferences might crucially a⁄ect the degree of competition
and then the pricing for competitors.
As explained in OR 2000, the Purchasing Power Parity consists in a weak connection
between exchange rates and national price levels. In more detail, according to the Purchas-
ing Power Parity theory (or absolute PPP), the real exchange rate between two countries
is equal to one or, alternatively, tends to turn back to the unity when the long-run ratio







where Pi is the domestic-currency price of good i, P ￿
i is the foreign-curreny price, and E
is the exchange rate, de￿ned as the home-currency price. On the other hand, according
to a weaker version of the same theory (or relative PPP), changes in national price levels











Finally, an even stronger version of the absolute PPP is the Law of One Price (LOP),
stating that if trade barriers (either natural or government imposed) are absent, any




In this chapter (such as in the next one), I want to study the determinants of short-
term deviations from the relative PPP and, particularly, on pricing-to-market. I can
refer to many important modern works on this subject. Following, I will try to give
a short review. P. Krugman (1986) observed that movements of US import prices are
not perfectly correlated with movements of exchange rates: this made some evidence of
pricing-to-market by foreign sellers to the American market. From the theoretical point of
view, Krugman mostly explained pricing-to-market through dynamic models of imperfect
competition. He particularly focused on both the role of supply dynamics (coming from
the adjustment costs of distribution infrastructure related to imports) and the role of
demand dynamics (coming from the ￿rm￿ s investments in reputation). Feenstra, Gagnon
and Knetter (1996) tried to explain why import prices do not fully respond to exchange
rates (i.e. incomplete pass-through). Exploiting a panel data set on automobile exports
from the US , Germany, France and Sweden to twelve destination countries, they found
that pass-through is increasing in the export country￿ s market share in a particular import
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then the exporter will deal with a poor competition and, consequently, will be more keen
to pass through an exchange rate. Backus and Cucini (2000) studied the variability of
terms of trade with respect to real output and trade volumes. They set up a dynamic
equilibrium model of international business cycle. They found that comovements of terms
of trade mostly depend on the source of shocks. Namely, movements of terms of trade and
output turned out to be positively correlated if they were both generated by productivity
shocks. Instead, such correlation resulted to be negative if those movements were generated
by oil supply shocks. This is because in case of, for example, a negative shock on oil
prices, domestic output of industrialized countries falls with respect to domestic output of
nonindustrialized producers of oil, while relative prices of industrialized countries￿domestic
goods increase. According to Goldberg and Verboven (2001) there are three potential
sources of price di⁄erences across countries: price elasticities leading to di⁄erences in
markups, costs and import quotas constraints. They employed a large dataset comprising
information on 150 car models across ￿ve national markets (Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy and the UK) to make some empirical estimates. In particular, they found that French,
British and, especially, Italian consumers regard goods from the same country origin as
closer substitute with respect to goods coming from di⁄erent countries. In Germany,
instead, domestic and foreign goods belonging to the same market segment resulted to
be equally substitute. Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2005) developed an empirical
study in the Law of One Price (LOP) theory, according to which identical goods should
be priced the same in di⁄erent countries, once their prices are turned into a common
currency. So, they measured good-by-good deviations from the LOP for a large range of
goods and services across all European countries. They mainly showed, exploiting classic
characteristics of goods, that good-by-good dispersion in the absolute LOP deviations
depend negatively on the tradeability of goods and positively on the share of non-traded
inputs used for the production of goods. Berka and Crucini (2009) developed a study
about the sources of terms of trade over a panel of 38 countries, aiming at detecting
the contributions of individual goods to the variance of the aggregate terms of trade.
Particularly, this work built up an alternative measure of the standard terms of trade, that
is the consumption terms of trade. Their data allowed to distinguish between retail prices
of traded goods that are faced by national consumers and relative prices of the same goods
that are calculated according to trade prices at the border. If producers and consumers
cope with the same prices, then there is no di⁄erence consumption and production terms
of trade. One of the most important ￿nding was that consumption terms of trade at local
price is more volatile than then production terms of trade at world prices, even though
they are correlated to each other. Berka and Devereux (2010) measured real exchange
rates at both disaggregate and aggregate level and found that the PPP did not hold for
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non-tradable goods than for tradable ones. Furthermore, they showed that real exchange
rate in signi￿cantly determined by relative GDP per capita across di⁄erent countries.
Another important strand of the PPP literature, instead, has focused on one further
issue related to the puzzle, that is the slow rate at which deviations from PPP die out
(however, I do not deal with this particular issue within my research work.) Rogo⁄(1996)
considered several di⁄erent sources of international divergence of prices, such as trans-
portation costs, tari⁄s, nontari⁄ barriers, information costs and di⁄erent national quality
standards. He mainly explained the PPP puzzle with the fact that international goods
markets are not as integrated as the domestic ones due to high trade barriers for many
goods. Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000) addressed the persistence of real exchange rates devi-
ations. First, in terms of mean reversion of shocks, they did not ￿nd too much di⁄erence
between prices of tradables and nontradables. This was because, as they argued, many
traded goods already include many nontradable components. Moreover, they claimed
that monopolistic supply of goods can explain international price di⁄erentials only for
"big ticket" commodities, such as cars, but not for smaller ones, such as clothes. Thus,
they turned to trade costs as a more plausible rationale. Cheung, Chinn and Fujii (2001)
analysed the connection between market structure and the persistence of sectoral real
exchange rates for a panel of 14 OECD countries. The main result was that the more
imperfect the industry market competition, the larger the tendency to pricing-to-market
and, then, the slower the rate of PPP reversion. Imbs, Mumtaz and Rey (2005) claimed
that there is no reason why every good should converge to international price parity ho-
mogeneously at the same time: so, the relative price dynamics varies across goods, that
can crucially di⁄er according to, for instance, degree of tradability, degree of competition,
or transportation costs. Therefore, the too slow mean reversion of aggregate exchange
rate was due to the fact that such a heterogeneity in price adjustment dynamics at the
individual good level was not taken into account. Crucini and Shintani (2008), using
US sectoral data, found a positive correlation between the persistence in LOP deviations
and distribution margins: more speci￿cally, those margins included costs needed to move
goods and services from the producer to the consumer.
My contribution to the literature shortly summarized above consists in extending the
model set up by Atkeson and Burstein (American Economic Review, 2008; AB (2008),
hereafter) by introducing cross-country heterogeneity in demand preferences and home
bias e⁄ect. The original framework is a model aiming at explaining large and systematic
deviations from the relative PPP (Purchasing Power Parity, i.e. the hypothesis according
to which the relative price of a trade good should stay constant over time.) So, the
main object was to theoretically address two empirical facts: ￿rst, the terms of trade of
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partners of trade, are much less volatile than the Producer Price Index-based real exchange
rate for the same type of goods; second, movements in Consumer Price Index-based real
exchange rates for manufacturing goods are almost as volatile as movements in Producer
Price Index-based real exchange rates for manufactures. The common explanation that
the authors gave to both the issues was related to pricing-to-market, that is the choice
of individual producers to change the relative price of her output abroad and at home
as a response to aggregate international shocks. More speci￿cally, their model relies on
two main characteristics: imperfect competition with variable markups and international
trade costs (both ￿xed and "iceberg" type marginal costs.) Thus, ￿rms did not result
to completely pass through variations in marginal costs to prices due to the fact that
markups depended on the market share. However, imperfect competition with variable
markups is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition in order to have pricing-to-market: in
fact, without any trade costs, ￿rms have to face the same competitors both abroad and at
home, so that they will have the same markups and charge and the same prices in both the
markets. So, their model turned out to be able to match many relevant characteristics of
international trade and market structure and, particularly, to reproduce actual deviations
from the relative purchasing power parity in the US. With respect to the framework
quickly summarized above, I ￿rst introduce asymmetry in demand preferences: this is
obtained by giving the same panel of commodities aggregated in the ￿nal consumption
good heterogeneous weights across the two countries that the model features. Furthermore,
the home bias e⁄ect is captured by adding not only heterogeneity in preferences, but
also ￿xed costs of production. So doing, sectors related to larger preference weights will
comprise a larger number of competitors as long as larger weights will scale up revenues
and pro￿ts that, in turn, will be more likely to cover the entry costs.
Nevertheless, I think that their work leaves something that can be further improved,
especially in terms of the second "fact". Their simulations showed that reaction to aggre-
gate shocks of CPI-based RER is equal to only a bit more than 80 percent of the reaction
to aggregate shocks of PPI-based RER: thus, there is a remaining 20 percent of the actual
relationship between the two movements that still needs to be explained. So, this is the
challenge of the second part of my thesis. In more detail, the link between PPI-based real











where PPI=PPI￿ is the PPI-based real exchange rate, EPI=IPI is the terms of trade,
PPI=EPI is the ratio of domestic producer and export prices and, ￿nally, IPI=PPI￿ is
the ratio of import (that is, foreign country export) and foreign producer prices. Notice
that hats indicate changes in the logarithm of the variables; furthermore, nominal exchange
108rates are not used in order to express international price ratios as prices are assumed to
be measured in a common currency. In case of relative PPP holding, the last two terms of
(36) are zero; however, AB 2008 provided evidence that they are actually larger than zero
at the aggregate level and that was the ￿rst signal that, in fact, PPP did not hold. On
the other side, one further signal of not holding relative PPP was that international trade
was not able to reduce the impact of movements in relative producer prices on relative
consumer prices for tradable goods. In terms of formula, I can express the relationships
between consumer price and producer price in both the domestic country (say country 1)
and the foreign country (say country 2) as follows:
[ CPI1 ’ [ PPI1 + s1
￿
d IPI1 ￿ \ EPI1
￿
;
[ CPI2 ’ [ PPI2 + s2
￿
\ EPI1 ￿ d IPI1
￿
:
More speci￿cally, s1 and s2 are the share of consumption expenditure on imports in,
respectively, country 1 and country 2. In particular, due to preference asymmetry across
countries, it can be
s1 6= s2;
so that shares of consumption expenditure on imports, that are assumed to be equal in the
original framework, are allowed to di⁄er in my model. Nevertheless, such an asymmetry
does not necessarily imply trade unbalance between the two countries as long as countries
can be asymmetric in size.
Thus, the ratio of the change in the CPI-based RER (real exchange rate) and the
change in the PPI-based RER is given by
[ CPI1 ￿ [ CPI2
[ PPI1 ￿ [ PPI2
= 1 ￿ (s1 + s2)
\ EPI1 ￿ d IPI1
[ PPI1 ￿ [ PPI2
: (37)
Of course, as in AB 2008, the latter expression highlights that the larger deviations from
the relative PPP, the more relative consumer prices and relative producer prices move
together. If PPP holds, then the second term of the right side of (37) is very close to 1
(both at in the domestic market and in the foreign market, prices react to shocks in the
same way), so that ￿ uctuations in relative consumer prices as a share of ￿ uctuations in
relative producer prices almost amount to 020
20In more detail, the closer (37) to the unity, the closer
￿




[ PPI1 ￿ [ PPI2
￿
to zero, as
long as there are some imports in both country 1 and country 2 (i.e. s1 and s2 are positive). So, showing
that (37) is almost 1 implicitly leads to show also that the terms of trade is signi￿cantly less volative
than PPI-based real exchange rate, that is the ￿rst "fact" regarding the U.S. economy that Atkeson and
Burstein wanted to explain through their model.
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The ￿rst idea to try to improve AB (2008) is to introduce cross-country asymmetry in
demand preferences. The intuition starts from observing that even in a globalized market,
there are still crucial di⁄erences in demand preferences across countries. Those di⁄erences
are often hard to relax because of cultural, geographical, climatic, etc. reasons and might
crucially a⁄ect the market share that an international trader can gain by selling in a
foreign country. Thus, such a heterogeneity might help explaining quantities and prices
of goods/services traded internationally.
In the literature, it is possible to ￿nd some studies about the connection between
"identity" and economic outputs. For example, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) included
identity within a model of behaviour; more speci￿cally, they analyzed di⁄erent examples
of bahaviours that are related to identity, such as gender discrimination in the labour
market, the household division of labour and the economic mechanics of social exclusion
and poverty. The ￿rst result was that people take identity-based payo⁄s from their own
actions. The second result revealed that people take identity-based payo⁄s also from
others￿actions (externality e⁄ect). Finally, third parties can produce persistent changes
in people￿ s payo⁄s. Francois and Ypersele (2002) de￿ned cultural goods as those goods
that domestic consumers value in a di⁄erent manner with respect to foreigners and that
are produced by increasing returns to scale technologies. A real case reported in this
work was that of Hollywood movies that, according to the popular press, were threatening
traditional cultures within European countries. Giannetti and Yafeh (2008) focused on
the e⁄ects of cultural di⁄erences across ￿nancial markets. Through a large dataset of
international syndicated bank loans, they ￿rst found that professional decision-makers are
keen to give better contractual conditions and share risk with counterparts that result to
be more alike. On the other hand, participant banks turned out to fund syndicated loans
from culturally distant banks for lower portions. Olivier, Thoenig and Verdier (2008)
developed a model aimed at examining the relationship between international trade and
the dynamics of cultural identity. So, in their model, they included a cultural good, that
was meant as a positive group externality among individuals having the same culture and
the same consumption patterns of that good. There were assumed two types of agents:
homo economicus, who does not bene￿t from the group externality and homo culturalis,
who bene￿ts from both individual consumption and positive group externality. In terms of
results, on the one hand, cultural identity a⁄ected both prices and allocation of resources
through the standard demand channel: the larger the size of a given cultural community,
the larger the demand for the relative cultural good, the larger the price of that good in
equilibrium. On the other hand, there is also a cultural identity e⁄ect leading to cultural
homogenization over the society. Auer (2008) focused on a two-sided heterogeneity: on the
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are heterogeneous in their taste for those attributes of products. The work found that
taste di⁄erences across countries are a limit to international trade; however, in the long-
run, volume of trade turned out to be the same as in the case of no taste di⁄erences
across countries. The latter means that Linder (1961)￿ s theory according to which taste
heterogeneity is an impediment to international trade holds only in the short-run.
In order to empirically illustrate how demand preferences di⁄er across countries, I
employ OECD data on national CPI weights.21Speci￿cally, the weight of each good in a
CPI represents the share of total household expenditure that is spent on that good over
the weight reference period. So, I choose to take the values of CPI weights in year 2000 for
the US and for the US￿major international trading partners. In the following Table 4.1,
I report the ranks of the top 10 US international merchandise trading partners by value
in 1980, 1990 and 2001, compiled by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics of the US
Department of Transportation. In 2001, the trade with the top 10 partners represented
more than 68 percent of the total international trade volume of the US. Notice that the
￿rst three positions have been held by Canada, Japan and Mexico, while Germany and
the U.K have been stably holding, respectively, the fourth and the ￿fth position. South
Korea and China have become more and more important as US trading partners by time.
In particular, China jumped from the 24th position in 1980 to the 4th position in 2001.
Finally, Italy and France held the bottom positions among the top 10 US partners in 2001,
changing not so much since the last two decades.
21These are annual expenditure weights for the national CPI at the level of COICOP classi￿cation.
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Top 10 US International Trade Partners by Value:1980-2000
Country Rank in 1980 Rank 1990 Rank in 2001 Total Trade, 2001
Canada 1 1 1 380;693
Mexico 3 3 2 232;942
Japan 2 2 3 184;241
China 24 10 4 121;515
Germany 22 4 4 5 89;265
United Kingdom 5 5 6 82;195
South Korea 13 7 7 57;381
Taiwan 9 6 8 51;543
France 7 8 9 50;191
Italy 11 9 10 33;740
Top 10 1;283;707
Top 10, % of total 68:53%
Total, all countries 1;872;985
Source: OECD database
So, from the OECD dataset, I pick up the CPI weights for the following US interna-
tional trading partners: Canada, Mexico, Japan, Germany and the UK. These countries,
along with China (that I exclude here as it does not belong to OECD which, in turn, does
not provide data on CPI weights), represent a big share of the total international trade of
the US and then they might well show in practice the extent to which the US have to deal
with international preferences heterogeneity. The OECD dataset provides data on CPI
weights related to 58 products classi￿ed according to the four-digit C.O.I.C.O.P. (Classi-
￿cation of Individual Consumption According to Purpose) nomenclature. Then, I group
all the products according to seven broad categories: Food, Housing, Apparel, Transport
and Communication, Medical Care, Education and Recreation, Other Goods.23 In Table
4.2 below, I report the aggregate CPI weight associated to each of those categories for the
US and the US trading partners.
From the CPI weights presented, with respect to all the international trading partners
in the table, the US turn out to have a relatively larger share of total household expenditure
spent for Housing (including housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels, furnishings,
household equipment and routine household maintenance, restaurants and hotels) and
Medical Care and a lower share spent in Food (including food, non-alcoholic and alcoholic
beverages and tobacco), Apparel (including clothing and footwear) and Education and
Recreation (in the latter, it precedes only Mexico). Furthermore, turning to the US
trading partners, Mexico and, in a second position, Japan result to be among the farthest
22For 1980 and 1990, Germany includes both West Germany and East Germany.
23See the Appendix for the the contents of each of those categories.
112ones from the US in terms of expenditure shares on Food and Housing, that represent more
than half of the total expenditure for all the countries apart from the UK (for which they
represent slightly less the 50 percent of the total). The UK are very far in terms Housing
(45.28 percent in the US versus 33.4 percent in the U.K), Medical Care (5.51 percent
in the US versus 2.5 percent in the UK) and Education and Recreation (9.12 percent in
the US versus 17.1 percent in the UK). The UK is also the most distant trade partner
in terms of expenditure share in Apparel (4.39 percent in the US versus 6.7 percent in
the UK). Overall, the most homogenous country with the US in terms of total household
expenditure shares seems to be Canada; among the European countries, instead, Germany
seems to be relatively closer with respect to the UK. Indeed, at the more disaggregate level,
such a heterogeneity in CPI weights becomes even more evident.
It is also worth noting that the cross-category heterogeneity in preferences also vary
across countries. In fact, as shown by the standard deviation values at the bottom of
Table 4.2, there are countries, such as the US (s:d: = 14:38) and Canada (s:d: = 13:28),
where preferences seem to be more concentrated in some categories (namely, Housing and
Transport and Communication) with respect to the others. On the other side, the UK
turn out to have the lowest standard deviation (equal to 10:39) across category relative
preferences, that are then more evenly distributed across expenditure items.
Table 4.2. CPI weights % (year 2000)
Countries
Sectors US Canada Mexico Japan Germany UK
Food 11:48 16:06 29:2 21:6 14:01 16:2
Housing 45:28 40:1 31:17 37:5 41:78 33:4
Apparel 4:39 6:58 6:6 5:7 5:51 6:7
Transport and Communication 17:64 21:17 17:38 11:5 16:39 17:7
Medical Care 5:51 2:2 3:42 3:8 3:54 2:5
Education and Recreation 9:11 10:67 8:2 14:1 11:75 17:1
Other goods 6:59 3:22 4:03 5:8 7:02 6:4
Total, % 100 100 100 100 100 100
s.d. across categories 14:38 13:28 11:80 11:94 12:98 10:39
Source: OECD database
4.1.2 Fixed costs of production and home bias e⁄ect: evidence
A more complicated extension of AB (2008) that I employ consists in introducing ￿xed
costs of production and home bias e⁄ect. Particularly, the latter implies that, in presence
of increasing returns, countries will be more oriented to produce and export those goods
for which they have relatively larger markets.
One of the most important works about the home bias e⁄ect is Krugman (1980). The
113latter is two-country monopolistic competition model with free entry (i.e. monopoly pro￿ts
are driven to zero). The main result was that the larger the trade costs, the larger the
taste specialization, the larger the scale economies and the larger the specialization in the
production of one particular good: in turn, this specialization increases the opportunity
to become a net-exporter of that good. Thus, a key role in determining the home bias
e⁄ect is taken by ￿xed costs of production and economies of scale. Blanchard and Kiyotaki
(1987), through a famous monopolistic competition model, studied the e⁄ects of aggregate
demand, depending on real money balances, on output. In particular, they found that, if
there are ￿xed costs, the movements in output, productivity and pro￿tability result to be
positively correlated. The latter result led to implications in terms of entry. In more detail,
if ￿xed costs reduce aggregate demand, then the pro￿ts earned by ￿rms can be negative;
moreover, imperfect competition prevents new entrants from catching all the demand by
lowering prices with respect to existing ￿rms. Therefore, very high nominal wages can
stop new ￿rms from entering the market. Rotemberg and Woodford (1993) analyzed the
importance of taking into account imperfect competition in order to accurately measure
the e⁄ects of various shocks to the economy. In terms of economies of scale, they found that
zero pro￿ts are compatible with a wedge between marginal costs and factor prices if the
average returns to scale are equal to that wedge: thus, in case of increasing returns, average
cost is larger than marginal cost and price can equal average costs (and pro￿ts can be zero)
even if price is larger than marginal cost. Kim (2004) developed a theoretical dynamic
setting that comprises four relevant characteristics of models with scale economies: ￿xed
costs, variety of products, decreasing marginal costs and market power. The work led to
two main conclusions. First, if ￿xed costs do not vary and pro￿ts are driven to zero in
every period, then the aggregate increasing returns to scale only depends on the degree of
returns to variety. This is due to endogeneity of the number of ￿rms, that is determined
by a mechanism of entry and exit: movements in the number of ￿rms can be regarded as
movements in productivity in reaction to aggregate shock to inputs. Second, if ￿xed costs
are allowed to react to changes in aggregate productivity or the zero-pro￿t condition does
not hold in the short-run, then aggregate returns to scale turn out to be determined by
product variety, diminishing marginal costs and market power.
Turning the speci￿c home bias e⁄ect, Roy and Viaene (1998) set up a Ricardian model
featuring country bias in consumer preferences. More speci￿cally, identical physical goods
can be perceived as di⁄erent by consumers as they are manufactured in di⁄erent coun-
tries. Such a perception might be due to di⁄erent factors, like the reputation of quality
of goods produced in some particular countries, information and beliefs on the produc-
tion process in other countries, considerations of noneconomic nature related to social
or political bias. So, the ￿rst contribution of this work is that production specialization
across countries can be a⁄ected by the preference, leading to equilibria that di⁄er from
114those predicted by the classical Ricardian model. The second major result of this paper is
that both inter-industry and intra-industry forms of trade can happen at the same time
despite of the absence of market imperfection, strategic behaviour or product di⁄erentia-
tion. Hillberry and Hummels (2002) focused on the relationship between home bias e⁄ect
and the co-location decisions of both intermediate and ￿nal goods producers. Thus, small
trade costs imply co-location between producers of intermediate goods and producers of
￿nal goods: industrial demands turned out to be more oriented towards goods that are
locally available because ￿rms move in order to minimize trade costs. Therefore, demand
resulted to be home biased in general equilibrium. Hanson and Xiang (2004) built up and
empirically estimated a model aiming at studying the variation of home market e⁄ects
across di⁄erent industries. From the theoretical point of view, the main implication of
their model, featuring two countries, one large and one small, was that the home market
e⁄ect depends on the number of industries with di⁄erentiated products within the whole
economy. On the one hand, in case of many industries, those industries with larger trans-
port costs and lower substitution elasticity will tend to concentrate more within the large
country with respect to those industries with lower transport costs and larger substitution
elasticity. On the other hand, in an economy with only two industries, those industries
with high transport costs and low demand elasticity will tend to concentrate in the large
country in absolute and not just in relative terms. Lopez, Pagoulatos and Gonzalez (2006)
measured the degree of home bias for processed food and beverage products within the
US. So, their work provided evidence of strong "home bias" that signi￿cantly prevented
foreign imports from entering the US domestic market; furthermore, they showed that
imports levels, on average, would be nine times as large as the actual ones if the home
bias did not exist. Therefore, the main conclusion is that the home bias e⁄ect is not only
determined by the supply side (such as had been already showed through gravity mod-
els) but also by demand preferences. Whalley and Xin (2007) set up a numerical general
equilibrium model in order to measure the e⁄ects of changes in home bias within regions
on the worldwide trade growth over the last decades. They discovered that changes in
home product di⁄erences over the period considered (i.e.1975-2004) could have led to a
reduction in global trade by 27 percent with respect to 2004 levels. More speci￿cally,
larger e⁄ects came from home bias changes in developing countries with respect to e⁄ects
from developed countries. These results seemed to be indicating the growing importance
of regionalization within the global economy, probably due to an increase in the number of
trade agreements. Mylonidis (2008) studied the relationship between home bias towards
domestic tradable goods and deviations from PPP. The work ￿rst provided a two-country
model, where consumers are assumed to buy two types of goods: a domestically produced
good and a foreign produced good. Then, in the empirical part, the "home" country was
represented by a pool of countries (Germany, Japan, France, Italy, Canada and the UK),
115while the "foreign" country by the US; the main result was that the home bias was able
to explain a large part of the PPP deviations. Finally, Balta and Delgado (2009) claimed
that the policies aimed at building up a Single Market in Europe were not so e⁄ective
because, as they showed, all EU 15 countries are more oriented to consume home products
and invest in home equities. Furthermore, with respect to their economic size, EU 15
countries resulted to be more home biased than Japan and the US. In more details, there
are some countries, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Germany, that seemed
to be integrated, while there are other countries, such as Greece and Spain, whose demand
resulted much less oriented to foreign products and equities.
In order to give some empirical evidence of the presence of home bias in the US and
in some of its major trading partners, I graphically show the relationship between con-
sumption and production at the sector level. So, I exploit the OECD Stan database.
In particular, I collect data on consumption (HHFC, that is Household Final Consump-
tion) and on production (Gross Output at basic prices) from the Input-Output tables.
The number of enterprises, instead, is taken from SSIS (Structural Statistics of Industry
and Services). All the data are referred to two-digit industry level (ISIC, International
Standard Industrial Classi￿cation, Revision 3)24
Figure 4.1 below shows that, in the US in middle 2000s, consumption and production
patterns across di⁄erent industries are fairly similar: the larger the consumption of the
product of a given industry, the larger the production of that industry. In particular,
the number of enterprises in a given industry seems also to be positively correlated to
the total production/consumption of that industry￿ s good. Thus, the larger the share of
total household expenditure on the product of given industry, the larger the production of
that product and the larger the amount of ￿rms that enter that industry. Indeed, at the
domestic level, consumers￿preferences result to be correlated to how much each industry
produces and how many ￿rms can (pro￿tably, presumably) enter in each industry. So, in
an internationally open market, I might also expect foreign competitors to be also limited
by the domestic demand preferences of the destination market: the thinner the demand
preference for a given product in country, say, 1, the lower the chances to earn pro￿ts by
producing and selling that good from country, say, 2 to country 1.
Figure 4.2 below illustrates the same patterns of consumption, gross output and number
of enterprises across industries for the UK, in the middle 2000s. In this case, the positive
correlation between consumers￿preferences and the number of active enterprises across
industrial sectors seems to be even more evident25.
24See the Appendix I for the list of industries considered in this empirical analysis.
25See the Appendix for other examples.
116Figure 4.1. Home bias. US, mid 2000s
Figure 4.2. Home bias. UK, mid 2000s
4.2 The model
The model I set up is a direct extension of AB (2008) framework. The latter is a two-
country model where each country (indexed by i = 1;2) produces a large amount of
di⁄erentiated goods. Trade between those two countries is limited by two types of trade
costs: ￿xed costs and iceberg marginal costs. Furthermore, the driving force of interna-
117tional price ￿ uctuations is given by aggregate shocks to productivity.






where ￿ is the discount factor and u(cit;1 ￿ lit) = log
￿
c￿ (1 ￿ lit)
1￿￿￿
. In particular,
cit indicates ￿nal consumption and lit indicates the working hours of the representative
household in country i at time t. In the maximization problem, the consumet budger
constraint is:
Pitcit + bit+1 = Witlit + (1 + r)bit;
where the expenditure side of the constraint is given by the sum of purchase of the ￿nal
consumption good and purchase of one-period-forward bonds while the income side is given
by the the sum of labour income and income from maturing bonds purchased at time t￿1.
Moreover, in each country households are assumed to trade a complete set of international
















where Wit and Pit indicate, respectively, the wage and the ￿nal consumption price in
country i at time t. Thus, 38 and 39 are used in solving for equilibria and they hold for
every t and for every state of nature. Finally, the intertemporal ￿rst-order condition for






c (cit+1;1 ￿ lit+1) = u
0
c (cit;1 ￿ lit):
Aggregation of Goods into Sectors
As the model targets the study of the behaviour of international relative prices at
both an aggregate and a disaggregate level, it features more levels of aggregation of goods.
Individual ￿rms produce goods, that are commodities representing physical objects, which
can be traded across coutries. Moreover, ￿rms sell their outputs to speci￿c sectors. The
latter are the ￿rst level of aggregation used in the model and represent the lowest level
of disaggregation of commodities employed for the construction of price indeces. In more
detail, in each of those sectors there are only a small number of ￿rms: this means that
the price charged by each ￿rm is a⁄ected by the prices charged by all the other ￿rms
118within the same speci￿c sector. Finally, sectors are aggregated into a ￿nal composite
consumption good. Next, I describe the aggregation of di⁄erentiated goods into sectors
and the aggregation of sectors into ￿nal consumption at time t (the subscript t will be
dropped for simplicity.) So, ￿nal consumption, ci, is obtained by aggregating the large















uij = 1: (40)























Here, the weight uij in (40) is used as to indicate the preference for the consumption of
a particular set of goods associated to sector j in country i.27In particular, it represents
the share of country i representative household ￿nal consumption on sector j speci￿c
goods. Therefore, such weights are used to proxy country level demand preferences, i.e.
the shares of aggregate consumption (ci) on each sector j, representing the lowest level of
disaggregation of commodities used for national price index construction. So, turning to
the lower level of aggregation, in each country i and sector j there may be, in equilibrium,
up to K domestic ￿rms selling di⁄erentiated goods and up to K foreign ￿rms selling their
output to the same sector. In terms of notation, ￿rms k = 1;2;:::;K are indicated as
domestic, while ￿rms k = K + 1;K + 2;:::;2K as foreign. So, assuming that there are no
international trade barriers and ￿xed production costs either, so that all the ￿rms, both













where qijk indicates the sales of ￿rm k in sector j and country i. Goods within the same
26This way of aggregating goods is very similar to that used in Bhaskar (2002): individual goods are
aggregated according to a nested CES function in order to yield the ￿nal composite consumption good.
27See Gal￿ and Monacelli (2005): they similarly used weights in the ￿nal consumption function in order
to proxy the preference of the domestic representative consumer for goods coming from di⁄erent national
markets.
119sector are assumed to be more substitutable than goods across di⁄erent sectors, that is
1 < ￿ < ￿. Note that imperfect substitution between goods within the same sector implies
that each ￿rm within that sector charges a distinct price although ￿rms are involved in




















4.2.1 A simple case: heterogeneous demand preferences
Production
Firms produce according to a constant returns to scale function employing labour as
the only input. In particular, the production function of a ￿rm takes on the following
form:
qijk = Aizjklijk; (46)
where lijk is the labour amount employed at the ￿rm level, Ai is the aggregate productivity
in country i, that is common to all ￿rms producing in that country, and zjk is the ￿rm level
productivity. Each ￿rm within sector j and country i draws its idiosyncratic productivity
zjk from a log-normal distribution, that is logzjk ￿ N (0;￿j). More speci￿cally, ￿rm level
productivity is assumed to be constant over time, while the aggregate productivity, Ai, is
allowed to change after shocks to the aggregate national economy i.
On the one hand, a ￿rm with productivity zjk selling to the domestic market i, within
sector j, will cope with the following marginal costs (I assume there are not ￿xed costs of







On the other hand, ￿rms willing to sell abroad have to cope with not only (marginal)
production costs but also with international trade costs. The latter are assumed to be of
two di⁄erent types. First, every ￿rm wishing to export any amount of its output to the
other country has to pay a ￿xed labour costs, Fx. Second, exporting ￿rms￿marginal costs
will be scaled up by an iceberg type costs, D > 1. Notice that such international costs, of
both ￿xed and iceberg type, are constant over time and must be faced each time a ￿rm
wants to export. Therefore, the marginal costs faced by a ￿rm placed in country 1, sector







Indeed, if D = 1, then the marginal costs faced to sell both at home and abroad are
equal. Finally, the total number of ￿rms selling to each sector is determined endogenously
in equilibrium. I assume that all the ￿rms sell in the respective domestic country, as
they do not have to deal with ￿xed costs of production, so that the minimum number
of competitors within each sector is exogeneous and is equal to K. However, among the
further K potential sellers from abroad, it can happen that not all of them are able to
cover the ￿xed costs of export and then make nonnegative pro￿ts by exporting. Thus, the
total number of sellers to one sector can be lower than 2K in equilibrium.
Pro￿t maximization and price setting
Firms producing individual goods are engaged in imperfect competition. More speci￿-
cally, ￿rms play a static game of quantity competition. Each of them chooses the quantity
qijk to sell in country i taking as given the quantities chosen by all the other ￿rms in the
economy, along with the respective domestic wage rate Wi , the ￿nal consumption quantity
ci and the aggregate price Pi. Indeed, ￿rms are assumed to be aware that their choice
about qijk a⁄ects the sectoral aggregate price Pij and the sectoral aggregate production
yij.
Domestic ￿rms
I ￿rst solve for equilibrium prices and quantities for the domestic ￿rms. I assume that
in each sector there are only K domestic ￿rms producing and selling. As an example, I take
sector j in country 1: the vector of prices P1jk and quantities q1jk for ￿rms k = 1;2:::;K,
are equilibrium prices and quantities in sector j if, for each ￿rm in that sector, the quantity





















where y1j is given by (43). Notice that, in the maximization problem, aggregate price, P1,
￿nal consumption, c1, and the quantities produced by the other competitors in sector j,
q1lk, with l 6= k, are taken as given. Moreover, the oligopolistic structure at the sector level
ensures the endogeneity of markups, even though such an endogeneity could have been
obtained according to alternative ways (see Feenstra, 2003, and Melitz and Ottaviano,
1212008.) 28
Thus, in sector j, equilibrium prices are found by solving a system of K nonlinear































In solving the system of equations, W1, A1 and the ￿rm level productivities, zjk are taken
as given. Needless to say, the procedure described above to ￿nd equilibrium prices in
sector j in country 1 is the same for all the sectors in both the countries, 1 and 2.
Adding foreign ￿rms
The number of foreign competitors within each sector is determined according to a
dynamic multistage game solved by backward induction, with ￿rms deciding in each period
whether and how much to export. As I said before, di⁄erently from domestic competitors,
foreign sellers have to deal with iceberg marginal costs and ￿xed costs of export: this means
that they enter the foreign market only if they can cover the ￿xed costs of export and
make nonnegative pro￿ts. The levels of wages in the two countries, Wi, ￿nal consumption,
ci, and aggregate price, Pi are taken as given during the procedure; they are determined in
general equilibrium. Foreigners are assumed to be ordered according to a reverse order of
unit costs, that is from the most productive to the least productive. As I did before, I use
sector j in country 1 to illustrate the procedure. Each entrant K+n, with n 2 [1;K], plays
a simultaneous-move game of quantity competition. Equilibrium prices are calculated
through a system of K + n nonlinear equations: in more detail, the ￿rst K equations are
related to the domestic ￿rms (51), while the following n equations are related to the prices
that the ￿rst n entrants in sector j from country 2 charges to country 1 consumer. In
28Feenstra (2003) introduced a translog expenditure function within a monopolistic competition model,
that also yields demand elasticities depending on the prices and the number of competing goods. Moreover,
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) used quasilinear preferences over a continuum of di⁄erentiated varieties and
obtained that a larger number of varieties results in a decrease in the price elasticity of demand.







Once I have calculated the equilibrium prices, I can calculate the sectoral price (44);
then, I can derive the amount exported by ￿rm K + n, by using (42), (45) and P1c
￿
1
(the latter is used to calculate the sectoral output.) Then, I can calculate the pro￿t
earned by the nth entrant: if it does not cover the ￿xed cost of export, W2Fx, then in
equilibrium there will be K + n ￿ 1 competitors.29Therefore, this procedure, that has to
be repeated in both the countries, sector by sector, yields the ￿nal number of competitors
in each sector (including exporters) and a set of equilibrium prices Pijk given ￿xed wages,
aggregate prices and quantities (that are calculated in general equilibrium, as explained
next). Furthermore, note that, given the prices calculated through the procedure described
below, weights exogeneously scale the quantity that each ￿rm can sell to each one of the
two markets (i.e. domestic and foreign). Thus, they also determine the amount of pro￿ts
that ￿rms can make and, particularly, the possibility to export. For example, the larger
country 1￿share of consumption on sector j, the larger the quantity of its speci￿c product
that each ￿rm can sell to that sector, the larger the chances to cover ￿xed costs of exports
due to larger revenues and pro￿ts.
General equilibrium
The model is solved statically at every date for the general equilibrium prices and
quantities, as a function of the realized productivity shocks at the aggregate level, that
are A1 and A2. The problem consists of ￿nding a ￿xed point in the aggregate variables,
Pi, ci, Wi, li, with i = 1;2, using W2 as a numeraire. The solution to this problem is
found as follows. I ￿rst derive the number of competitors and prices in each sector in




2 c2, and W2 as given. Then, I can calculate aggregate
and sectoral prices according to, respectively, (41) and (44); furthermore, I can calculate
quantities produced by each ￿rm through (42) and (45). Aggregate labour demand (L1
and L2) is derived by summing up the labour demand of all the ￿rms (also considering
the ￿xed costs of export). Thus, the ￿xed point in the aggregate variables are found when
the three ￿rst order conditions (38) and (39) result to be satis￿ed.
How does the model generate Pricing-to-Market ? Explanation
I assume that ￿ > ￿. This implies that each ￿rm￿ s markup over its marginal costs is an
increasing function of the market share hold by that ￿rm within its sector. As I can see in
the elasticity formula (52), if the market share approaches to zero, then the ￿rm only faces
29Note that each entrant only takes into account the already existing competitors, along with which,
simultaneously, it sets its price. Thus, entrants do not look at the e⁄ect of their entry decision on the total
number of ￿rms within their sector; the latter is endogeneosuly determined at the end of the selection
process.
123the sectoral demand elasticity ￿ and imposes a markups equal to ￿=(￿ ￿ 1). However, if
the market share tends to one, than the ￿rm faces a lower demand elasticity, that is ￿,
so that it will be able to impose a larger markup, that is ￿=(￿ ￿ 1). Therefore, it turns
out that for a sectoral market share between zero and one, the markup is increasing in
the market share. Furthermore, the assumption ￿ > ￿, along with the other assumption
of a ￿nite number of competitors within each sector, that is K < 1, leads to incomplete
pass-through of changes in costs to prices. Speci￿cally, if an individual ￿rm or a group of
￿rms deal with an increase in marginal costs relative to the other competitors within the
same sector (this can happen because aggregate productivities in the two countries might
change over time, a⁄ecting foreign competitors within the same sector in a di⁄erent way),
then this will lower the market share and, consequently, the markup in equilibrium. Thus,
the increase in price will be lower than the increase in marginal costs.
However, imperfect competition with variable markups is a necessary but not su¢ cient
condition in order to have pricing-to-market: in fact, without any trade costs, ￿rms have
to face the same competitors both abroad and at home, so that they will have the same
markups and charge and the same prices in both the markets.
4.2.2 A more complicated case: heterogeneous preferences, ￿xed costs of
production, and home bias
In the following section, I am presenting a more complicated extension of AB (2008), that
consists in introducing the home bias e⁄ect through combining ￿xed costs of production
with heterogeneous demand preferences across countries. In particular, such an e⁄ect (as
shown in Krugman, 1980) implies that, in presence of increasing returns, ￿rms will be more
oriented to produce and sell those goods for which there are larger domestic markets. So,
di⁄erently from the model presented in 4.2.1, not only exporters but also domestic sellers
have to deal with entry costs. Therefore, both the number of domestic sellers and the
number of foreign sellers will be endogeneously determined through a dynamic multistage
game solved by backward induction.
Production
Firms produce according to a constant returns to scale function employing labour as
the only input. The production function of a ￿rm takes the same form as in (46). In this
new case, all ￿rms have to deal with ￿xed costs of production, Fp, that will impose entry
selection to all competitors. Thus, those ￿rms that are not able to make pro￿ts enough to
cover such costs, will not produce and sell in the domestic market and in the foreign one
either.
On the one hand, a ￿rm with productivity zjk selling to the domestic market i, within
sector j, will cope with both ￿xed costs of production, Fp, and the same marginal costs
as in (47). On the other hand, ￿rms willing to sell abroad have to cope with not only
124production costs (both ￿xed and marginal) but also with international trade costs. As
before, the latter are assumed to be of two di⁄erent types. First, every ￿rm wishing to
export any amount of its output to the other country has to pay a ￿xed labour costs,
Fx. Second, exporting ￿rms￿marginal costs will be scaled up by an iceberg type costs,
D > 1. Therefore, the marginal costs faced by a ￿rm placed in country 1, sector j, and
with productivity zjk wishing to sell part of its output to country 2 is the same as in
(48). Moreover, notice that both the ￿xed costs of production, Fp, and costs of exporting,
that are D and Fx, are constant over time and must be faced each time ￿rms are willing,
respectively, to produce or export.
Finally, the total number of ￿rms selling to each sector is determined endogenously
in equilibrium. As all the ￿rms have to face ￿xed costs of production, both the number
of domestic competitors and the number of foreign competitors depends on the ability
of entrants to the market to cover ￿xed costs of production. Indeed, the selection for
foreigners will be always tougher than for domestic competitors as long as they have also
to pay ￿xed costs of exports. Therefore, in equilibrium, the number of total competitors
within each sector is included in the interval [0;2K], as there can be up to a max of K
domestic ￿rms and up to a max of K foreign competitors.
Pro￿t maximization and price setting
As in the simple case described before, ￿rms producing individual goods are engaged in
imperfect competition. More speci￿cally, ￿rms play a static game of quantity competition.
Each of them chooses the quantity qijk to sell in country i taking as given the quantities
chosen by all the other ￿rms in the economy, along with the respective domestic wage
rate Wi , the ￿nal consumption quantity ci and the aggregate price Pi. Indeed, ￿rms are
assumed to be aware that their choice about qijk a⁄ects the sectoral aggregate price Pij
and the sectoral aggregate production yij.
Domestic ￿rms
I ￿rst solve for equilibrium prices and quantities for the domestic ￿rms. The number of
domestic competitors (here intended as sellers) within each sector is determined according
to a dynamic multistage game solved by backward induction, with ￿rms deciding in each
period whether to enter the market and how much to sell. The levels of wages in the two
countries, Wi, ￿nal consumption, ci, and aggregate price, Pi are taken as given during the
procedure and are determined in general equilibrium. Moreover, domestic competitors are
assumed to be ordered according to a reverse order of unit costs, that is from the most
productive to the least productive. In particular, during the selection of domestic ￿rms, all
the potential competitors from abroad are assumed to be active, so that each domestic ￿rm
will have to face at least K (foreign) sellers. In this way, I reproduce also for domestic ￿rms
the entry conditions assumed in the previous simple case for foreign competitors (in that
case, all the domestic ￿rms were assumed to be active during the selection of exporters).
125So, as I did before, I use sector j in country 1 to illustrate the procedure. Each entrant
m, with m 2 [1;K], plays a simultaneous-move game of quantity competition: equilibrium
prices are calculated through a system of K + m nonlinear equations. On the one hand,







for k = 1;2;:::::;K;
where "(sijk) is as in (52) and sijk as in (53). On the other hand, the other m equations
refer to the prices that the ￿rst m domestic entrants in sector j charge; more speci￿cally,







Once I have calculated the equilibrium prices, I can calculate the sectoral price by (44);
then I can derive the amount sold by the mth lowest unit costs domestic ￿rm, q1jK+m by
using (42), (45) and P
￿
1 c1 (the latter is used to calculate sectoral output). Therefore, I
can calculate the pro￿t earned by the mth domestic ￿rm in sector j of country 1: if this
does not cover the ￿xed costs of production, that is W1Fp, then, in equilibrium, there will
be K + m ￿ 1 ￿rms in sector j of country 1, i.e. K foreign ￿rms and m ￿ 1 domestic
￿rms. Thus, this procedure, repeated in both the countries, sector by sector, yields the
￿nal number of domestic competitors in all sectors, that I indicate with Mij 2 [0;K], and
a set of equilibrium prices Pijk given ￿xed wages, aggregate prices and quantities (that
are calculated in general equilibrium). Furthermore, note that, given prices calculated
according to the procedure just described, weights exogeneously scale the quantity that
each ￿rm can sell. Thus, they also determine the amount of pro￿ts that ￿rms can make
and, particularly, the possibility to produce anything. For example, the larger country 1￿
share of consumption on sector j, the larger the quantity of its speci￿c product that each
￿rm can sell to that sector, the larger the chances to cover ￿xed costs of production due
to larger revenues and pro￿ts.
Adding foreign ￿rms
Once I have derived the number of domestic competitors sector by sector in the two
countries, I turn to determining the number of exporters according to a procedure that is
similar to what used in the previous simple case with no ￿xed costs of productions. The
main di⁄erence with that case is the number of domestic ￿rms in each sector: one the one
hand, it is calculated endogenously in the manner showed before (in the previous case,
it was assumed to be always equal to K); on the other hand, it can di⁄er across sectors
and countries due to di⁄erent distributions of productivities across sectors and preference
weights across sectors and countries.
126Thus, di⁄erently from the simple case, foreign sellers have to deal not only with iceberg
marginal costs and ￿xed costs of export, but also with ￿xed costs of production: this
means that they enter the foreign market only if they can cover the sum of ￿xed costs of
production and ￿xed costs of export and make nonnegative pro￿ts. As before, the levels
of wages in the two countries, Wi, ￿nal consumption, ci, and aggregate price, Pi are taken
as given during the procedure and are determined in general equilibrium. Foreigners are
assumed to be ordered according to a reverse order of unit costs, that is from the most
productive to the least productive. Again, I use sector j in country 1 to illustrate the
procedure. Each new exporter, n, with n 2 [1;K], plays a simultaneous-move game of
quantity competition. Equilibrium prices are calculated through a system of M1j + n
nonlinear equations. In more detail, the ￿rst M1j equations are related to domestic ￿rms
(51), while the other n equations refer to the prices that the n most productive exporters














Once I have calculated the equilibrium prices, I can calculate the sectoral price by (44);
then I can derive the amount exported by the nth exporter q1jM1j+n, by using (42), (45)
and P
￿
1 c1 (the latter is used to calculate sectoral output). So, I can now calculate the pro￿t
earned by the nth most productive seller in sector j from country 2: if this does not cover
the ￿xed costs of productions plus the ￿xed costs of export, that is W2 (Fp + Fx), then,
in equilibrium, there will be M1j + n ￿ 1 ￿rms selling to sector j in country 1: Therefore,
this procedure, repeated in both the countries, sector by sector, yields the ￿nal number of
competitors in each sector (including exporters) and a set of equilibrium prices Pijk given
￿xed wages, aggregate prices and quantities (that are calculated in general equilibrium,
as explained next). Also in this case, given the prices calculated through the procedure
described below, weights exogeneously scale the quantity that each ￿rm can sell to each
one of the two markets (i.e. domestic and foreign). Thus, they also determine the amount
of pro￿ts that ￿rms can make and, particularly, the possibility to export.
General equilibrium
The general equilibrium is calculated in the same fashion as in the simple case described
before. Thus, the ￿xed point in the aggregate variables is found when the three ￿rst order
conditions (38) and (39) result to be satis￿ed.
4.3 Numerical results
1274.3.1 Construction of demand preferences
In order to implement numerical exercises aimed at verifying the e⁄ectiveness of the two
extensions to AB (2008) introduced above, I ￿rst need to proxy country level demand
preferences. So, I choose to use the CPI weights provided in the OECD database.30
These weights represent the shares of household ￿nal consumption on di⁄erent goods. As
explained in the Introduction of this chapter, by exploiting the most disaggregated classes
of products available in the database (four-digit C.O.I.C.O.P), I can collect data on the
CPI weights for 58 products (they are listed in the Appendix). These products are grouped
in 7 broader categories: Food, Housing, Apparel, Transport and Communication, Medical
Care, Education and Recreation and Other goods.31 I collect data for the US, and some
of its major trade partners: Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the UK. In the numerical
simulations of the two-country model I set up, demand preferences of "country 1" will be
proxied by US CPI weights, while demand preferences of "country 2" will proxied by CPI
weights of each of the US trading partners selected.
Following I explain how I built up the demand preferences fuijgi=1;2;j=1;S used in my
numerical tests. For each country, i = 1;2, and for all those categories, that I index by
f = 1;2;::::;7; I extract the mean, ￿if, and the standard deviation, ￿if, of the weights
included.32 Then, I split the number of sectors used in my numerical exercises, S, into 7
equal parts: so, each parts contains S=7 sectors.33 Each of these parts represents one of
the categories that I use to group the products. For each country and for each of the 7
parts, I draw weights from a log-normal distribution, whose mean and standard deviation




. Finally, I rescale all the weights
previously drawn so that the sum of weights in each part is equal to the actual aggregate
CPI weight (reported in Table 4.2) and, consequently, the sum of all the weights at the
country level is equal to one. Speci￿cally, weights used in the numerical exercises result
to be equal to:
30I have also tried to employ more detailed CPI weights as proxies. Particularly, for the U.S., I used
weights representing relative importance in the CPI (U.S. city average, December 2001). Those weights
are provided by the U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics. For Japan, instead, I collected data on the weights
related to items of the 2000-Base CPI from the Japanese Statistic Bureau, Director General for Policy
Planning and Statistical Research and Training Institute. Nevertheless, results were not that di⁄erent
from those that I am presenting here. Furthermore, the OECD database gives me the opportunity to use
the CPI weights of more countries and, crucially, to compare those weights as they are always related to
the same panel of goods. In fact, one of the issues implied by the use CPI weights provided by national
statistical institutes was that the panel of items chosen to build up CPI indeces can actually di⁄er.
31Those categories are also used for the construction of most of the national CPI weights.
32The values of ￿if and ￿if are reported in the Appendix.
33When S is not perfectly divisible by 7, then I round the number of elements of the ￿rst 6 parts to
the nearest integer less than or equal to S=7. So, in the last part, I include all the remaining sectors from





(actual CPI weight), with f = 1;::;7;j = 1;:::J;i = 1;2;sf 6= jf:
4.3.2 The simple case: heterogeneity in demand preferences
I ￿rst present the results of numerical exercises that test the ￿rst and simpler extension
of AB (2008) I propose, i.e. the introduction of cross-country demand preference hetero-
geneity. As I said, the main target is to get closer to the actual data about volatility
of manufacturing international relative prices. In more detail, the standard deviation of
CPI=CPI￿ relative to PPI=PPI￿ for the US is equal to 1:08 in the period 1985-2006, so
that the major aim of my work it to take the original framework as close as possible to
that value (without worsening the other results).34
In order to test the e⁄ectiveness of the model that I set up, I ￿rst need to set the
values of the parameters on both the demand and the production side. On the demand
side, I have already illustrated before how I construct the demand preferences at the sector
level fuijgj=1;::;J;i=1;2; furthermore, the two parameters in household￿ s utility function are
set according to a standard fashion: ￿ equal to 0.96 and ￿ equal to 2/3. Turning to
the production parameters (S;K;￿;￿;￿;D;F), they are set as in AB (2008), in order to
make my results directly comparable with those in the original framework. S is equal to
20,000 and K is equal to 20; thus, in numerical simulations, in each country there are
400,000 ￿rms and 20,000 sectors. The latter are interpreted as more disaggregated with
respect to ten-digit NAICS (North American Industry Classi￿cation System) sectors, that
actually amount to 10,000. In terms of demand elasticities, ￿ is set equal to 1.01, so
that sectoral expenditure shares are kept almost constant; ￿ is chosen equal to 10, that
is at the high extremity of the range (5 to 10) empirically found by Anderson and van
Wincoop (2004) for the elasticity of demand for imports at the sectoral level. The setting
of the other parameters (￿, D and F) is chosen to make the model, in the symmetric
equilibrium (i.e. A1 = A2), able to reproduce the actual data in the US on the overall
volume of trade, the percentage of exporters and the level of industry concentration at
the sector level. So, the ￿rst economic value concerning the US economy that I want
to target is the average of exports relative to gross output in manufacturing sectors in
the period 1997-2003. According to OECD databse, that ratio was equal to 11.7 percent
in 1997 and 21 percent in 2003: thus, on average, the value of the ratio was equal to
34PPI is the manufacturing producer price index for the U.S.; PPI* is the trade-weighted producer price
index for U.S. trading partners; CPI is the consumer price index for U.S. goods in the period 1985-2006;
CPI* is the trade-weighted consumer price index for U.S. 1985-2006 trading partners). Furthermore, data
on U.S. PPI and CPI are taken from BLS; data on PPIs and CPIs for trading partners are mostly taken
from OECD and IFS databases. Exceptions: Japanese PPI (from Bank of Japan), U.K. PPI (from UK
National Statistics), Mexican and South Korean CPIs and PPIs (from, respectively, Banco de Mexico and
Bank of Korea).
129about 16.5 percent. The second value targeted is the share of US manufacturing plants
that export in the period 1987-1992, that is 25 percent. In more detail, the latter is the
average of the fraction of exporters over total plants in 1987 (21 percent) and in 1992 (30
percent), according to Bernard and Jensen (2004). Finally, the third economic value that
I try to match in my numerical exercises is the median Her￿ndahl index across sectors
equal to 1,50035. The US Census Bureau, in 1997, calculated that the median Her￿ndahl
index across 473 six-digit NAICS industries, was equal to 571, while the average of the
Her￿ndahl indeces across the same industries was 737. As said before, sectors used in
the model are interpreted as at a lower level of disaggregation with respect to NAICS
sectors, at which a higher level of concentration can be expectable. Moreover, the choice
of the value 1,500 makes the median sector de￿nable, according to the US Department
of Justice, as "moderately concentrated". Therefore, the standard deviation of ￿rm level
productivity distribution, ￿ is set equal to 0.385, while the ￿xed costs of export, F, are
chosen equal to 0.0003; ￿nally, D, i.e. the iceberg type marginal cost of exporting, is set
at the value of 1.45, following the evidence reported in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).
In the Appendix, I provide details about how I construct variations to price indeces, i.e.
[ CPI1, [ CPI2 , [ PPI1, [ PPI2.
Following in Table 4.3, I am presenting the results from the numerical exercises that test
my ￿rst extension to AB (2008).36 The test consists in measuring how much international
relative prices change in equilibrium after a negative shock to aggregate productivity in
country 1, that is A1, such that aggregate costs in country 1, W1=A1, relative to aggregate
costs in country 2, W2=A2, increase by 1 percent. Indeed, as long as W2 is chosen as a
numeraire, the aggregate costs in country 2 do not change after this shock.
So, from the results reported, it comes out that introducing preference heterogeneity
both across sectors and across countries does not lead any improvement in terms of the
target variable (i.e. the volatility of CPI-based RER with respect to the volatility of PPI-
based RER). This means that variable keeps almost the same gap from the unity as in
the benchmark case, where preferences are assumed to be homogeneous. The tests are
implemented on 20,000 sectors such as in AB (2008) and all the common parameters (i.e.
K;￿;￿;￿;D;Fx) are set at the same values as in the original framework. Thus, the only
di⁄erence with the latter is the heterogeneity in preferences. Country 1 preferences are
always proxied with US CPI weights in 2000, while country 2 preferences are proxied with
CPI weights of some of the US major trading partners: Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico
35Note that the Her￿ndahl index relative to a sector is the sum of the squared market shares held by
￿rms within that sector, multiplied by 10,000.
36It might be worth mentioning how I solve the nonlinerar systems of price equations. This is to
eventually justify some (small) discrepancies between my numerical results in the benchmark case and
numerical results in AB (2008). I use the trust-region dogleg method implemented by the software Matlab.
In more detail, the algorithm is a variant of the the Powell dogleg method. Furthermore, the starting
point is calculated in a full symmetric system, where nobody exports.
130and the UK. The countries chosen to represent country 2 in the numerical exercises have
di⁄erent degrees of heterogeneity in preferences with respect to the US, as shown in Table
4.2. Furthermore, as evidenced before, US trading partners also show di⁄erent degrees
of heterogeneity in preferences across CPI categories. So, both proxying country 2 with
countries that are very similar in preferences with respect to the US (such as Canada)
and proxying country 2 with countries that are really di⁄erent from the US from the same
point of view (such as Mexico, Japan) yield almost no change in terms of movements of
CPI-based RER relative to movements of PPI-based RER after aggregate shocks with
respect to the original framework. Nevertheless, preference heterogeneity seems to matter
more in terms of extensive and intensive margins. In particular, in all the heterogeneous
preferences cases tested, the ratio (in percentage terms) of exporters to the total number
of domestic producers results to be lower than in the benchmark case. In detail, the
lowest export margin is found when country 2 is proxied with Canada, that is both the
most similar country in terms of preferences to the US and the US trade partner with the
largest standard deviation across categories of CPI preferences (see Table 4.2). Moreover,
the largest extensive margin is related to the case in which country 2 is proxied by the
UK which, among the US trading partners selected, is that one with the lowest standard
deviations across categories of CPI weights. Therefore, it seems that it is harder to export
to those countries where preferences are more concentrated in some sectors than in others.
The intuition is that if consumption tends to concentrate in some sectors, the other ones
will result to be so thin that only a few exporters will be able to enter those sectors.
However, sectors to which very large preference are associated, are not able to o⁄set
the previous e⁄ect by letting a relatively larger number of exporters enter the market.
Moreover, preference heterogeneity also turn out to a⁄ect the intensive margin. As for
the extensive margin before, the lowest value comes out when country 2 is proxied with
Canada, while the largest value (15:4977 percent) when country 2 is proxied with the UK
(14:0228 percent). Finally, in terms of market concentration across sectors, the median of
Her￿ndahl index across sectors does not change so much when preference heterogeneity
is introduced. More speci￿cally, in all the ￿ve case with heterogeneity in preferences the
value of the index (1;473) is just slightly larger than in the benchmark case (1;463):
this is because the number of exporters from country 2 to country 1 is lowered by the
introduction of preference asymmetry. Thus, because there are fewer competitors (from
abroad) in country 1, the marker concentration across sectors result to be a little larger.
131Table 4.3. Heterogenous preferences case:
implications of 1 percent increase in (W1=A1)=(W2=A2)
Heterogeneous preferences Ho.P.37 Actual
Country 1 US US US US US Data
Country 2 Canada Germany Japan Mexico UK
Parameters
S 20;000 20;000 20;000 20;000 20;000 20;000
K 20 20 20 20 20 20
￿ 0:385 0:385 0:385 0:385 0:385 0:385
￿ 1:01 1:01 1:01 1:01 1:01 1:01
￿ 10 10 10 10 10 10
D 1:45 1:45 1:45 1:45 1:45 1:45




0:8369 0:8374 0:8376 0:8371 0:8374 0:8379 1:08
Ext. M.(%)38 21:843 22:5275 22:5987 22:2985 22:7662 24:7877 25:00
Int. M.(%) 14:0228 14:6346 14:9329 14:6953 15:4977 14:0500 16:5
M.H.Index 1;473 1;473 1;473 1;473 1;473 1;463 n:a:
4.3.3 The more complicated case: heterogeneous preferences, ￿xed costs of
production, and home bias.
Before starting with numerically testing the model that I built up, I perform a mapping
exercise aimed at pursuing two aims. The ￿rst one is to quickly understand whether
introducing ￿xed costs of production can really a⁄ect the predictions in AB (2008). The
second one is to ￿nd out those values of ￿xed costs of production for which the ability of
the model to match the volatility of CPI-based real exchange rate with respect to volatility
of PPI-based real exchange rate could be improved, without worsening too much the other
results in terms of marginal and intensive margins.
Figure 4.3 shows that introducing ￿xed costs of production is able to increase the ratio
of changes in CPI-based RER to changes in PPI-based RER. Speci￿cally, it comes up
that the largest the ￿xed costs, the larger the value of the ratio predicted by the model.
Figure 4.4, instead, shows that the extensive margin, i.e. the ratio (in percentage) of
exporters to all domestic producers, is also a⁄ected by such ￿xed costs. For low values of
￿xed costs, the export ratio predicted turns out to be larger than those found in actual
data. For values larger than 0.0007, the export ratio seems to be, roughly, back to the
37Ho.P.=Homogeneous preferences. As in AB (2008), preferences are equal both across sectors and
across countries.
38Abbreviations: Ext. M.= Extensive Margin; Int. M.=Intensive Margin; M.H.Index=Median Her￿nd-
ahal Index.
132actual data amount. Finally, from Figure 4.5, it results that the larger the ￿xed costs of
production, the lower the intensive margin, that is the ratio (in percentage) of exports to
manufacturing gross output. However, at fairly large values of ￿xed costs, the intensive
margin results to be lowered at not more than 1 percent. So, from this simple exercise,
it seems that introducing such costs into the model could improve the results from the
original framework: for relatively large values of Fp, the ratio of changes in CPI-based
RER to changes in PPI-based RER is increased, without changing so much in terms of
both extensive and intensive margin.
Figure 4.3. Fixed costs of production and PTM
133Figure 4.4. Fixed costs of production and extensive margin
Figure 4.5. Fixed costs of production and intensive margin
In Table 4.4 below, I am reporting the results from the numerical exercises that test
the second and more complicated extension to AB (2008), which introduces ￿xed costs
of production other than preference asymmetry. Even in this case, the test consists in
measuring how much international relative prices change in equilibrium after a negative
shock to aggregate productivity in country 1, that is A1, such that aggregate costs in
country 1, W1=A1, relative to aggregate costs in country 2, W2=A2, increase by 1 percent.
134It results that adding positive ￿xed costs of production to the original setting can lead to
an improvement in terms of ability of the model to predict the actual reaction to aggregate
shocks of CPI-based RER relative to the reaction of PPI-based RER. In fact, the ratio
of changes in CPI-based RER to changes in PPI-based RER is equal to 0.8762, that is
closer to the unity with respect to homogeneous preference/no ￿xed costs of production
case (0.8379). As for the simpler case, the tests are implemented on 20,000 sectors such
as in AB (2008) and all the common parameters (i.e. K;￿;￿;￿;D;Fx) are set at the same
values as in the original setting. In addition, according to the same rationale used in the
original setting, the ￿xed costs of production, i.e. Fp, are set at the value (0.0012) that
allows the model to match the extensive margin, the intensive margin and the degree of
market concentration across sectors in the US economy. So, in the benchmark case, that
in this case includes positive ￿xed costs of production and preference symmetry, the main
target seems to be closer than before. In terms of matching other US actual data, the
extensive margin results to be almost unchanged after the introduction of ￿xed costs. The
ratio of exporters to total domestic producers is just a little lower (24.5370 percent ) than
before (24.7877 percent), as producers selling abroad have now to deal with two types of
￿xed costs that are summed up: ￿xed costs of production, Fp, and ￿xed costs of exporting,
Fx. Thus, in this case, the "barrier" to exporting turns out to be higher. Nevertheless, the
extensive margin keeps being really close to actual data (25 percent) because not just the
number of exporters in the economy falls but the number of total producers itself. In fact,
nobody now can produce and sell anything as long as it is not able at least to cover the
positive ￿xed costs of production, Fp. The (little) change in the number of competitors
also lead to a (slight) increase in value of the median of the Her￿ndahl index (1;533), that
keeps being very close to actual data (1;500). The only value that seems to be more heavily
changed with respect to the zero ￿xed costs of production case is the intensive margin that,
as expected from the results of the mapping exercise, comes out to be lowered to 12.9649
percent. However, the latter value is far in between the low (11.7 percent) and the high
(21 percent) ends of the range from which the actual value I refer to is drawn from. The
next tests consider not only the ￿xed costs of production but also preference asymmetry.
As in the previous case, country 1 preferences are always proxied with US CPI weights
in 2000, while country 2 preferences are proxied with the CPI weights of some of the US
top trading partners: Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico and the UK. Thus, preference
heterogeneity turns out to never give better outcomes than preference homogeneity in this
case too. Such as in the simpler framework, on the one hand, the lowest extensive margin
(23.1812 percent) outcome is related to the case in which, in terms of preferences, country
2 is proxied with Canada, that reports the largest heterogeneity across categories of CPI
preferences. Furthermore, the lowest ratio of exporters to total producers is also associated
to the lowest intensive margin (13.1029 percent) and, in addition, to the lowest ratio of
135changes in CPI-based RER to changes in PPI-based RER (0.8684). The latter might be
explained with the fact the lower the number of exporters in the economy, the lower the
impact of pricing-to-market on the aggregate economy, as long as ￿rms selling only in the
domestic market can not charge di⁄erent prices across di⁄erent (national) markets. On
the other hand, the largest extensive margin value (24.2024 percent) is found in the case in
which country 2 is proxied by the UK that, among the US trading partners selected here,
reports the lowest standard deviation across categories of CPI weights. The largest share
of exporters also implies the largest trade volume (14.4532 percent) and corresponds to
the second (after Japan) largest value or the target variable (0.8708). In this case, a larger
number of exporters means a larger number of producers that can charge di⁄erent prices
across the two di⁄erent markets where they sell their products; this leads to a larger impact
of pricing-to-market on international aggregate prices. Tests with country 2 preferences
proxied by CPI weights of Germany and Japan yield results fairly similar to those obtained
in the previous case, where country 2 is represented by the UK: in the ￿rst case the target
value takes on value 0.8707, while in the second case value 0.8710. Finally, it can also be
observed that the value of the median Her￿ndahl index increases when I add preference
heterogeneity to ￿xed costs of production. The value of the median turns out to be larger
than 1,580 in all the ￿ve cases of heterogeneity, while it is equal to 1,533 in the benchmark
case with homogeneous preferences. This might be due to the tougher selection at the
entry that preference asymmetry and ￿xed costs of production together impose at the
entry, especially in the smaller (i.e. with lower expenditure preference weights) sectors.
This e⁄ect is not o⁄set by a softer selection in larger sectors.
136Table 4.4. Fixed costs of production and heterogeneous preferences:
implications of 1 percent increase in (W1=A1)=(W2=A2)
Heterogeneous preferences Ho.P.39 Actual
Country 1 US US US US US Data
Country 2 Canada Germany Japan Mexico UK
Parameters
S 20;000 20;000 20;000 20;000 20;000 20;000
K 20 20 20 20 20 20
￿ 0:385 0:385 0:385 0:385 0:385 0:385
￿ 1:01 1:01 1:01 1:01 1:01 1:01
￿ 10 10 10 10 10 10
D 1:45 1:45 1:45 1:45 1:45 1:45
Fp 0:0012 0:0012 0:0012 0:0012 0:0012 0:0012




0:8684 0:8707 0:8710 0:8699 0:8708 0:8762 1:08
Ext. M.(%)40 23:1812 23:8325 23:9000 23:6246 24:2024 24:5370 25
Int. M.(%) 13:1029 13:6489 13:9233 13:7095 14:4532 12:9649 16:5
M. H. Index 1;583 1;583 1;585 1;582 1;583 1;533 n:a:
4.4 Conclusions
The fourth chapter of my thesis studies one of the major issues in international economics,
that is the Purchasing Power Parity puzzle, that consists in a weak connection between
exchange rates and national price levels. One of the common explanations to this issue is
often given by pricing-to-market. Indeed, there is a lot of evidence about the fact that the
same goods can be priced di⁄erently according to the (national) markets in which they are
sold. Thus, the ￿rst aim that I pursue is to evaluate the e⁄ect of cross-country preference
heterogeneity on di⁄erences of prices across di⁄erent national markets for the same goods.
Preference heterogeneity might be explained by many di⁄erent factors, of both cultural
and environmental type (think, for example, of how hard selling Italian co⁄ee in the Indian
market or air conditioners in the Arctic areas is). Di⁄erent tastes across countries could
lead to di⁄erent distributions of country level total expenditure of households over the same
panel of goods. Thus, such a heterogeneity could a⁄ect international trade both in terms
of quantities and in terms of prices. This is because tastes can contribute to determine
the country speci￿c size of the market for each good and, in turn, the market size can
39Ho.P.=Homogeneous preferences. Preferences are equal both across sectors and across countries.
Di⁄erently from the previous case, the ￿xed costs of production are set as larger than zero.
40Abbreviations are explained in the previous footnote.
137a⁄ect the degree of competition and prices charged by competitors. Furthermore, cross-
country asymmetry in tastes is also studied in combination with ￿xed costs of production
and economies of scale, so as to capture the home bias e⁄ect. In more detail, I test the
hypothesis that, in order to exploit increasing returns to scale, national economies tend to
produce more those goods that domestic consumers seem to like more than other goods.
In order to address the aims stated above, I extend the very rich framework set up by
Atkeson and Burstein (AER, 2008), by introducing cross-country heterogeneity in demand
preferences and ￿xed costs of production. The original model studied large and systematic
deviations from the relative purchasing power parity (i.e. the hypothesis according to
which the relative price of a trade good should stay constant over time), that had been
found in actual data related to several countries. The explanation that the authors gave
to the issue mainly relied on pricing-to-market, that is the choice of individual producers
to change the relative price of her output abroad and at home as a response to aggregate
international shocks. More speci￿cally, their model featured two important characteristics:
imperfect competition with variable markups and international trade costs (both ￿xed and
"iceberg" costs.) In terms of results, their model resulted to be able to match many relevant
values of international trade and market structure and, particularly, to almost reproduce
actual deviations from the relative purchasing power parity in the US economy. So, I chose
to start from that setting as I thought that their work could be further improved. In fact,
actual data give evidence of pricing-to-market as CPI-based real exchange rate result to be
almost as volatile as PPI-based real exchange rate in many countries (if PPP held,instead,
then the movements of the two types of real exchange rates should be almost no related at
all.) Nevertheless, according to AB (2008), ￿ uctuations of CPI-based real exchange rate
after aggregate productivity shocks are as large as only slightly more than 80 percent of
the ￿ uctuations of PPI-based exchange rate. Thus, there is a remaining 20 percent of the
actual relationship between the two movements that still needs to be explained.
The ￿rst step of my work was to ￿nd a plausible proxy to country level demand
preferences. Within this scope, I chose CPI weights provided by the OECD database, that
represent the shares of household ￿nal consumption on 58 products classi￿ed according
to the four-digit C.O.I.C.O.P. (i.e. Classi￿cation of Individual Consumption According
to Purpose). So, I collected CPI weights data for the US and for ￿ve of the top US
international trading partners (Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico and the UK). Then, for
each country, I aggregated the weights according to seven broad categories: Food, Housing,
Apparel, Transport and Communication, Medical Care, Education and Recreation, Other
Goods. This was to allow to more easily compare CPI weights distributions across the six
countries considered. More speci￿cally, it turned out that the US have the largest share of
total household expenditure spent for Housing and Medical Care and a lowest share spent
for Food and Education and Recreation (in the latter, it precedes only Mexico). Moreover,
138among the US trading partners, Mexico and, in a second position, Japan resulted to be
among the farthest ones from the US in terms of expenditure shares on Food and Housing,
that in most of the cases represent more than half of the total expenditure. Overall, the
most homogeneous country with the US in terms of CPI weights distribution seems to be
Canada; among the European countries, instead, Germany looks to be relatively closer
with respect to the UK. In addition, I also tried to empirically show the presence of home
bias in the US and in some of the top US trading partners. Even in this case I exploited
the OECD database, where I found data, at the 2-digit industry level (ISIC, Rev. 3) on
consumption, production (from the Input-Output tables) and on the number of enterprises
(from SSIS, i.e. Structural Statistics of Industry and Services). Thus, I graphically gave
some evidence that in the US, such as in the UK and, to a lesser extent, in Germany, in
di⁄erent years, consumption and production patterns across di⁄erent industries are very
close. This means that, within those economies, the larger the consumption of a certain
good, the larger the production of that good and, particularly, the larger the number of
￿rms producing that good. Thus, it came out that consumer preferences are also linked
to the number of ￿rms able enter and produce within each industry.
Next, I tested the two extensions of AB (2008) introduced. In the numerical exercises,
all the parameters that are common to the original setting are set at the same values.
The target is to measure changes in international relative prices after a negative shock to
aggregate productivity in one of the two countries. Thus, according to the ￿rst (simpler)
extension, the only di⁄erence with the original framework is the heterogeneity in demand
preferences. More speci￿cally, preferences in country 1 are always proxied with US CPI
weights in 2000, while preferences in country 2 are proxied with CPI weights of some of
the top US trading partners: Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico and the UK. It resulted
that introducing preference heterogeneity both across sectors and across countries does
not improve the ability of the model to predict the actual volatility of CPI-based RER
with respect to the volatility of PPI-based RER. In more detail, proxying preferences in
country 2 with preferences of countries more similar to the US (such as Canada) made
almost no di⁄erence with respect to proxying them with preferences of more di⁄erent
countries (such as Mexico and Japan). If cross-country preference heterogeneity did not
give relevant results, cross-sector preference heterogeneity turned out to matter more,
especially in terms of both extensive and intensive margins. It came out that exporting
to countries where preferences are more concentrated in some sectors with respect to the
others (such as Canada) is harder than exporting to those countries where preferences are
more equally distributed across di⁄erent goods (such as the UK). Intuitively, one the one
hand, if consumption is more concentrated in some sectors, the other ones will be so thin
that exporters will have to struggle to sell goods belonging to them. On the other hand,
sectors associated to very large preferences are not able to o⁄set the previous e⁄ect by
139allowing a relatively larger number of exporters to access the market.
Turning to the more complicated extension, that includes both preference heterogeneity
and ￿xed costs of production into the original model, this led to an improvement in terms of
prediction of the actual ratio of changes in CPI-based RER to changes in PPI-based RER.
Moreover, the extensive margin predicted by this version turned out to be not so di⁄erent
from the actual data. This was because production ￿xed costs do not impose a reduction
of the only number of exporters, but of the number of all producers that now have to
face selection at the entry. On the other side, the degree of concentration across sectors
resulted to be a little higher according to the new model as the total number of competitors
within the two economies falls: however, the value of the median Her￿ndahl index does
not become too di⁄erent from the value reported in AB (2008). Even in this case, adding
preference heterogeneity across countries did not yield any bene￿t in terms of prediction
of the target variable. As before, among the heterogeneous preference cases tested, the
lowest ratio of exporters to total domestic producers results (and the lowest intensive
margin) were given by the case in which preferences are less equally distributed across
categories (i.e. US trading partner￿ s preferences are proxied by Canada￿ s CPI weights).
In addition, the lowest extensive margin is also associated to the lowest prediction of the
volatility of CPI-based RER with respect to the volatility of PPI-based RER. This could
be explained by the fact the lower the number of exporters in the economy, the lower the
impact of pricing-to-market on the aggregate economy, as long as ￿rms selling only in the
domestic market can not charge di⁄erent prices across di⁄erent (national) markets. On
the other side, the largest the extensive margin, the largest the intensive margin and one
of the largest predicted values of the target variable resulted in the case in which US trade
partner￿ s preferences are proxied by the UK that, di⁄erently from Canada, report a lower
value of standard deviation across CPI weights.
In conclusion, it might be worth mentioning the results from one further test I im-
plemented, that consisted in allowing for cross-country heterogeneity in ￿xed costs of
production, that is Fp1 6= Fp2. In fact, it would not be hard to believe that ￿xed costs of
production vary across countries. However, the test did not give important improvements
with respect to the homogeneous ￿xed costs of production case.
1405 The Role of Trade Costs Asymmetry in Explaining
Pricing-to-Market
5.1 Introduction
The ￿fth chapter of my thesis tries to address the same issue as in the previous chapter, i.e.
the Purchasing Power Parity puzzle, following a di⁄erent approach. In this case, I focus
on the role of trade costs and, particularly, of the possible cross-country heterogeneity
in those costs in explaining the extent of pricing-to-market. In fact, even though a part
of those costs (mainly related to physical distance) could be thought of as not strongly
depending on the direction of the shipping, there is another part that may vary according
to the direction itself, as country speci￿c. Therefore, shipping a pair of shoes from Europe
to the US might lead to a di⁄erent trade cost with respect to shipping that pair of shoes
from the US to Europe. This is because US exporters to Europe might have to deal with
costs related to, for example, wholesale and retail costs, marketing, advertising costs and
local transport, that are di⁄erent in extent from the costs that European exporters have
to face when they ship their goods into the US market.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) estimated the tax equivalent of "representative"
trade costs (for industrialized countries) to be equal to around 170 percent. Those costs
included transportation costs (of both freight and time type), border related trade barriers
(i.e. tari⁄ and nontari⁄ barriers, language barrier, di⁄erent currency, information and
security costs) and retail and wholesale distribution costs. They documented the fact that
some of them can vary across di⁄erent goods and di⁄erent countries. An important case
might be given by nontari⁄ barriers, that are measures aimed at, in a broad de￿nition,
price, quantity and quality control as long as at antidumping control. According to the
TRAINS (TRade Analysis and INformation System) data, the US have 27.2 percent of
tari⁄lines subject to nontari⁄trade barriers, while, for example, Argentina they are equal
to 71.8 percent, in Canada to 30.7 percent and in Mexico to 58.0 percent. Another relevant
case is given by transport costs, that can be of direct type, such as freight charges and
insurance, or of indirect type, such as holding cost for the goods in transit, inventory cost
due to bu⁄ering the variability of delivery dates and preparation costs related to the size
of shipment. The all commodities arithmetic average range from 7.3 percent of the free
on board price in Uruguay to 17.5 percent in Brazil (it is equal to 10.7 percent in the US).
Distribution costs also result to be varying across countries: they range from 42 percent
of producer prices in Belgium to 70 percent in Japan (in the US they are equal to 68
percent).
Indeed, such a heterogeneity could generate asymmetries in terms of international trade
volumes and prices. In particular, if these costs a⁄ect the degree of competition within the
141national economies by imposing entry barriers to exporters, then the heterogeneity in those
costs could also imply di⁄erent pricing across countries. Thus, on the one hand, countries
that impose lower trade costs to foreign competitors should have more competition within
the domestic market and, then, lower prices. On the other hand, countries that impose
larger barriers to competitors coming from abroad, might have less competition in the
market and then larger prices. So, even at the ￿rm level, it could result that the price
charged in the domestic market di⁄er from the price charged abroad as a consequence of,
ceteris paribus, a di⁄erent degree of competition in the two markets due to trade costs
heterogeneity.
Therefore, in this chapter, I aim at testing whether such an asymmetry in trade costs
can give a contribute to understand why ￿rms seem to price-to-market and, in turn, why
the purchasing power parity does not seem to hold. I am ￿rst going to provide some actual
data that give some evidence about such an asymmetry in reality and, then, I am starting
from same framework as before, that is AB (2008), to build up a model that takes into
account both variable markups and (heterogeneous) international trade costs.
A short review of the literature about international trade costs is following. Samuelson
(1954) studied the e⁄ects of di⁄erent types of trade impediments within a simple two-
country two-good model. In particular, the ￿rst type of impediment was given by real
transport costs, there were de￿ned in a way that will become famous in the modern
literature on international trade. The starting idea was that part of the good shipped
abroad is consumed in the act of shipments. Thus, these trade limits were de￿ned as "real"
as they implied the use of resources in shipping goods. As an example to describe such
costs, Samuelson used ice: only a part of the ice exported to another country will arrive at
destination, while the other part will be melted away. Limao and Venable (2002) pointed
out that traded costs depend on infrastructure, by which they meant the average of the
density of the road network, the covered road network, the rail network and the amount
of telephone lines per person. Thus, infrastructure variable turned out to also a⁄ect
trade volume. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) set up gravity model featuring multiple
regions and multiple di⁄erentiated goods. Each region was assumed to be specialized in
the production of one good and the total supply of each good was assumed to be ￿xed. In
this model, prices were allowed to di⁄er across destinations because of trade costs, that
arose from the exporter side. More speci￿cally, trade costs were thought of as information
costs, legal and regulatory costs and transport costs. Thus, bilateral trade was determined
by relative trade barriers, that are the bilateral trade barriers relative to the average trade
barriers that each of the two regions have to face with all trading partners. Burstein,
Neves and Rebelo (2003) showed a really large extent of distribution costs for the average
consumer good: it amounted to around 40 percent of the retail price in the US and 60
percent of the retail price in Argentina. According to their model, no good is traded
142for free. This is because all goods need distribution services (such as wholesale and retail
services, marketing and advertisement and local transportation services) that are intensive
in local labour and land, so that they can not be traded. So, because such distribution
services are non-tradable and country speci￿c, then they contribute to generate price
di⁄erentials for traded goods across countries. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) surveyed
di⁄erent measures of trade costs, that are de￿ned as costs faced to ship a good to the ￿nal
consumer. Some examples of trade costs made follow: transportation costs (concerning
both freight and time), policy barriers (of both tari⁄and non-tari⁄types), cost of switching
from one currency to another one, information costs, security costs, contracts enforcement
costs, legal costs and wholesale and retail distribution costs. They turned out to be
really large, especially in the industrialized countries. Moreover, they were also shown
to be very variable across both goods and countries. Corsetti and Dedola (2005) set
up a two-country model of real and monetary transmission in case of international price
discrimination. According to this framework, upstream monopolistic ￿rms sell tradable
goods to competitive retailers that are located in di⁄erent places. Such vertical interaction
between monopolistic producers and local retailers, that leads to market segmentation, is
exploited to study the implications of distributive trade on the level of exchange rate
pass-through into import prices. Particularly, the elasticity of demand for the same good
turned out to di⁄er across national markets due to the fact that distribution services are
intensive in local nontraded inputs. Arkolakis (2008) aimed at shedding light on market
penetration costs that are mainly thought of as marketing costs. The larger the population
size of a market, the lower the cost of selling goods to a given number of consumers within
that market (some evidence is provided about how cost of advertising varies by population
size). Furthermore, the larger the number of consumer reached, the larger marginal cost
of marketing, meaning that a ￿rm entering the market is going to deal with increasing
marginal costs in order to reach additional consumers (evidence on decreasing returns
to scale of advertising costs was also reported). Finally, Helpman, Melitz and Rubistein
(2008) set up a model able to catch two important features of international trade: ￿rst,
zero trade ￿ ows between many pairs of countries; second, the varying number of exporting
￿rms across destination countries. Then, trade barriers resulted to be able to a⁄ect trade
through two channels: the intensive margin, that is the trade volume for each exporter,
and the extensive margin, that is the number of exporters. In more detail, producers
willing to export were assumed to deal with two additional costs, that were a transport
cost and a ￿xed cost of exporting to a speci￿c country. Thus, those additional costs were
not assumed to depend on the identity of exporting producers but on the identity of origin
and destination countries.
I extend the Atkeson and Burstein (2008) framework by introducing heterogeneous
international trade costs. More speci￿cally, my model keeps some crucial features that are
143already in the original framework, such as imperfect competition with variable markups
and international trade costs. However, with respect to that setting, I add asymmetry
in iceberg costs: exporters￿marginal costs are scaled up by factors that can vary across
countries. The main target I am pursuing is to possibly improve the ability of the original
framework in showing that CPI-based real exchange rates are as volatile as PPI-based
real exchange rates, without worsening the other important results. In fact, if actual
data were saying that relative consumer prices moved almost one-by-one with relative
producer prices, that model I am referring to was able to address only slightly more than
80 percent of that relationship. Just as a quick reminder, they started from two empirical
facts concerning the US economy: ￿rst, the manufacturing terms of trade are much less
volatile then the PPI-based real exchange rate; second, CPI-based real exchange rates move
roughly one-by-one with manufacturing PPI-based real exchange rates. That evidence at
the aggregate level was suggesting that relative PPP (Purchasing Power Parity, that is the
hypothesis according to which the relative price of a good traded between two countries
is supposed to be constant over time) was not holding at the aggregate level, because of
pricing-to-market. The link between PPI-based real exchange rate and the terms of trade











where PPI=PPI￿ is the PPI-based real exchange rate, EPI=IPI is the terms of trade,
PPI=EPI is the ratio of domestic producer and export prices and, ￿nally, IPI=PPI￿ is
the ratio of import (that is, foreign country export) and foreign producer prices. Notice
that hats indicate changes in the logarithm of the variables; furthermore, nominal exchange
rates are not used in order to express international price ratios as prices are assumed to
be measured in a common currency. If case of relative PPP holding, the last two terms of
(54) are zero; nevertheless, Atkeson and Burstein provided evidence that they are actually
larger than zero at the aggregate level and that was the ￿rst signal that, in fact, PPP
did not hold. On the other side, one further signal of not holding relative PPP was that
international trade was not able to reduce the impact of movements in relative producer
prices on relative consumer prices for tradable goods. In terms of formula, I can express
the relationships between consumer price and producer price in both the domestic country
(say country 1) and the foreign country (say country 2) as follows:
[ CPI1 ’ [ PPI1 + s1
￿
d IPI1 ￿ \ EPI1
￿
;
[ CPI2 ’ [ PPI2 + s2
￿
\ EPI1 ￿ d IPI1
￿
:
In more detail, s1 and s2 are the shares of consumption expenditure on imports in, re-
144spectively, country 1 and country 2. In particular, due to preference asymmetry across
countries, it can be
s1 6= s2;
so that shares of consumption expenditure on imports might be di⁄erent. Nevertheless,
such an asymmetry does not necessarily imply trade unbalance between the two countries
as long as countries can be asymmetric in size. Thus, the ratio of the change in the
CPI-based RER (real exchange rate) and the change in the PPI-based RER is given by
[ CPI1 ￿ [ CPI2
[ PPI1 ￿ [ PPI2
= 1 ￿ (s1 + s2)
\ EPI1 ￿ d IPI1
[ PPI1 ￿ [ PPI2
: (55)
Of course, as in Atkeson and Burstein (2008), the latter expression highlights that the
larger deviations from the relative PPP, the more relative consumer prices and relative
producer prices move together. If PPP holds, then the second term of the right side of (55)
is very close to 1, so that ￿ uctuations in relative consumer prices as a share of ￿ uctuations
in relative producer prices almost amount to 0.
5.1.1 Cross-country heterogeneity in trade costs
In order to show that at least part of international trade costs can vary across countries,
I will next report some data that I have drawn from the World Bank database. The ￿rst
variable I consider is the cost to export. That latter measures the fees imposed on a 20-foot
container in US dollars. Particularly, the fees considered are those related to completing
the procedure to export to a particular country, such as documents, administrative fees
for customs clearance and technical control, terminal handling charges, customs broker
fees and inland transport.41 The second variable I take into account is the lead time to
export, that is recorded in calendar days. The time is calculated from the moment the
procedure is initiated to the moment it is completed. Moreover, the fastest legal procedure
is considered in case there are alternative faster procedures that require additional costs.
The procedures are assumed to be completed without delays. In case more procedures
can be completed in parallel, they are measure simultaneously. Finally, the measure also
includes the waiting time between di⁄erent procedures.
The World Bank provides the values of these variables from 2005 to 2009. I choose
to take the average value across those years for the US and the US top ten international
trading partners (that represent 65.78 percent of the total volume of US international
trade), that are Canada, Mexico, Japan, China, Germany, the UK, South Korea, France
41The World Bank futher speci￿es that tari⁄s or trade taxes are not included and that only o¢ cial
costs are recorded.
145and Italy (sorted by trade volumes in 2001, according to the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics of the US Department of Transportation).42The values calculated are reported
in Table 5.1 below. It results that costs to export to the US (984 $) are lower than costs
to export to Canada (1348 $), Mexico (1370 $), Japan (989 $), France (1019.6 $) and
Italy (1222.6 $) that, together, represent 47.08 percent to total US international trade
volume. In more detail, costs to trade to the US turn out to be, respectively, 27 and
28.17 percent lower than costs to export to Canada and Mexico, that are the top two US
trading partners. Furthermore, in terms of lead time to export, exporting goods to US
consumers takes less time than exporting goods to consumers from all the US top trading
partners. More speci￿cally, exporting to the US takes, on average 5 calendar days, that is
less than half of the time needed to exporting procedures to Canada (11.2 days), Japan
(11 days) and France (13.8 days) and less than one third of the time required to complete
the procedure of exporting in Mexico (17 days) and Italy (18 days). The gap becomes
even larger when the US are compared to China, where lead time to export is equal, on
average, to 24 days. Therefore, it seems that exporting procedure to the US are less costly
in terms of both fees and time than exporting procedures to those US trading partners
that represent a very large share of the total US international trade volume.
Table 5.1
Export Costs Heterogeneity
Country Cost to Export Lead Time to Export









South Korea 762:8 10
France 1019:6 13:8
Italy 1222:6 18
Source: World Bank database
42Export costs data for Taiwan, that is ranked at the 8th position among the top 10 U.S. trade partners,
are not available in the World Bank database. So, I excluded Taiwan even when I calculated the share of
total U.S. volume represented by the top U.S. trade partners.
1465.2 The model
The model I set up is a direct extension of Atkeson and Burstein (2008) framework. The
latter is a two-country model where each country (indexed by i = 1;2) produces a large
amount of di⁄erentiated goods. Trade between those two countries is limited by two types
of trade costs: ￿xed costs and iceberg costs. Furthermore, the driving force of international
price ￿ uctuations is given by aggregate shocks to productivity.






where ￿ is the discount factor and u(cit;1 ￿ lit) = log
￿
c￿ (1 ￿ lit)
1￿￿￿
: In particular,
cit indicates ￿nal consumption and lit indicates the working hours of the representative
household in country i at time t. In particular, cit indicates ￿nal consumption and lit
indicates the working hours of the representative household in country i at time t. In the
maximization problem, the consumet budger constraint is:
Pitcit + bit+1 = Witlit + (1 + r)bit;
where the expenditure side of the constraint is given by the sum of purchase of the ￿nal
consumption good and purchase of one-period-forward bonds while the income side is given
by the the sum of labour income and income from maturing bonds purchased at time t￿1.
Moreover, in each country households are assumed to trade a complete set of international
















where Wit and Pit indicate, respectively, the wage and the ￿nal consumption price in
country i at time t. Thus, 56 and 57 are used in solving for equilibria and they hold for
every t and for every state of nature. Finally, the intertemporal ￿rst-order condition for






c (cit+1;1 ￿ lit+1) = u
0
c (cit;1 ￿ lit):
Aggregation of Goods into Sectors
As the model targets the study of the behaviour of international relative prices at
147both an aggregate and a disaggregate level, it features more levels of aggregation of goods.
Individual ￿rms produce goods, that are commodities representing physical objects, which
can be traded across coutries. Moreover, ￿rms sell their outputs to speci￿c sectors. The
latter are the ￿rst level of aggregation used in the model and represent the lowest level
of disaggregation of commodities employed for the construction of price indeces. In more
detail, in each of those sectors there are only a small number of ￿rms: this means that
the price charged by each ￿rm is a⁄ected by the prices charged by all the other ￿rms
within the same speci￿c sector. Finally, sectors are aggregated into a ￿nal composite
consumption good. Next, I describe the aggregation of di⁄erentiated goods into sectors
and the aggregation of sectors into ￿nal consumption at time t ( the suscript t will be
dropped for simplicity.) So, ￿nal consumption, ci, is obtained by aggregating the large


































So, turning to the lower level of aggregation, in each country i and sector j there may be,
in equilibrium, up to K domestic ￿rms selling di⁄erentiated goods and up to K foreign
￿rms selling their output to the same sector. In terms of notation, ￿rms k = 1;2;:::;K
are indicated as domestic, while ￿rms k = K +1;K +2;:::;2K as foreign. Assuming that
there are no international trade barriers and ￿xed production costs either, so that all the
￿rms, both domestic and foreign, are able to sell in each sector, sector level aggregate












where qijk indicates the sales of ￿rm k in sector j and country i. Goods within the same
sector are assumed to be more substitutable than goods across di⁄erent sectors, that is
1 < ￿ < ￿. Note that imperfect substitution between goods within the same sector implies
that each ￿rm within that sector charges a distinct price although ￿rms are involved in





















Firms produce according to a constant returns to scale function employing labour as
the only input. In particular, the production function of a ￿rm takes on the following
form:
qijk = Aizjklijk; (64)
where lijk is the labour amount employed at the ￿rm level, Ai is the aggregate productivity
in country i, that is common to all ￿rms producing in that country, and zjk is the ￿rm level
productivity. Each ￿rm within sector j and country i draws its idiosyncratic productivity
zjk from a log-normal distribution, that is logzjk ￿ N (0;￿j). More speci￿cally, ￿rm level
productivity is assumed to constant over time, while the aggregate productivity, Ai is
allowed to change after shocks to the aggregate national economy i.
A ￿rm with productivity zjk selling to the domestic market i, within sector j, will cope







Instead, ￿rms willing to sell abroad have to cope with not only (marginal) production
costs but also with international trade costs. The latter are assumed to be of two di⁄erent
types. First, every ￿rm wishing to export any amount of its output to the other country
has to pay a ￿xed labour costs, Fx. Second, exporting ￿rms￿marginal costs will be scaled
up by an iceberg type costs, Dl > 1, where l 6= i. Crucially, di⁄erently from the cases
presented in chapter 4, iceberg costs can di⁄er across countries, so that it can be that
D1 6= D2. Therefore, the marginal costs faced by a ￿rm placed in country 1, sector j, and







Indeed, if Dl = 1, then the marginal costs faced by ￿rms placed in country i to sell
both at home and abroad are equal. Notice that trade cost, both of iceberg type and
￿xed type, are constant over time and must be dealt with every time a ￿rm wishes to
149export anything. Finally, the total number of ￿rms selling to each sector is determined
endogenously in equilibrium. I assume that all the ￿rms sell in the respective domestic
country, as they do not have to deal with ￿xed costs of production, so that the minimum
number of competitors within each sector is equal to K. Nevertheless, among the further
K potential sellers from abroad, it can happen that not all of them are able to cover the
￿xed costs of export and then make nonnegative pro￿ts by exporting. Thus, the total
number of ￿rms within one sector can be lower than 2K in equilibrium.
Pro￿t maximization and price setting
Firms producing individual goods are engaged in imperfect competition. More speci￿-
cally, ￿rms play a static game of quantity competition. Each of them chooses the quantity
qijk to sell in country i taking as given the quantities chosen by all the other ￿rms in the
economy, along with the respective domestic wage rate Wi , the ￿nal consumption quantity
ci and the aggregate price Pi. Indeed, ￿rms are assumed to be aware that their choice
about qijk a⁄ects the sectoral aggregate price Pij and the sectoral aggregate production
yij.
Domestic ￿rms
I ￿rst solve for equilibrium prices and quantities for the domestic ￿rms. I assume that
in each sector there are only K domestic ￿rms producing and selling. As an example, l take
sector j in country 1: the vector of prices P1jk and quantities q1jk for ￿rms k = 1;2:::;K,
are equilibrium prices and quantities in sector j if, for each ￿rm in that sector, the quantity





















where y1j is given by (61). Notice that, in the maximization problem, aggregate price, P1,
￿nal consumption, c1, and the quantities produced by the other competitors in sector j,
q1lk, with l 6= k, are taken as given.
Thus, in sector j, equilibrium prices are found by solving a system of K nonlinear































In solving the system of equations, W1, A1 and the ￿rm level productivities, zjk are
taken as given. Needless to say, the procedure described above to ￿nd equilibrium prices
in sector j in country 1 is the same for all the sectors in both the countries, 1 and 2.
Adding foreign ￿rms
The number of foreign competitors within each sector is determined according to a dy-
namic multistage game solved by backward induction, with ￿rms deciding in each period
whether and how much to export. As previously said, di⁄erently from domestic competi-
tors, foreign sellers have to deal with iceberg marginal costs and ￿xed costs of export:
this means that they enter the foreign market only if they can cover the ￿xed costs of
export and make nonnegative pro￿ts. The levels of wages in the two countries, Wi, ￿nal
consumption, ci, and aggregate price, Pi are taken as given during the procedure; they are
determined in general equilibrium. Foreigners are assumed to be ordered according to a
reverse order of unit costs, that is from the most productive to the least productive. As
I did before, I use sector j in country 1 to illustrate the procedure. Each entrant K + n,
with n 2 [1;K], plays a simultaneous-move game of quantity competition. Equilibrium
prices are calculated through a system of K + n nonlinear equations: in more detail, the
￿rst K equations are related to the domestic ￿rms (69), while the following n equations
are related to the prices that the ￿rst n entrants in sector j from country 2 charges to







Once I have calculated the equilibrium prices, I can calculate the sectoral price (62);
then, I can derive the amount exported by ￿rm K + n, by using (60), (63) and P1c
￿
1 (the
latter is used to calculate the sectoral output.) Then, I can calculate the pro￿t earned by
the nth entrant: if it does not cover the ￿xed cost of export, W2Fx, then in equilibrium
there will be K + n ￿ 1 competitors in sector j of country 1. Therefore, this procedure,
repeated for both the countries, sector by sector, yields the ￿nal number of competitors
in each sector (including exporters) and a set of equilibrium prices Pijk given ￿xed wages,
aggregate prices and quantities (that are calculated in general equilibrium, as explained
next).
151General equilibrium
The model is solved statically at every date for the general equilibrium prices and
quantities, as a function of the realized productivity shocks at the aggregate level, that
are A1 and A2. The problem consists of ￿nding a ￿xed point in the aggregate variables,
Pi, ci, Wi, li, with i = 1;2, using W2 as a numeraire. The solution to this problem is found
according the following manner. I ￿rst derive the number of competitors and prices in




2 c2, and W2 as given. Then, I can calculate
aggregate and sectoral prices according to, respectively, (59) and (62); furthermore, I
can calculate quantities produced by each ￿rm through (60) and (63). Aggregate labour
demand (L1 and L2) is derived by summing up the labour demand of all the ￿rms (also
considering the ￿xed costs of export). Thus, the ￿xed point in the aggregate variables is
found when the three ￿rst order conditions (56) and (57) result to be satis￿ed.
5.3 Numerical results
Before fully testing the model I set up, I perform a mapping exercise aiming at two targets.
The ￿rst one is to quickly verify whether iceberg cost heterogeneity can a⁄ect the value of
the target variable, the is the ratio of changes in CPI-based RER to changes in PPI-based
RER. The second target is to eventually ￿nd out those values of trade costs for which it
is possible to improve the results of AB (2008).
So, I test the model on a limited number of sectors, i.e. S = 100, for di⁄erent values of
D1 2 [1:10;1:15;1:20;:::;2:00], that is the iceberg type marginal cost that exporters from
country 2 to country 1 have to pay. The values of D2, that is the iceberg type marginal
cost that exporters from country 1 to country 2 have to pay, is kept constant at 1:45.
Figure 5.1 shows that the value of the target variable changes as D1 changes. Speci￿cally,
keeping D2 constant, the lower D1, the larger the volatility of CPI-based RER with respect
to PPI-based RER predicted by the model. In addition, Figure 5.2 describes the behaviour
of country 1 intensive margin for di⁄erent values of D1. This is similar to the behaviour
of the target variable shown before, that is the lower the value of D1, the larger the value
of country 1 intensive margin.43 At the margin, it seems that the e⁄ect of changing the
iceberg type marginal cost of exporting to country 1, D1, on the target variable is larger
than the e⁄ect on the intensive margin. This means that, in terms of calibration, I can
easily improve the ability of the model to predict the volatility of CPI-based RER relative
to PPI-based RER without a⁄ecting so much the most important control variables used:
the extensive margin and the intensive margin.
Trying to explain what illustrated in the two graphs, heterogeneity in trade costs
implies, ceteris paribus, a di⁄erent selection degree to exporters in the two countries that,
43Notive that country 1 extensive margin does not change as country 1 exporters keep facing the same
iceberg type marginal costs and ￿xed costs of exporting.
152in turn, leads to a di⁄erent number of competitors over the aggregate national economies.
So, if D1 < D2, then exporters from country 2 to country 1 face lower marginal costs
than exporters from country 1 to country 2. Thus, country 1 will have a larger number
of foreign competitors with respect to country 2, as for exporters to country 1 it will
be relatively easier to cover the ￿xed costs of exporting, Fx. Overall, this is going to
a⁄ect the market shares that each competitor (both domestic and foreign) can hold in the
two markets: assuming that the number of domestic competitors is the same in the two
markets, due to a larger number of exporters, country 1 is going to have a larger number
of competitors that, consequently, will have lower market shares and market power with
respect to competitors in country 2. Furthermore, this is going to strengthen the di⁄erence
in market share that each exporters has in the relative domestic and foreign market. So
doing, it can also increase the extent of pricing-to-market predicted by AB (2008). In fact,
the latter showed that pricing-to-market occurs when the change in the markup related
to export prices is di⁄erent from the change in the markup related to domestic prices.
In more detail, pricing-to-market comes out if the elasticity of markup varies with ￿rm￿ s
market share and market shares at home and abroad are di⁄erent, and (or) if market
shares at home and abroad react to shocks to aggregate costs in a di⁄erent way.
In order to understand the direction of the changes in the target variable as D1 changes,
it is worth to turn to what shown in Figure 5.2. The lower D1, the larger the intensive
margin in country 1: this happens because, even though the extensive margin does not
change, i.e. the number of exporters to country 2 is always the same (D2 is kept constant),
the ratio of exports to gross output increases as an e⁄ect of an increase in imports, due to
lower D1. So, an increase in trade volume is also associated to a larger extent of pricing-to-
market: the larger the export volume, the larger the e⁄ect of pricing di⁄erentials between
the domestic and the foreign market in aggregate.
153Figure 5.1. Iceberg cost heterogeneity and PTM
Figure 5.2. Iceberg cost heterogeneity and intensive margin
In Table 5.2 below, I am reporting the results from the numerical exercises that test my
extension to AB (2008), that introduces iceberg type marginal cost asymmetry. The test
consists in measuring how much international relative prices change in equilibrium after
a negative shock to aggregate productivity in country 1, that is A1, such that aggregate
costs in country 1, W1=A1, relative to aggregate costs in country 2, W2=A2, increase by 1
percent. It results allowing for heterogeneity in iceberg costs in the original setting can
lead to an improvement in terms of ability of the model to predict the actual reaction to
154aggregate shocks of CPI-based RER relative to the reaction of PPI-based RER. The tests
are implemented on 20,000 sectors such as in AB (2008) and all the common parameters
(i.e. K;￿;￿;￿;Fx) are set at the same values as in the original framework. The only,
crucial, novelty with respect to the original setting is given by the heterogeneity in the
iceberg type costs: country 1 exporters￿marginal costs will be scaled up by 1.45 (i.e. the
value of D2), while country 2 exporters￿marginal costs will be scaled up by a lower factor,
that is 1.30 (i.e. the value of D1). Thus, the introduction of heterogeneity in iceberg costs
yielded an improvement in terms of ability of the model to predict the actual volatility of
CPI-based RER with respect to volatility of PPI-based RER44 In fact, the value produced
by the extended model is equal to 0.8884, that is closer to the actual value, that is 1.08,
with respect to the value predicted by AB (2008), that is 0.8379. Furthermore, the new
model does not change the predicted value of the extensive margin (24.7877 percent), that
then keeps being very close to the actual data (25.00 percent). The intensive margin, for
the reasons explained before, turns out to be increased with respect to the benchmark
model (14.05 percent): speci￿cally, it is equal to 15.6843 percent. However such a value
is far included between the two extreme points of the interval of values from which the
actual value is drawn: 11.7 percent and 21 percent. Finally, the measure of concentration
across sectors results to be lowered with respect to the benchmark case: this is because,
by reducing D1, more exporters and, then, more competitors will operate in country 1
where, in turn, the median Her￿ndahl index actually falls (1,350).
Table 5.2. Heterogeneous Vs. Homogeneous Trade Costs














Ext. Margin (%) 24:7877 24:7877 25:00
Int. Margin (%) 15:6843 14:0500 16:5
M. Her￿ndahl Index 1;350 1;463 n:a:
44In the Appendix, I provide details about how I construct variations to price indeces, i.e. [ CPI1,
[ CPI2 , [ PPI1, [ PPI2.
1555.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, I studied the role of asymmetry in international trade costs in explaining
pricing-to-market and, then, the Purchasing Power Parity puzzle. Even though a part
of those costs (the one that is more associated to physical distance) does not strongly
depend on the direction of shipping, there is another part that can vary by direction as
it is country-speci￿c. So, as an example, shipping a pair of shoes from Europe to the US
might lead to a di⁄erent trade cost with respect to shipping that pair of shoes from the
US to Europe. This is because US exporters to Europe might have to deal with costs
related to, for example, wholesale and retail costs, marketing, advertising costs and local
transport, that are di⁄erent in extent from the costs that European exporters have to
face when they ship their goods into the US market. In the literature, a really important
contribute to understand the extent and the variability of trade costs has been given by
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) estimated the tax equivalent of "representative" trade
costs to be equal to around 170 percent. Those costs included transportation costs, border
related trade barriers and retail and wholesale distribution costs. They documented the
fact that some of them can vary across di⁄erent goods and di⁄erent countries.
Thus, my starting idea was that such an asymmetry might generate, ceteris paribus,
asymmetries in terms of international trade volumes and prices. In particular, if these costs
a⁄ect the degree of competition within national economies by imposing entry barriers to
exporters, then the heterogeneity in those costs could also imply, even at the ￿rm level,
di⁄erent pricing across countries.
In order to verify the e⁄ectiveness of this idea I have extended Atkeson and Burstein
(2008) framework by introducing heterogeneous international trade costs. Quantitatively,
the main target was to possibly improve the ability of the original framework, featuring
variable markups and (homogeneous) trade costs, to predict the actual extent of pricing-
to-market. In fact, according to data the CPI-based real exchange rate is almost as volatile
as the PPI-based real exchange rate, while the original setting predicts only slightly more
than a 80 percent relationship between the ￿ uctuations of the two rates.
Moreover, aiming at empirically enforcing my theoretical intuition, I provided some
data, from the World Bank database, that show that trade costs can vary across countries.
More speci￿cally, I consider two variables, that are the cost to export, which measures the
fees (in US dollars) imposed on a 20-foot container, and the lead time to export, which is
recorded in calendar days. From data, it resulted that cost to export to the US is lower
than costs to export to some of the top US trading partners, such as Canada, Mexico,
Japan, France and Italy. In addition, exporting goods to US consumers takes less time
than exporting goods to consumers from all the US top trading partners: the gap turned
out to be really large in case of Mexico, Italy and, especially, China. Turning to the results
156from testing the extended model, it came out the introducing iceberg costs heterogeneity
can improve the ability of AB (2008) to predict the actual volatility of CPI-based RER
with respect to the volatility of PPI-based RER. In particular, all the common parameters
were set at the same values as in the original framework. The only, crucial, di⁄erence was
given by the heterogeneity in the iceberg type costs: country 1 (that represents the US)
exporters￿marginal costs will be scaled up by 1.45 (i.e. the value of D2), while country 2
(that represents the US trading partners) exporters￿marginal costs will be scaled up by a
lower factor, that is 1.30 (i.e. the value of D1). In terms of explanation of such a ￿nding,
the asymmetry in trade costs led to a di⁄erent number of competitors across the two
countries: assuming that the number of domestic competitors is the same, more exporters
will enter country 1 as trade costs associated to that market are lower. So, this is going to
a⁄ect the market shares that each competitor (both domestic and foreign) can hold in the
two markets: country 1 is going to have a larger number of competitors that, consequently,
will have lower market shares and market power with respect to competitors in country
2. Therefore, heterogeneity in the number of competitors,ceteris paribus, strengthens the
di⁄erence in market share that each exporters has in the relative domestic and foreign
market and, then, the extent of pricing-to-market predicted in AB (2008). In fact, the
latter proved that pricing-to-market occurs if the elasticity of markup varies with ￿rm￿ s
market share and market shares at home and abroad are di⁄erent, and (or) if market
shares at home and abroad react to shocks to aggregate costs in a di⁄erent way.
Furthermore, the new model does not change the predicted value of the extensive
margin, that then keeps being very close to the actual data. The intensive margin, instead,
turned out to be increased with respect to the benchmark model, even though it was still
not too far from actual data. In fact, as shown in a mapping exercise, the lower D1, the
larger the intensive margin in country 1: this happens because, even though the extensive
margin does not change, i.e. the number of exporters to country 2 is always the same
(as D2 is kept constant), the ratio of exports to gross output increases as an e⁄ect of an
increase in imports, due to lower D1. Therefore, an increase in trade volume is also related
to a larger extent of pricing-to-market: the larger the export volume, the larger the e⁄ect
of pricing di⁄erentials between the domestic and the foreign market in aggregate.
1576 Concluding remarks
In this work, I want to shed light on the role of some types of asymmetries within in-
ternational markets. So, on the one hand, I study allocation e¢ ciency problems related
to the integration of input factors across markets that are heterogeneous in the level of
internal competition toughness. On the other hand, I evaluate the e⁄ect of cross-country
heterogeneity in demand preferences and trade costs on ￿rms￿choice of pricing-to-market.
So, in the ￿rst part of the thesis, I focus on the cross-market markup heterogeneity. I
analytically derive the equilibrium in two di⁄erent economic frameworks, in both of which
production is distributed among (many) heterogeneous monopolistic ￿rms aggregated ac-
cording to a nested CES function. In the ￿rst setting, the two production factors in the
economy, i.e. labour and capital, are assumed to be free mobile across regional/national
markets. In the second one, instead, labour is exogenously restricted at the individual
market level, while capital is kept free mobile. Input factors allocation across markets
turn out to be crucially di⁄erent between the two settings. In the integrated model, in-
dividual market level allocation of production factors depends not only on the relative
productivity but also on the demand elasticity of the market: the larger the productiv-
ity and/or the larger the demand elasticity, the larger the allocation of both capital and
labour. In the labour constrained framework, instead, labour allocation in each market
is given, while capital allocation turns out to be not only a function of both the market
speci￿c relative productivity and demand elasticity as before, but also of the amount of
labour exogenously allocated. According to the Social Planner, inputs allocation only
follows the relative productivity of the individual markets: the larger the relative produc-
tivity, the larger the share of production factors held. Both the competitive economies
that I derive are able to reproduce that allocation as long as demand elasticities across all
the markets are the same. In this case, the integrated model yields a ￿rst best solution,
while the labour constrained model can match the former if the exogenous allocation of
the labour force across the markets is equal to the e¢ cient one. However, none of the com-
petitive economies (i.e. fully integrated and labour restricted) I set up can provide a ￿rst
best solution if markups are heterogeneous across markets. In that case, full integration
leads to an ine¢ cient allocation of both capital and labour: there will be overallocation
of inputs in the markets with relatively lower markups and underallocation of them in
the markets with relatively larger markups. This is because the larger the markup, the
larger the gap between marginal cost and price of the produced good. Thus, if monop-
olistic powers are heterogeneous, then production resources will tend to be overallocated
within those sectors where the demand elasticity is larger, that is where the gap between
marginal cost and price is relatively lower. However, I ￿nd that the allocation distortion
implied by markup asymmetry can be (partially) corrected by an exogeneous restriction
of labour force mobility: this solution allows to exogeneously withdraw (part) of the in-
158e¢ ciently excessive amount of labour allocated in the relative more competitive market
and move that into the relative less competitive market. Nevertheless, this turns out to
be not a ￿rst best solution. The reason is that capital is still assumed to be free mobile
(as it is actually more di¢ cult to think of a restricted capital market) and its allocation
keeps being distorted such as in the integrated setting. Moreover, restriction will lead to a
solution that is as close to the ￿rst best as low the output elasticity of capital: intuitively,
the lower the contribute of capital to production, the more e⁄ective (exogeneous) labour
movements will be in order to get closer to the optimal solution.
In more practical terms, the purpose of my work is to establish an e¢ cient degree
of labour force integration across national markets, according to the starting population
distribution and the degree of asymmetry in competition level. On the one hand, this
would allow to evaluate how e⁄ective current agreements on production factors mobility
are, especially within the European Union. On the other hand, it would also make possi-
ble to contribute to the debate about the economic opportunity of integrating candidate
countries with the current EU members. In fact, one of the key targets at the origin of the
European Union is to generate and promote a Single Market and, of course, full integration
of input factors, namely capital and labour, is crucial to achieve that target. However, my
theoretical work shows that, once markets get integrated, free trade of production factors
might raise problems as a consequence of asymmetry in markets competitiveness across the
countries involved in the agreement. In order to show how plausible and realistic the allo-
cation e¢ ciency problem can be within the European context, I provide some data (from
the OECD database) about the extent of market entry barriers related to both current EU
member states and some of the EU candidates (Turkey and Iceland). This is because, as
argued in Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001), the level of market competition can
depend on the level of entry barriers that prevent new competitors from entering the mar-
ket and competing with the incumbents. Thus, in terms of product market regulations,
among the EU-15 countries, there is a big gap between Greece, that reports the largest
entry barriers, and Ireland and the UK, that report the lowest entry barriers. Moreover,
the members that joined the Union in 2004 seem to have larger barriers than the original
members. Among the candidate members, Turkey￿ s barriers exceed the EU-15 ones and
can be placed in within the top values across the whole Union; on the other hand, Iceland
has got very low barriers. Moreover, from some literature about migration ￿ ows across
the European Union after the enlargement in 2004, it comes out that the largest migration
￿ ows were directed from those countries that report the largest values of entry barriers
to those countries that, instead, report the lowest barriers. So, even though I have not
estimated an (eventual) ine¢ ciency in the labour force allocation across the larger current
European Union, I argue that the problem related to cross-market asymmetry might be
plausible. Furthermore, I point out that further enlargements of the Union should also
159take into account such possible misallocation problems due to heterogeneity in degree of
market competitiveness.
Indeed, the work is expected to be further extended in the future through both a the-
oretical development of the model and, possibly, an empirical validation of the theoretical
predictions. Thus, on the theoretical side, my framework might be developed by making
markups endogenous through a free entry mechanism: this means introducing sunk ￿xed
costs in order to make the number of competitors within each industry not given. Keeping
￿rms heterogeneous in terms of technical productivity, one of the scopes of this extension
would be to model the relationship between the market speci￿c competition toughness and
the productivity distribution across competitors. In more detail, the individual market
relative markup would not just depend on the number of competitors as in Epifani and
Gancia (2011), but rather on the number of ￿rms that are productive enough to cover ￿xed
costs and enter the market. Therefore, it would be possible to establish a link not only
between markup and aggregate productivity but also between markup and productivity
distribution. In fact, there might exist markets with a very large aggregate productiv-
ity but with only a few very strong competitors that are able to enter the markets, so
that those market would result really productive despite of a low internal competition.
Furthermore, introducing also a dynamic perspective instead, I might consider ￿rm level
productivities coming from the same distribution across all the industries; moreover, I
might also assume that the starting number of ￿rms in each industry is the same. Thus,
the shock a⁄ecting only one ￿rm in only one industry could then change the number of
￿rms within that industry and, if the markup depends on the number of ￿rms, that shock
involving only one ￿rm could lead to markup heterogeneity and then to misallocation of
input factors. Therefore, this extension would give a more precise picture of competition,
particularly at the international level, as it would represent and link with each other very
important features of market structure, such as competition toughness and productivity
distribution of producers. On the empirical side, I am going to try to ￿nd evidence of what
my model predicts. In particular, the plan is to measure average price-cost margins and
aggregate productivities for the member countries that have joined the European Union
so far and, then, to estimate an e¢ cient allocation of both labour force and investments
in each of the member countries according to those measures and my model￿ s predictions.
Thus, I would be able to compare the results from those estimates with actual allocation
of labour and capital across the Union in order to possibly assess whether misallocation
problems do actually exist or not. Finally, within this scope, I could exploit the large
database provided by Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk), that collects data at the company
level on standardized annual accounts, ￿nancial ratios, sectoral activities and ownership
for 38 European countries, so that it seems to be very useful for this research project.
The second part of my thesis addresses one of the major issues in international eco-
160nomics, that is the Purchasing Power Parity puzzle, consisting in a weak connection be-
tween exchange rates and national price levels. More speci￿cally, it focuses on pricing-to-
market, that is known as one of the most important factors of such a discrepancy. Thus, at
the aim of shedding further light about the reasons why ￿rms price their goods di⁄erently
across national borders, I extend the very rich framework set up by Atkeson and Burstein
(American Economic Review, 2008). That framework studied the large and systematic de-
viations from the relative purchasing power parity (i.e. the hypothesis according to which
the relative price of a trade good should stay constant over time.), that had been found in
actual data related to several countries. The explanation given to the issue mainly relied on
pricing-to-market, that is the choice of individual producers to change the relative price of
her output abroad and at home as a response to aggregate international shocks. In more
detail, their model featured two important characteristics: imperfect competition with
variable markups and international trade costs (both ￿xed and "iceberg" costs.) In terms
of results, their model resulted to be able to match many relevant values of international
trade and market structure and, particularly, to almost reproduce actual deviations from
the relative purchasing power partity in the US economy. So, the target is to improve the
reference work in terms of ability to predict the actual value of pricing-to-market. In fact,
actual data give evidence of pricing-to-market as CPI-based real exchange rate result to be
as volatile as PPI-based real exchange rate in many countries (if PPP held,instead, then
the movements of the two types of real exchange rates should be almost no related at all.)
Nevertheless, according to the original setting, ￿ uctuations of CPI-based real exchange
rate after aggregate productivity shocks are as large as only slightly more than 80 percent
of the ￿ uctuations of PPI-based exchange rate. Thus, there is a remaining 20 percent of
the actual relationship between the two movements that still needs to be explained. So, I
develop two di⁄erent extensions to that model. The ￿rst consists in introducing demand
preference heterogeneity and ￿xed costs of production; the second, instead, consists in
allowing for cross-country international trade costs asymmetry.
In order to justify the analytical extensions to the reference model, I provide some
data giving some evidence about both cross-country asymmetry in demand preferences
(and home bias) and cross-country trade costs heterogeneity. Thus, on the one hand,
from the OECD database, I collect CPI weights data, that I use as a proxy to country
level demand preferences, for the US and for ￿ve of the top US international trading
partners (Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico and the UK). It results that the US have the
largest share of total household expenditure spent for Housing and Medical Care and a
lowest share spent for Food and Education and Recreation (in the latter, it precedes only
Mexico). Moreover, among the US trading partners, Mexico and, in a second position,
Japan turn out to be among the farthest ones from the US in terms of expenditure shares
on Food and Housing, that in most of the cases represent more than half of the total
161expenditure. Overall, the most homogenous country with the US in terms of CPI weights
distribution seems to be Canada; among the European countries, instead, Germany looks
to be relatively closer with respect to the UK Furthermore, I also show the presence of
home bias in the US and in one of the most important US trading partners, that is the
UK. In more detail, it comes out that, at the two-digit industry level, consumption and
production patterns are very close. This means that, within those economies, the larger
the consumption of a certain good, the larger the production and, in addition, the larger
the number of ￿rms producing that good. So, consumer preferences are also linked to
the number of ￿rms able enter each industry. On the other hand, I give some data, from
the World Bank database, that show that trade costs can vary across countries. More
speci￿cally, I consider two variables, that are the cost to export, which measures the fees
(in US dollars) imposed on a 20-foot container, and the lead time to export, which is
recorded in calendar days. So, it comes out that cost to export to the US is lower than
costs to export to some of the top US trading partners, such as Canada, Mexico, Japan,
France and Italy. In addition, exporting goods to US consumers takes less time than
exporting goods to consumers from all the US top trading partners: the gap turns out to
be really large in case of Mexico, Italy and, especially, China.
Turning to the numerical results, it results that introducing both cross-country and
cross-sector preference heterogeneity does not improve the ability of the model to predict
the actual volatility of CPI-based real exchange rate with respect to the volatility of PPI-
based real exchange rate. More speci￿cally, preferences in country 1 are always proxied
with US CPI weights in 2000, while preferences in country 2 are proxied with CPI weights
of some of the top US trading partners: Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico and the UK
Nevertheless, if cross-country preference heterogeneity does not give any relevant result,
cross-sector preference heterogeneity turns out to matter more, in terms of both extensive
and intensive margins. In more detail, it comes out that exporting to countries where
preferences are more concentrated in some sectors is harder than exporting to those coun-
tries where preferences are more equally distributed across di⁄erent goods. Intuitively, if
consumption is more concentrated in some sectors, then the other ones will be so thin
that exporters will have to struggle to sell goods belonging to them. Nevertheless, sectors
associated to very large preferences are not able to o⁄set the previous e⁄ect by allowing a
relatively larger number of exporters to access the market. However, the more complicated
extension, that introduces both preference heterogeneity and ￿xed costs of production into
the original model, leads to an improvement in terms of prediction of the actual extent of
pricing-to-market. This result can be considered even stronger if it is taken into account
that other important values related to the US economy are actually matched: the ratio of
exports to gross output in manufacturing sectors (i.e. intensive margin) and the share of
US manufacturing plants that export (i.e. extensive margin.)
162Finally, the second extension to Atkeson and Burstein (2008), that introduces cross-
country international trade costs heterogeneity, also yields an improvement to the original
setting, in terms of ability to predict the actual value of pricing-to-market. In more detail,
I consider asymmetry in iceberg costs, by setting that cost in the country representing the
US at a lower level with respect to the country representing US trading partners, so as to
match actual data about export cost. Trying to explain this result, the asymmetry in trade
costs leads to a di⁄erent number of competitors across the two countries: assuming that
the number of domestic competitors is the same, more exporters will enter the country
that is associated to relatively lower trade costs. In turn, this is going to a⁄ect the
market shares that each competitor (both domestic and foreign) can hold in the two
markets: the country that imposes lower costs to importers will have a larger number
of competitors that, consequently, will have lower market shares and market power with
respect to competitors in the other country. Thus,the heterogeneity in the number of
competitors,ceteris paribus, strengthens the di⁄erence in market share that each exporters
has in the relative domestic and foreign market and, then, the extent of pricing-to-market.
In fact, as argued in the framework I refer to, pricing-to-market occurs if the elasticity
of markup varies with ￿rm￿ s market share and market shares at home and abroad are
di⁄erent, and (or) if market shares at home and abroad react to shocks to aggregate costs
in a di⁄erent way. Even in this case, the model does not worsen too much the original
setting￿ s predictions of US extensive and intensive margins.
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A.1 Fully segmented econonomy
Suppose that both capital and labour are segmented at the industrial sector level, i.e.
both the input factors are inelastically supplied sector by sector.
Welfare
In an industry s, the welfare function, I#
s is given by summing up all ￿rms￿pro￿ts,
e ￿
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s Ls; (72)
where Ks is the exogenous capital supply in capital s, e i#
s is the nominal value of the
interest rate in sector s, Ls is the exogenous labour supply in sector s and e w#
s is the
nominal wage rate in industry s. At the aggregate level, the total welfare is given by
adding up all the industry level welfares. Notice that I use the sign # as a superscript to
indicate the variables from the fully segmented economy.
Producer optimization
Even in this setting, the monopolistic ￿rms have to hire both physical capital and
labour on competitive, respectively, capital and labour markets, because they do not own
any input factor. The nominal pro￿t of ￿rm n;s is
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n;s is the nominal price charged by ￿rm n;s, k#
n;s and l#
n;s are, respectively, the
demand of capital and labour from the same ￿rm. Notice that, as both the capital and
the labour market are segmented, both nominal rates and nominal wages result to be
di⁄erent across industries.
Thus, ￿rm n;s faces the demand curve such as the one shown before (??) and seeks






























Each monopolistically competitive ￿rm faces the minimization problem in (73), in order
to derive the minimal unit cost. The result is that each agent within the same industry





































As I said before, both capital and labour are exogenously given at the sector level.





















As a monopolist, the intermediate input ￿rm n;s seeks to maximize its pro￿t by
charging a price e p#
n;s that is equal to a ￿xed mark-up (1=￿s) over cost. Using the optimal
capital/labour ratio (74) and the derived demand for capital and labour (75) yields the











I set up the following system of equations in order to ￿nd the closed solution to the
model: the aggregate production function (1), the derived demand of intermediate goods
(4), the optimal capital/labour ratio (74), the price functions (77, 4, 3), and the input
factors markets clearing conditions (76).
Thus, I ￿nd that, within sector s, ￿rm n;s relative price is inversely proportional to































Thus, the industry level relative price turns out to be an decreasing function of the
labour inelastically supplied in that sector, ￿ Ls, the capital inelastically supplied in that
sector, Ks, and the industry level aggregate productivity, ￿s; indeed, it also results to
be scaled up by a function of all the industry level aggregate productivities, and exoge-
165nous capital and labour supplies. Particularly, notice that in this case, di⁄erently from
competitive economies showed before, the demand elasticities are not an argument of this
function.
Following, I describe the equations relative to sector level rental and wage rates. On
the one hand, in sector s, the equilibrium real interest rate, is, di⁄erently from the other
two competitive economies illustrated before, turns out to be an increasing function of
the sector speci￿c demand elasticity, ￿s, and the sector speci￿c aggregate productivity,
￿s:Of course, the more capital intensive the sector, the lower the equilibrium interest rate.
Finally, the real price of capital in equilibrium is also scaled up by a function of all both
























On the other side, the equilibrium sector relative wage rate results to be a function of the
same parameters as the equilibrium interest rate. Of course, in this case, the equilibrium
wage is increasing with respect to the sector speci￿c capital intensity. Particularly, with
respect to the labour segmented competitive economy, it also depends on the industry
speci￿c exogenous capital supply, Ks:
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Factor allocation and ￿nal output
Next, I present the aggregate economy production, that is given by a CES aggrega-
tion of industry level outputs. In turn, the latter come from simple C-D functions, which
have sector speci￿c exogeneous supplies of capital and labour along with aggregate pro-
ductivity as arguments. Particularly, di⁄erently from both the fully integrated economy
and the labour segmented economy, demand elasticities are not included within the ag-


















On the other hand, at the ￿rm level, production depends on both a sector level average of
both capital and labour inelastic supplies and the relative productivity of the intermediate
good producer. Of course, the more e¢ cient the individual ￿rm n;s, the larger the share of
the industry aggregate output Y # it will produce. Indeed, even at this level of production,















Finally, factor allocation of capital and labour at the ￿rm level is a function of the
average exogeneous allocation of the production resources, respectively, ￿ Ks and ￿ Ls, and
the relative e¢ ciency of the ￿rm. Crucially, in this case, distribution of factors do not
depend at all on the within industry demand elasticity (labour is actually allocated in
the same manner as in the labour segmented economy). Thus, if both the input factors
markets are segmented at the sector level, then there is no distortion coming from demand






























Finally, as fairly intuitively, if both capital and labour were segmented at the industrial
sector level, then it would be possible to replace the ￿rst best solution by exogenously
allocating in each sector as much capital and labour as the Social Planner would do. In











So, if both capital and labour are allocated according to the Social Planner solution, the
MRS will exactly match the MRT:




A.2 Construction of categories of four-digit C.O.I.C.O.P. items
Following is the list of the 58 products, classi￿ed according to the four-digit C.O.I.C.O.P
nomenclature and grouped in seven broader categories, for which OECD provides CPI
weights:
￿ Food: Bread and cereals; Meat; Fish and seafood; Milk, cheese and eggs; Oils and
fats; Fruit; Vegetables; Sugar, jam, honey, chocolate and confectionery; Food prod-
ucts n.e.c.; Non-alcoholic beverages; Alcoholic beverages; Tobacco.
167￿ Housing: Actual rentals for housing; Imputed rentals for housing; Materials for the
maintenance and repair of the drilling; Services for the maintenance and repair of
the drilling; Water supply; Miscellaneous services relating to the drilling; Electricity;
Gas; Liquid fuels; Solid fuels; Heat energy; Furniture and furnishings, carpets and
other ￿ oor coverings; Household textiles; Household appliances; Glassware, table-
ware and household utensils; Tools and equipment for house and garden; Goods
and services for routine household maintenance; Restaurants, cafØs and the like;
Canteens; Accommodation services.
￿ Apparel: Clothing and Footwear.
￿ Transportation and Communication: Purchase of vehicles; Spare parts and acces-
sories for personal transport equipment; Fuels and lubricants for personal transport
equipment; Maintenance and repair of personal transport equipment; Other ser-
vices in respect of personal transport equipment; Transport services; Postal services
Telephone and telefax equipment and services.
￿ Medical Care: Medical products, appliances and equipment; Out-patient services;
Hospital services.
￿ Education and Recreation: Education; Audio-visual, photographic and information
processing equipment; Other major durables for recreation and culture; Other
recreational items and equipment, gardens and pets; Recreational and sporting
services; Cultural services; Games of chance; Newspapers, books and stationery;
Package holidays.
￿ Other goods: Personal care; Personal e⁄ects n.e.c; Social protection; Insurance; Fi-
nancial services n.e.c.; Other services n.e.c.
Table A-1 (I and II part) below presents means and standard deviations of CPI weights
calculated across the items within each of the broad categories country by country. Note
that in the Apparel sector is not reported because it includes only one good, that is
Clothing and footwear.
168Table A-1 (I part)
CPI weights (means and s.d.￿ s across sectors)
US Canada Mexico
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Food 0:96 0:51 1:34 0:82 2:43 2:27
Housing 2:26 5:0 2:00 3:75 1:56 2:75
Transport and Communications 2:20 2:05 2:65 2:09 2:17 2:18
Medical care 1:84 0:89 0:73 0:66 1:14 1:23
Education and Recreation 1:01 0:79 1:18 0:82 0:91 1:14
Other goods 1:10 1:12 0:54 1:04 0:67 1:32
Source: OECD database
Table A-1 (II part)
CPI weights (means and s.d.￿ s across sectors)
Japan Germany UK
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Food 1:8 1:01 1:17 0:67 1:35 0:83
Housing 1:87 3:10 2:19 4:69 1:86 2:84
Transport and Communication 1:44 1:04 2:05 1:21 2:21 1:61
Medical care 1:27 0:92 1:18 0:55 0:83 0:40
Education and Recreation 1:57 1:3 1:30 0:77 2:14 0:96
Other goods 0:97 0:11 1:17 0:86 1:07 0:92
Source: OECD database
A.3 Home bias evidence
The list of 2-digit (ISIC 3 Rev.) industries used for the empirical analysis presented in
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 in the Introduction section and in the next cases (Figure A-1,
Figure A-2, Figure A-3, Figure A-4, Figure A-5) follows: Agriculture, hunting, forestry
and ￿shing; Mining and quarrying; Food products, beverages and tobacco; Textiles, textile
products, leather and footIar; Wood and products of wood and cork; Pulp, paper, paper
products, printing and publishing; Coke, re￿ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel;
Chemicals and chemical products; Rubber and plastics products; Other non-metallic min-
eral products; Basic metals; Fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment;
Machinery and equipment n.e.c; O¢ ce, accounting and computing machinery; Electrical
machinery and apparatus n.e.c; Radio, television and communication equipment; Med-
ical, precision and optical instruments; Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; Other
transport equipment; Manufacturing n.e.c; recycling; Electricity, gas and water supply;
Construction; Wholesale and retail trade; repairs; Hotels and restaurants; Transport and
storage; Post and telecommunications; Finance and insurance; Real estate activities; Rent-
169ing of machinery and equipment; Computer and related activities; Research and develop-
ment; Other Business Activities; Public admin. and defence; compulsory social security;
Education; Health and social work; Other community, social and personal services.
Figure A-1 and Figure A-2 show that ￿nal consumption, gross output and the number
of ￿rms at the 2-digit industry level are positively correlated in both the US and the UK
even ten years before the period considered in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 (i.e. middle
1990s). In more detail, it seems that such a correlation was even stronger for the US at
that time.
Finally, Figure A-3, Figure A-4 and Figure A-5 show ￿nal household consumption,
gross output and number of enterprises at the 2-digit industry level in the early 2000s for,
respectively, the US , the UK and, moreover, Germany (just recall, as shown in Table 4.1,
that the latter has been one of the top international trading partners for the US since the
1980s45) So, it seems that also in Germany, even though at a lesser extent than in the US
and in the UK, there is home bias as long as industries whose products are more consumed
are also those industries with a larger number of active enterprises.
Figure A-1. Home bias. US, mid 1990s
45Note that SSIS does not provide the number of enterprises at the 2-digit industry level for Canada,
Japan and Mexico (and for Germany in 1990s). Nevertheless to say, no data were available for China, as
the latter does not belong to OECD.
170Figure A-2. Home bias. UK, mid 1990s
Figure A-3. Home bias. US, early 2000s
171Figure A-4. Home bias. UK, early 2000s
Figure A-5. Home bias. Germany, early 2000s
A.4 Construction of price indeces
The change in both producer and consumer price indeces is measured by expenditure
share-weighted averages of the change in prices of individual ￿rms. In more detail, accord-
ing to this procedure, the change in the price index from time t ￿ 1 to time t takes into
account only the price changes of individual ￿rms that sell in both the time periods. In
fact, as shown during the description of the model, aggregate productivity shocks crucially
172a⁄ects the marginal costs of ￿rms and, then, prices and pro￿ts. Therefore, the number
of competitors can change between the two periods due to ￿xed costs of production and
export. Thus, changes in aggregate prices indeces are constructed according to the follow-
ing de￿nitions. Note that subscripts denote country (i = 1;2) , sector (j = 1;:::;J) and
￿rm (domestic ￿rm:k = 1;:::;K; foreign ￿rm: k = K + 1;:::;2K). Furthermore, the level
of variables at time t (after the aggregate productivity shock) is indicated with a prime,
while the level of variables at time t￿1 (before the aggregate shock) is indicated without
the prime.
Thus, in country 1, the PPI change is given by summing up prices changes by domestic




























Note that the market share held by each ￿rm k within its sector j in country i is de￿ned
by (53), while the market share held by each sector j within the whole national economy





Furthermore, note that changes in prices charged in country 1 are weighted by both ￿rm
level and sector level market shares related to country 1, while price charged in country
2 are weighted by market shares related to country 2. In addition, the CPI change in





























Turning to country 2, the PPI change is given by summing prices up changes by ￿rms




























On the other side, the CPI change in country 2 is given by summing up price changes by
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